

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

ON THE AFTER-EFFECT OF SEEN MOVEMENT. Cambridge, University Press, 1911.

PLEASURE–UNPLEASURE. AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION ON THE FEELING ELEMENTS. Cambridge, University Press, 1919.

ON MEMORY AND THE DIRECTION OF ASSOCIATIONS. *British Journal of Psychology*, 1913, v, pp. 447–465.

SIMULTANEOUS AND SUCCESSIVE ASSOCIATION. *British Journal of Psychology*, 1915, vii, pp. 434–452.

ON THE FEELINGS AND THEIR NEURAL CORRELATE, WITH AN EXAMINATION OF THE NATURE OF PAIN. *British Journal of Psychology*, 1917, viii, pp. 423–476.

THE INFLUENCE OF FEELING UPON MEMORY. *British Journal of Psychology*, 1923, xiii, pp. 405–416.

ZWEI NEUE APPARATE ZUR UNTERSUCHUNG DES TEMPERATURSINNES DER HAUT. *Zeitschrift für Sinnesphysiologie*, 1913, Bd. 47, pp. 412–419.

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

BY

A. WOHLGEMUTH, D.Sc. (Lond.)

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Schwärmer prägen den Stempel des Geistes auf Lügen und Unsinn ;
Wem der Probierstein fehlt, hält sie für redliches Gold.

GOETHE (*Epigramme*).

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PREFACE

It must have been about 1910 that I first became interested in Psycho-analysis. The idea that the dream was an expression of an unconscious wish appealed to me for a moment, but I soon came to the conclusion that this was evidently not the case with many dreams. The distinction of the latent dream-thoughts from the manifest dream-content being then pointed out to me, my interest was renewed, and I decided to study Freud's writings. I acquired all those published until then in book-form and perused them in their chronological order. I admit that there was much that I could not follow and more that appeared to be without proof. However, I went on reading in order to get a general grasp of the subject, thinking that on a second perusal and closer study, those parts would then become clear, and that they would fit into a general whole. One of the last works which I read was *Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensen's Gradiva*. This booklet was a very disagreeable surprise. Freud had vouched in the *Traumdeutung* for the accuracy of his analyses by stating that the latent dream-thoughts were arrived at from the manifest dream-content by the dreamer's own free associations, and that their constituting a comprehensible whole, fitting well into the dreamer's life, was a confirmatory proof. But here the *Gradiva* dreams were never dreamt, they were a poet's phantasy; the dreamer furnished no free associations, and yet Freud construed them into a comprehensible whole, fitting well into an imaginary dreamer's life. This showed conclusively that, even if Freud's theory was all he claimed

for it, it was quite useless as a means of penetrating to the "latent dream-thoughts." In a more critical frame of mind I returned to the study of Freud's writings, with the results which I have stated in the following pages. From the foregoing remarks it is clear that I approached the subject without bias, with a perfectly open mind. Freud's propensity to the sexual did not influence me in the least. The reading of the Œdipus-Complex affected me in the same way as I was affected when I first realized that the cherished religious beliefs of my childhood had to be jettisoned; however, I soon made peace with myself.

Nach Wahrheit streb' ich ja allein!

Truth may be stifled for a while, but still it remains the truth to the end of time.

I have stated at the end of the book the reasons why I abstained until now from publishing these results and the reasons which induce me to publish them now.

I am sorry that I have had to criticize some good friends rather severely. I would have gladly changed Quintillian's *Propositum illud* to *Potius dictum quam amicum perdendi*, but my case would have suffered. I had to expose the inherent absurdity of Freud's teaching, and "*Ce n'est que le ridicule qui tue.*"

Quamquam ridentem dicere verum
Quid vetat?

says Horace. However, I console myself with the knowledge that my said friends and I labour for the same common purpose, that is, the establishment of Truth.

A. WOHLGEMUTH.

Rutland Lodge, Shortlands, Kent.
August, 1923.

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A Critical Examination of Psycho-analysis

I

PSYCHOLOGICAL STATEMENT

Rien n'est beau que le vrai; le vrai seul est aimable.
BOILEAU.

PSYCHOLOGY is, literally, the Science of the Soul. Like other exact sciences—for Psychology is to-day, like Physics, Chemistry, Biology, etc., an exact science—like other exact sciences, I say, psychology has to keep clear of all metaphysical speculation. Therefore, for the psychologist of to-day, *the term Soul denotes nothing but the sum-total of the psychic dispositions and psychic processes.* "Since psychology," says Wundt,[1] "sets itself to-day the task, not to construct the actuality of the psychic life on the basis of superficial generalizations, but to analyse it in all its phases, and this, as far as possible, with the help of exact methods, it has therefore no use for any other conception of the soul than just this, that *the soul is nothing else but the psychic phenomena.*"

"The totality of the psychic phenomena," to quote Alfred Lehmann,[2] "the self, its conditions and activities, is termed the "*Soul*" in scientific psychology. The Soul has, therefore, a much wider range than consciousness, for it signifies not only that which at the moment

[1] *Grundzüge d. physiol. Psychologie*, 5te Aufl., 1903, iii, p. 761; 6te Aufl., 1911, iii, p. 738.
[2] *Grundzüge der Psychophysiologie*, 1912, p. 15.

is actually present in consciousness, but also that which is past and that which may possibly appear there."

I will give just one other quotation, viz. from Stout[1]: "There are three ways in which dispositions may be regarded by the psychologist. Primarily he knows them by the manner in which they operate in determining psychical processes. It is from this point of view that he is led in the first instance to *posit* their existence at all. So regarded, they are merely permanent possibilities of psychical process. But, of course, they must in reality be more than this. A naked possibility is nothing. A possibility must be founded in the constitution of actual existence. What kind of actual existence does a psychical disposition possess? It is sometimes said to be an unconscious state, or modification of the subject, and the subject considered as the possessor of such unconscious states or modifications is called a soul. Against this I have nothing to say. It may well be nearer to the ultimate truth than any other statement. But to the psychologist this conception of the soul is not helpful. He has no independent means of knowing anything about it which could be useful to him. For him *the term 'Soul' is virtually only another name for the total system of psychical dispositions and psychical processes.*[2] But he has another clue which is more useful. Psychical dispositions, as well as psychical processes, have physiological correlates in states of nervous tissue. A psychical disposition is represented on the physiological side by a permanent modification of the substance of the brain. This may be called a physiological disposition. I do not say that the physiological disposition is identical with the psychical. But the two correspond in such a way that for psychological purposes it is within the limits a valid procedure to treat them as identical."

[1] *Groundwork of Psychology*, 2nd ed., 1903, pp. 8 *seq.*
[2] Italics are mine.

Having defined, then, the soul as the sum total of psychic processes and psychic dispositions, the question arises, what is a psychic process and what is a psychic disposition? A psychic disposition is a disposition to a psychic process; but more of this anon. A psychic process is a "soulish" or conscious process, a process of consciousness—and consciousness—?—well, I cannot give a definition of consciousness. Consciousness cannot be defined. If, for instance, Rudolf Eisler [1] states: "Consciousness is called that which is generic of all psychic processes, their common essence, their character as experience. . . . Consciousness is not an entity, activity, or quality existing by itself, apart from experiences, but is given in and with the psychic (in different degrees of activity and clearness)," he tells us what consciousness is *not*, but he does not tell us what consciousness *is*. And other philosophers are no more explicit. I can only refer the conscious questioner to his own experience and tell him: Since you are conscious you know what is meant by consciousness.

Although consciousness cannot then be defined, I am yet able to make statements about conscious processes. I can, for instance, say that the total conscious processes at any one moment can be split up into part processes. Whilst I am looking at the fire I can at the same time enjoy its warmth, listen to some music, and, perchance, be aware of the discomfort of a slight toothache, and so on. I can also say that some of these processes are clearer and more definite than others, that some are permanent and persistent, others transient or intermittent. When I do all this for the purpose of observation I am, what is technically called, introspecting, I am analysing my conscious processes, I am performing a *Psychic Analysis*.

It may here be expedient to warn the reader against the temptation of forming his fundamental psychological

[1] *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*, 3te Aufl., 1910, i, p. 178.

conceptions from certain convenient but loose ways of speaking and writing. One meets often with phrases like the following: An idea enters into, or passes out of, consciousness; a sensation rises above, or sinks below, the threshold of consciousness, etc. The psychologist knows what is meant by such statements, and frequently uses them himself; to eschew them would be pedantic. But it would be fatal to a clear grasp of the science of psychology to be misled by this picturesque description of psychic processes, and we shall have ample opportunity of studying examples out of number where such misleading has occurred. The idea or sensation of the psychologist can no more be separated, or thought of apart, from consciousness, than the grin can be separated, or thought of apart, from the cat. The idea or sensation *is* consciousness, *is* the conscious process. To separate the content of consciousness from the conscious process is fallacious. It is equally fallacious to talk about an unconscious psychic process, that is an unconscious conscious process. This is nonsensical, being a contradiction in terms. But I shall revert to this later.

Consciousness is a process, always going on, going forward, constantly changing, never remaining stationary, and never being in all respects the same at succeeding moments. It has been likened to a stream, and this metaphor is a fairly happy one, since it emphasizes the dynamic character of consciousness. This flux, this stream of consciousness consists of many part processes, some of which are more vivid and more intense than others; they are like the middle of the stream where the current is greater, they are the focal processes, or, if the warning given above be heeded, we may use the convenient phrase: they are in the focus of consciousness. The group of processes which constitutes the idea of the Self or Ego is, in the normal subject, always present, it is the fundamental process, and to it all the other and constantly

changing processes are related or referred. It binds them all, so to speak, together, connects them to itself, and hence to one another. This fact will explain, what at first sight might have appeared a difficulty, that the stream of consciousness can be observed so as to make statements about it and ascertain its laws. This can be done with a fair amount of efficiency, and with proper training and practice this efficiency is vastly improved and great accuracy can be attained. If, then, one of my mental processes is that of observing and emphasizing parts of other simultaneous processes, I am what is technically called *introspecting*. Owing to the disposition of neural tissue (I shall revert to this presently), after the cessation of the psychic process it is possible to produce a fresh psychic process similar to the previous one, i.e. in usual language, to remember, to recall, to revive it. When this is done for the purpose of psychological observation, we are *retrospecting*. Many psychologists hold that all Introspection is really Retrospection, but I consider this view to be incorrect. I am quite sure that I can observe a psychic act during its occurrence, catch a thought, or idea, or perception, etc., on the wing, as it were. Nay, more: I hold that the so-called Retrospection is, after all, nothing else but Introspection, the *simultaneous observation of a revived process.*

I have just spoken of a disposition of the neural tissue, but before I go into this question, which will lead me on to Memory and Association, I must consider Psychophysical Relations, what is called the relation of Body and Mind, of Brain and Consciousness. It has been proved beyond any reasonable doubt that a correlation exists between psychic processes and processes in brain-cells or neurones, but what the relations of these processes exactly are cannot be affirmed with the same certainty, and several hypotheses have been formulated. These need not detain me, however, and I shall be content with

a mere reference to one or two of them. Some psychologists hold that these processes are identical, some that the psychic and the neural are but two aspects of the same process, like the concave and the convex sides of a curve. I cannot see a great difference between these two views. Another and more non-committal view is that of psycho-physical parallelism, viz. that parallel to the neural processes there run psychical processes and vice versa. Many psychologists are inclined to favour what is termed the " Energetic " view, according to which consciousness is a form of energy. The blood circulating in the brain supplies it with highly complex chemical substances. Owing to their complex structure chemical potential energy is stored in them. These substances are taken up, assimilated, by the brain-cells. By the breaking down of these neurone-substances into simpler substances, energy is liberated, and this is psychic or conscious energy, which immediately changes again into other forms of energy, probably heat. Alfred Lehmann puts the energetic conception of consciousness very clearly.[1] " Energy exists in several different forms, of which some occur very frequently, whilst others are produced under quite special conditions. The psychic can be regarded as such a form of energy which has, up to the present, been shown to exist only in the central nervous system. This form of energy . . . has not only physical but also psychical properties, and it is produced, like any other form of energy, only by transformation of other kinds of energy. Looked at objectively, there is evident in the brain an uninterrupted physical causal sequence. Looked at subjectively, a psychical causal sequence appears only there, where during the energy transformation psychical energy is produced. This theory is therefore simply a ' partial identity doctrine,' which to the ordinary parallelism has the advantage that it does not postulate anything

[1] *Grundzüge der Psychophysiologie*, 1912, p. 28.

psychical in inorganic nature, where in fact it cannot even be suspected."

Or, again, Ostwald[1]: "When the organism has been exhausted by non-mental activity, we can point . . . to the expenditure of energy, mostly mechanical, as the cause of this exhaustion. Here do not occur in our consciousness in any way processes which are comparable with those of mental exertion. It is rather, in contradiction to the theory of parallelism, that psychic processes are impeded by the expenditure of mechanical energy. This is seen, for instance, that on a march that has been continued to exhaustion the last stages are completed almost unconsciously, and psychical activity is strictly confined to that required for the mechanical work. (*Note.*—It is therefore a great error, fraught with grave consequences, that is committed by overwrought mental workers, if they attempt to restore their impaired vital economy by violent bodily exertion. What they require is a supply of energy, and only such bodily movement is required as will enable the organism to assimilate the ingested food. At the same time it is appropriate to endeavour by means of a light and different occupation, as heterogeneous as possible to the old one, to recuperate the misused brain-parts.) These facts all suggest that with the psychical processes we have to do with the generation and transformation of a special kind of energy. . . . The above-mentioned facts correspond with the Transformation theory, in that all mental activity is accompanied by energy-transformation, and in that, on a first approximation, the transformation is proportional to the amount of the activity. We can assume that the used-up chemical energy has been employed to produce psychic energy. This psychic energy is, however, of short duration, which coincides with the psychic process. When this psychic

[1] Wilhelm Ostwald: *Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie*, 2te Aufl., 1902, pp. 376 *seq.*

process is completed, then the corresponding quantity of energy is also changed into another form of energy, probably heat."

A word or two next on the classification of the psychic phenomena. Since Kant, the tripartite division of mental processes is the one generally adopted by psychologists. According to this classification all elementary psychic processes can be referred to one or other of the three classes: Cognition, Affection, Conation—Knowing, Feeling, Striving. The first class, Cognition, or Knowing, is by far the largest and most diversified. All the thousands of kinds of sensations, auditory, visual, gustatory, olfactory, thermal, tactile, etc., belong to this. They are worked up into percepts, concepts, ideas; they enter into the functions of thought, reasoning, and so on. The second class, that of Affection or Feeling, contains only two elements, namely, those of Pleasure and Unpleasure; Pleasure and Pain, as they used to be wrongly called in the older psychology. I say wrongly, and emphasize this point, because the loose terminology has given rise to endless confusion of thought. For Pain is a sensation, and not a feeling; its feeling-tone, i.e. the feeling attached to it, is generally that of decided Unpleasure, yet pain may be without any feeling-tone, it may be neutral, or it may in some cases even have a pleasant feeling-element attached to it.[1] Pleasure and Unpleasure are *not* two directions of the same process, from either of which one may pass to the other through a zero-point, but they are two different kinds of processes, just as the sensations of warmth and cold are two different kinds of sensations, the different end-organs for which have, in fact, been demonstrated. Another point I wish to emphasize in this connection is this. Since all the different forms of psychophysical parallelism postulate that there is a

[1] Cf. A. Wohlgemuth: *Pleasure-Unpleasure. An Experimental Investigation on the Feeling-Elements.* Cambridge University Press, 1919.

neural process corresponding to each psychical process, it follows that there must be a neural process also for Pleasure and Unpleasure respectively. However perfectly evident this reasoning appears, it has been constantly violated by psychologists, who, inconsistent with their premises, try to account for feeling by the ratio of assimilation to dissimilation in the neurones, or to cerebral hyperæmia, or anæmia, etc.[1]

The third and last class of the elementary psychic processes is that of Conation or Striving, in the older psychology wrongly termed Willing. Here it appears to me we have only a single element, viz. striving. The striving may be striving towards or striving away, attraction or aversion. "Nolle fieri" is, as Thomas Aquinas puts it, "velle non fieri." Introspectively I fail to detect in attraction and aversion any difference except the direction of striving.

The very complex compound psychical processes known as "Emotions," e.g. anger, fear, joy, etc., are, in psychological textbooks generally, treated in connection with feeling. Although, owing to the fact that organic sensations enter so largely into the composition of the emotions, their feeling-tone is very pronounced, yet I hold that the conative element forms a still greater and the more important part.

A point of great consequence that is to be noticed in connection with the "Stream of Consciousness," etc., already referred to above, is that the constituent simultaneous processes are not all of the same importance, intensity, or clearness. Some predominate, and others are of smaller varying intensity, etc. The most prominent processes are figuratively spoken of as being in the *focus of consciousness*; we say we *attend* to them. If we indulge

[1] Cf. A. Wohlgemuth: "On the Feelings and their Neural Correlate with an Examination of the Nature of Pain," *Brit. Journ. of Psychology*, 1917, viii, pp. 423 *seq.*



Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3



Fig. 4

in a pictorial phantasy and imagine that we could fix the stream of consciousness and make a cross-section at a given moment, then we might represent the cross-section at a moment of fair attention by Fig. 1, where the lengths of the vertical lines would indicate the intensity, clearness, prominence, vividness, etc., of the respective component psychic processes. Here several processes are of moderate intensity, etc., quite a number of smaller and of small intensity, etc. Fig. 2 would represent a case of closely applied attention. Here only a few processes of great intensity, etc., and not many of small intensity, etc., are present. A case of a passive attitude of mind would be represented by Fig. 3, where there are a great number of processes, but all of very slight intensity, vividness, etc.

I have purposely refrained from making use of the figure generally given in psychological textbooks, and here produced in Fig. 4 to illustrate the Focus and Fringe of consciousness. The base-line is generally meant to represent the threshold of consciousness. The curve can be produced beyond the horizontal line, as indicated by the dotted portion, but what does it there represent? —Unconscious consciousness?—This is, as I said before, a contradiction in terms, an absurdity, and psychology has no use for it. The "Unconscious" is not a scientific conception; it is mysticism and mythology.

The vertical lines in my diagrams represent sections across the constituent psychical process that make up the total stream which is supposed to flow at right angles to the plane of the paper, and their lengths in the total cross-section would indicate their intensity, clearness, prominence, vividness, etc. Now, I hold that with these factors another one goes hand in hand, namely the "Meaning." The lengths of the lines in the diagrams indicate, then, also the amount of "Meaning" of the constituent psychic processes. It is necessary to make

this technical term clear to the psychologically untrained reader. Suppose a man sees an orange for the first time in his life. It is for him at first only a coloured spherical body. He learns its name, and on handling the object he becomes aware of its temperature, of the relative smoothness of its surface, of its elasticity, and its characteristic smell. He learns that it is a fruit, on peeling it notices its structure, and finally he discovers its taste. Seeing an orange on some subsequent occasion all these details, then, having once been conscious processes, may come back, or can be brought back to consciousness, i.e. the visual experience of an orange will occasion conscious processes similar to previous ones, the tactile, thermal, olfactory, gustatory, and other experiences may be "recalled," "revived," or "remembered." On a later occasion the name "orange" need not bring back all these details in their entirety, but the word has "acquired a meaning," it simply just means an orange.

How are we now to represent to ourselves the neural correlates of this *Meaning*? I conceive it in this way. To all those manifold psychic experiences that occur on those occasions when new facts about the orange were learnt there corresponded physiological processes in numbers of neurone-groups, and connections between these groups were established; with the cessation of the physiological and corresponding psychical processes the neurone-groups and their connections remained modified, and *dispositions* to be more easily excited together were established; Associations were formed, as the psychologist would say. When, then, on this future occasion the word orange is seen or heard, all these groups of neurones are, owing to the said formed associations, set, more or less, in an incipient state of excitation, and to them there exist, then, corresponding psychic processes of small intensity, clearness, etc., which constitute the acquired meaning of the word orange.

To make clear to my reader the term *Meaning*, as used in psychology, I have had recourse to neurological conceptions, and I shall do so again. Now, some authors have taken exception to the psychologist's reference to "*Nervous dispositions.*" Thus, to give an instance, Havelock Ellis says: "Some psychologists strongly dislike the word 'subconscious,' they are even disposed to argue that there is no subconscious mind, and that before and after the stage of 'awareness,' psychic facts only exist as 'dispositions of brain-cells.' The psychologist, however, as such, has no concern with brain-cells, which belong to the histologist." [1] This is right enough as far as it goes, but the psychologist has still less business to indulge in mysticism and obscurantism. To talk about "psychic facts before and after the stage of 'awareness'" is surely nonsensical, for the essential of a psychic fact is just this awareness. To account for facts before and after the existence of psychic facts, to formulate a working hypothesis, the psychologist avails himself of the knowledge of facts ascertained by the neurologist. Here, at least, he still deals with facts instead of launching out into phantasies. A "Disposition of brain-cells" *is* of direct concern to the psychologist, for it is likely to influence the function of other brain-cells, *to affect psychic facts*, just as the light from an electric lamp, to choose an analogy, falling on a Selenium bridge in the circuit changes the latter's conductivity, increases the resistance of the circuit, and hence diminishes its own intensity. Elsewhere [2] Havelock Ellis says with reference to this subject: "Such explanations are as much outside the psychologist's sphere as the old-fashioned explanations by reference to God and the Devil." Well, we have at least demonstrated the existence of brain-cells, we have handled them and experimented with them, but we have

[1] Havelock Ellis: *The World of Dreams*, London, 1911, p. 4, note.
[2] Loc. cit., p. 258.

not done anything of the sort with either God or the Devil. In referring to "disposition of brain-cells," we refer still to facts—whereas referring psychic processes (i.e. conscious processes) to a subconscious or unconscious region, like assigning them to God, or to the Devil, is to obfuscate the discussion.

"A certain natural process may not be attributed to those of chemistry," says Sir T. Clifford Allbutt,[1] "until those of physics are proved to be inadequate; to another process biological conceptions and methods are denied until those of physics first, and then of chemistry, have been tried and found wanting; psychological conceptions are denied to another until in their turns the physical, the chemical, and the physiological are exhausted, and so on; and within each category the same economy prevails." "*Nemo psychologus nisi prius physiologus*," said Johannes Müller; and William of Ockham, "*Entia non sunt multiplicanda.*"

Ideas, sense-perceptions, and other psychic experiences are not entities that enjoy an independent existence in or out of consciousness, and when out of consciousness continue in the "Subconscious," or "Preconscious," or "Unconscious," or what not. All that can be said about them is that they are psychic processes, and when the psychic process is finished, there are no ideas, or sense-perceptions, etc. We know that psychic processes are correlated with, probably they depend upon, neural processes. When the psychic process has terminated, we infer that this is because the neural process has ceased. We also know that it is possible to renew psychic processes, some in almost the same, some in modified, form. How is this to be explained? The same neurone-groups whose excitation corresponded to, or gave rise to, the psychical experience are excited again in a similar manner, because the previous experience had left a *disposition* in those

[1] *Science and Mediæval Thought*, The Harveian Oration of 1900, p. 57.

neurone-groups to be thus excited. This is the physiological basis of " Psychological Memory."

Memory has been defined as the ability to remember, i.e. to reproduce, to renew, to revive, past psychical experiences. Now this is, strictly speaking, not correct. To take an example : This morning I had breakfast, and I can remember a great number of details, a few of which will suffice here for my purpose. I have visual memory-images of the breakfast-room and of the breakfast-table laid out, of the coffee-pot, milk-jug, cups and saucers, cruet, marmalade-jar, etc. ; I have compound gustatory-tactile-thermal images of the taste of the porridge, and of the eggs and bacon and tomatoes ; I have an olfactory image of the smell of the coffee, and auditory images of the postman's knock and the barking of the dog, and so on. Giving myself up to this memory experience, I *know* it is not exactly a reproduction, a renewal, a revival, a second edition of this morning's sense experience. If I close my eyes and shade them, my field of vision, after a little while, becomes quite dark, and with the exception of the *Eigenlicht* of the retina, I cannot discover anything. Peep I may, as much as I like, into the darkness, not the faintest trace of the white of the tablecloth, or the gold rim of the cups and saucers, or the red of the tomatoes can I discover, not a vestige of a visual sensation. Nevertheless, I " see " the breakfast-table quite plainly and vividly with the " *Mind's Eye,*" as it is commonly expressed. That these memory-images are faint reproductions of the sensations, i.e. weak sensations, sensations of low intensity, is decidedly not true in my case, they are an experience *sui generis.* I consider myself a good visualizer, but how much I differ from other good visualizers, or from poor ones, and in what way, I cannot say, nor how much of any apparent difference is due to the difficulty and poverty of description. Of all my different kinds of memory-images the olfactory ones are, I believe,

the faintest and most indistinct. Similar remarks apply to the memory-images of the other senses. If, then, revival or reproduction are spoken of, these terms must not be understood literally. It would be well if Semon's term [1] "*Ekphory*," verb "*to ekphore*," were more generally adopted by psychologists. Another term introduced by Semon is "*Engram*." By this is meant the trace, mark, modification, impression, the neuro-psychic disposition, or whatever we may call it, that is made and left behind, speaking objectively, by a stimulus upon the nervous system, or, speaking subjectively, by a psychical experience upon the mind or soul.

Closely connected with Memory and Ekphory is the phenomenon of "*Association*." By this term is described in psychology the fact that if, say, two psychic processes occur simultaneously, or in close succession, the ekphory of the one of them tends to produce the ekphory of the other. E.g., a man coming again into a place where he has been before is apt to remember other details of his first visit—who accompanied him, the subject of the conversation, etc. If somebody pronounces in my hearing the words "to be or not to be," and then stops short, immediately the subsequent words "that is the question, etc.," will occur to me. If I see a man with a pronounced aquiline nose, he may remind me of the Duke of Wellington, and so on. The phenomenon of Association has received a considerable amount of attention, and a number of "Laws of Association" have been formulated, e.g. the Laws of Similarity, of Partial Identity, of Contrast, of Contiguity in time and space, etc. But these laws, one and all, can be reduced to a single one; in fact, there is only *one* Law of Association, namely that of Simultaneity of occurrence of the neural processes that correspond

[1] Richard Semon: *Die Mneme als erhaltendes Prinzip im Wechsel des organischen Geschehens*, 2te Aufl., Leipzig, 1908. *Die Mnemischen Empfindungen*, etc., Leipzig, 1909. English translation: *The Mneme*, published by George Allen and Unwin, London, 1921.

to the given psychical processes.[1] I have laid stress upon *neural* processes, for when a psychic process ceases the neural process need not have ceased. The neural process has to be of a certain intensity to have a corresponding psychic process, and as the neural process does not cease all at once, but gradually dies away, it follows that after the cessation of the psychic process there is still a period of constantly diminishing neural activity, the "*akoluthic phase*" of Richard Semon. It will now be seen that two succeeding psychic processes may have two neural processes whose existences are partially simultaneous, namely the akoluthic phase of the first process with the conscious phase of the second process. The simultaneous functioning of two neurone-groups renders the nervous paths connecting them more easily passable, they are *facilitated*, their resistance is reduced. This is the neural basis of the phenomenon of Association. The disposition to renewed activity of the neurone-groups and the influence of the activity of one group upon the activity of other groups through Association is the neural correlate of what is generally known as "Memory." But as it has been shown that similar dispositions to renewed activity and the influence of the activity of one group upon the activity of other groups obtains also among other kinds of cells, it has been found expedient to extend the term "Memory" to this disposition in general, and Ewald Hering, in a lecture before the *Wiener Akademie der Wissenschaften* in 1870, pronounced Memory as a general function of organized matter.[2]

This general function of organized matter termed "Memory" happens, then, according to certain "Laws of Associations," but as these laws become modified as

[1] *Vide* A. Wohlgemuth: "Simultaneous and Successive Association," *Brit. Journ. of Psychology*, 1915, vii, pp. 434 *seq.*

[2] A translation of Hering's paper is to be found in Samuel Butler's *Unconscious Memory*.

we rise in the evolutionary scale of organized matter, I have suggested[1] distinguishing biological, physiological, and psychological memories respectively, according to the science in whose province it falls to investigate the laws. It has generally been held that all association proceeded according to the same general law, viz. that of "Forward Conduction." This is to say, supposing a sequence of processes *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, . . . has happened, then, on the renewed occurrence of *c*, *d* would happen, not *b*. Now, while this is quite true with regard to the biological and physiological memories, yet, as I have been able to show,[2] it is not so with the psychological memory. Here, on the re-occurrence of *c*, *b* is just as likely to happen as *d*. In other words: the association in psychological memory is both forward and backward, it is equal in both directions.

I have now to go somewhat in detail into the question of the Influence of Feeling upon Memory, as it is of importance in the examination of the Psycho-analytic Theory. Is the ekphory of a past psychic process affected by the feeling-tone of that process? Is a pleasant experience or an unpleasant experience more easily, or less easily, remembered than a neutral one? This question cannot be answered off-hand, or by casual observation, but only by properly conducted psychological experiments. Now such experiments have been made, but as the conclusions of the various investigators appear, at first sight, to be at variance, I propose to examine them here critically. There is first the investigation by Kate Gordon.[3] In a first series of experiments coloured figures were exposed and protocols were taken. The number of correctly remembered items was used in conjunction

[1] A. Wohlgemuth: "On Memory and Direction of Associations," *Brit. Journ. of Psychology*, 1913, v, pp. 447 *seq.*

[2] Loc. cit.

[3] "Über das Gedächtnis für affektiv bestimmte Eindrücke," *Arch. f. die ges. Psychologie*, 1905, iv, pp. 437–458.

with the protocols. Three weeks later the pictures were shown again. As the number of experiments proved not to be sufficient, further experiments were made with fifty other black-and-white pictures. The result of these experiments are given in tables, and show that no marked general difference exists in the average number of the remembered points between the pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent groups. In a second series of experiments differently coloured squares arranged within larger squares were thrown upon a screen in a dark room. Forty figures were used, and the results are given again in two tables. From these the investigator concludes: "We can discover just as little difference in these experiments as in the previous series between the pleasant, unpleasant, and indifferent groups." The paper of Kate Gordon is followed by an article of Külpe, discussing and approving the preceding paper; and the fact that these experiments were conducted in his laboratory and under his direction is a guarantee that the investigation was made with care, thoroughness, and precision.

A paper by Wilhelm Peters,[1] which appeared in 1911, I will not discuss here, as this author himself in a later joint-paper[2] considered the number of experiments insufficient to come to any definite conclusion. In this latter investigation Peters and Němeček made use, as Peters did before, of the method of memory-associations. A stimulus-word was called out, and the subject had to react with a personal experience that came into his mind. When this was done the subject had to answer a number of questions put by the experimenter which had reference to the experience and the remembering of it. It was asked whether the experience at the time of its occurrence

[1] Gefühl und Erinnerung: "Beiträge zur Erinnerungs Analyse," *Psych. Arbeiten* (E. Kraepelin), 1911, vi, pp. 197–260.

[2] W. Peters and O. Němeček: "Massenversuche über Erinnerungs-assoziationen." "Fortschritte der Psych. und ihrer Anwendungen," 1914, ii, pp. 226–245.

was possessed of any feeling-tone, and, if so, what was this feeling-tone; further, whether at the moment of the remembering any feeling-tone was present and which; how long ago the experience occurred; how often a like experience had occurred, and how often it had been remembered. To the questions about the feeling-tone the subject had to state whether the experience was pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent; whether, when remembering, pleasure or unpleasure was present, or whether the remembering was indifferent, i.e. devoid of any feeling-tone. Some experiences were partly pleasantly toned, partly unpleasantly, also some recollections contained both pleasure as well as unpleasure components. In such cases the feeling-tone of the experience or of the recollection was called a "mixed tone." In the older investigation eight subjects took part, and 879 recollections were recorded. In the new investigation 146 students and school-children were employed, and 12,390 reactions were recorded, with 105 and 102 stimulus-words respectively. There are, however, some discrepancies in the figures given by the authors. The table of interest to us is their Table 3, which reads as follows:—

	118 Students.	28 School Children.	8 Adults.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Pleasure	50·2	56·2	65·0
Unpleasure	45·6	43·8	35·0
Mixed tone	4·2	—	5·0

This table entitles the authors to the conclusion that "by the subjects of all the three categories pleasantly toned experiences are more frequently remembered than unpleasantly toned ones," and I am quite prepared to accept it. But it is something totally different to say

that unpleasantly toned experiences are more easily forgotten than pleasantly toned ones. This conclusion is drawn from this investigation by some psycho-analysts, and is quite unwarranted, for it rests upon the assumption that pleasant and unpleasant experiences are equally numerous, which, of course, they are not. I shall below refer to Flügel's work on this subject. In the meantime suffice it to say that in the normal healthy human being pleasant experiences far outweigh the unpleasant ones, and only with pessimistic natures, melancholics, and hypochondriacs is the reverse the case. As the pleasant experiences outnumber the unpleasant ones, the same relations will obtain in the recollections, if pleasure and unpleasure are without influence upon memory, and as the proportions *are* apparently the same, the results of this investigation then would confirm the results of Kate Gordon's reported above. A confirmation of this is found in Table 6 of Peter's and Němeček, which I give here :—

Age	10–11 Years.	14–16 Years.	17–18 Years.	19–24 Years.
Number of subjects	28	28	48	38
Percentage of subjects with more pleasurable experiences	82·1	46·4	64·6	69·8
Percentage of subjects with more unpleasant experiences	17·9	53·6	35·4	30·2

We find here also that, with the exception of the subjects 14–16 years of age, the pleasant experiences are more numerous than the unpleasant ones. The age from 14 to 16 years is the age of the beginning of puberty in males, when, as a matter of common knowledge, the outlook on life generally becomes, for the time being, decidedly more gloomy and pessimistic.

There is a paper by Tolman and Johnson on Association-time and Feeling.[1] Lists of "Pleasant words" (e.g. smooth, victory, courtship, sister, etc.), of "Unpleasant words" (e.g. rough, defeat, grief, snake, etc.), and of "Indifferent words" (e.g. still, motion, business, hill, etc.) were used as stimulus words, and it was found that "names of simple but unpleasant sense qualities used as stimuli tend to lengthen the association-time quite as much as of unpleasant words of deeper emotional significance."[2] But whether with the stimulus-word or with the reaction-word any and which feeling-tone was connected can only be ascertained by the subject's introspection, and it does not appear from the paper that such evidence was obtained. To take such stimulus-words as "smooth," "victory," etc., to be accompanied by a pleasant feeling-tone, or "rough," "defeat," etc., by an unpleasant one, or that "still," "motion," etc., are indifferent, is mere assumption, and nothing else.

The objection I raised above against Peters and Němeček applies also to Colegrove[3] and the earlier work of Kowalewski.[4] Both authors made use of the questionnaire method, which, from a scientific standpoint, by itself is not without objections, and both authors came to similar conclusions as Peters and Němeček. However, Kowalewski's later experiments[5] are decidedly more valuable, as pointed out by Offner.[6] Kowalewski made 105 boys of a municipal elementary school write down one morning all the pleasant and all the unpleasant occurrences they had experienced the previous day, which happened to be a holiday. Ten days later—and it

[1] *Am. Journ. of Psychology*, 1918, **xxix**, pp. 187 *seq.*
[2] Loc. cit., p. 195.
[3] F. W. Colegrove: *Memory*, New York, 1901.
[4] A. Kowalewski: *Studien zur Psychologie des Pessimisuns*, Wiesbaden, 1904.
[5] A. Kowalewski: *A. Schopenhauer und seine Weltanschanung*, Berlin, 1908.
[6] M. Offner: *Das Gedächtnis*, 3te Aufl., Berlin, 1913, p. 85.

is only this second test that gives value to the experiment —the same task was put to the boys. They had to write down again all the pleasant and all the unpleasant occurrences that had happened to them on that holiday. In the three tables given by Kowalewski it is then found that with 37 boys of the youngest group 1½ per cent. more of the unpleasant occurrences that were recorded at the first test were remembered than of the pleasant occurrences. With the 52 boys of the second group, even 7 per cent. more of the unpleasant were now remembered, and only with the oldest and by far the smallest group of 16 boys were 5 per cent. more of pleasant occurrences remembered than at the first test. If Kowalewski's experiments are regarded in this light, which, however, he does not do, his conclusion, that pleasantly toned impressions have a greater memory value than unpleasantly toned ones, appears not only unwarranted, but the opposite conclusion, that the unpleasant experiences possess greater memory-value, seems established. In harmony with this, continues Offner, is the fact that Hacker [1] found 18 per cent. of his dreams to be unpleasantly toned and only 10 per cent. pleasantly toned; and Weed and Hallam [2] 57 per cent. unpleasant dreams against 28 per cent. pleasant ones.

However, Offner's interpretations of Kowalewski's results are neither without objection, as Lobsien [3] points out; the percentages are, after all, not very large, but, above all, the material upon which the conclusions are based is not very extensive.

Whateley Smith published [4] an account of some experiments attempting to measure the influence of feeling-tone

[1] F. Hacker: *Systematische Traumbeobachtungen mit bes. Berücksichtigung d. Gedanken*, Bonner Diss, Leipzig, 1911, p. 92.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 92.
[3] Max Lobsien: *Das Gedächtnis*, 1913, p. 91.
[4] W. Whateley Smith: "Experiments on Memory and Affective Tone," *Brit. Journ. of Psychology*, Gen. Sect., 1921, xi, pp. 236–250.

upon memory by means of association experiments and what is known as the "psychogalvanic reflex." The substitution of this for introspection is the essential drawback to this investigation, for the significance of this psychogalvanic reflex is anything but settled. This author tells us that "different subjects varied considerably in the reliability of the records it was possible to obtain from them," and has recourse to the more than reprehensible device of weighting his results "according to the experimenter's estimate of their reliability." By such means any desired result might be obtained. What may be admissible in "Psychic Research" has no room in experimental psychology. We are then presented with "positive and negative affective tones" which are *not* identical with pleasure and unpleasure, and we are not told whether they are psychic experiences. The procedure to ascertain the "memory values" of the words learnt is likewise open to most serious objection.

I will here subjoin a résumé of an investigation of my own on this subject that has as yet not been published.[1]

The experiments were carried out in two London Central Schools for girls on the morning of a day following a holiday. The girls were called into the hall and there addressed by the respective head mistresses. They were told that they would go back to their class-rooms and would be given a sheet of paper. The paper was to be folded in halves, and on the one side they were to put down all their pleasant experiences of the preceding holiday and on the other side all their unpleasant ones. There would be no time limit, and the papers were to be handed in as soon as completed. This first set of papers was then collected. Some time after this, in one school after the elapse of ten days and in the other school

[1] This paper has since been published. A. Wohlgemuth: "The Influence of Feeling on Memory," *Brit. Journ. of Psychology*, Gen. Sect., 1923, xiii, pp. 405 *seq.*

after a fortnight, the girls were again called into the hall and again addressed by their respective head mistresses. They were told that they would be required once more to record the pleasant and the unpleasant experiences which they had had on the holiday in question. The papers were collected again as before. They were then marked together in corresponding pairs and the results tabulated. These were as follows :—

First School : 403 children (ages 11–16 years).

(*a*) The whole of the results pooled.
Pleasant experiences recorded in first paper : 4,180.
Pleasant experiences forgotten in second paper : 1,821 = 43·6 per cent.
Unpleasant experiences recorded in first paper : 1,915.
Unpleasant experiences forgotten in second paper : 853 = 44·5 per cent.

(*b*) The percentage worked out for each child separately gave—
(1) an average for pleasant experiences forgotten of 41·8 (m.v. 17·0),
and an average for unpleasant experiences forgotten of 38·1 (m.v. 23·0) ;
(2) a mean for pleasant experiences forgotten of 41·6,
and a mean for unpleasant experiences forgotten of 40·0.

(*c*) The number of children who forgot—
a larger percentage of pleasant experiences was 214 ;
a larger percentage of unpleasant experiences was 160;
an equal percentage of both experiences was 29.

Second School : 284 children (ages 11–16 years).

(*a*) The whole of the results pooled.
Pleasant experiences recorded in first paper : 2,555.
Pleasant experiences forgotten in second paper : 879 = 34·5 per cent.
Unpleasant experiences recorded in first paper : 1,576.
Unpleasant experiences forgotten in second paper : 553 = 35·0 per cent.

(*b*) The percentage worked out for each child separately gave—
(1) an average for pleasant experiences forgotten of 33·2 (m.v. 16·4),
and an average for unpleasant experiences forgotten of 31·2 (m.v. 19·4) ;

(2) a mean for pleasant experiences forgotten of 33·3; and a mean for unpleasant experiences forgotten of 33·3.

(*c*) The number of children who forgot—
a larger percentage of pleasant experiences was 131,
a larger percentage of unpleasant experiences was 120,
an equal percentage of both experiences was 33.

Both Schools together: 687 children (ages 11–16 years).

(*a*) The whole of the results pooled.
Pleasant experiences recorded in first paper: 6,735.
Pleasant experiences forgotten in second paper: 2,700 = 40·1 per cent.
Unpleasant experiences recorded in first paper: 3,491.
Unpleasant experiences forgotten in second paper: 1,406 = 39·8 per cent.

(*b*) The percentage worked out for each child separately gave—
(1) an average for pleasant experiences forgotten of 38·2,
an average for unpleasant experiences forgotten of 35·3;
(2) a mean for pleasant experiences forgotten of 37·5; and a mean for unpleasant experiences forgotten of 33·3.

(*c*) The number of children who forgot—
a larger percentage of pleasant experiences was 345;
a larger percentage of unpleasant experiences was 280;
an equal percentage of both experiences was 62.

These figures, I think, considering the large mean variations, show without doubt that there is no difference whatever between the two feeling-tones, Pleasure and Unpleasure, in their influence upon memory. That is to say, with larger material the reliable work of previous investigators is confirmed.

This, then, I believe, is all the experimental work that has been done to investigate the influence of the nature of the feeling-tone upon memory, and it is evident that pleasure has no precedence over unpleasure. That affectively toned experiences are less easily forgotten than neutral ones is most probably true, and this would, then, be on account of the greater attention they obtain; but

there is not a shred of evidence that unpleasant experiences are more easily forgotten than pleasant ones.

The fact of what Kowalewski has called the "*Erinnerungsoptimismus*," optimism of recollection, has nothing whatever to do with the question, although it appears to have confused several authors. The feeling-tone that was attached to an experience need not, and generally does not, attach to the memory-image of that experience, i.e. to its recollection. The altered conditions, the knowledge that the experience is past, may often invest the memory-image of an unpleasant experience with a pleasant feeling-tone. This is the reason why people talk about the good old times, which were no better, but rather worse, than the present ones.

From my experiments, described above in outline, it is evident that the pleasant experiences of a normal healthy individual far outnumber the unpleasant ones, unless it be assumed that the rate of forgetting is enormously greater during the first day for the unpleasant experiences than during the following fortnight, for which there is evidently not the slightest reason. The erroneous conclusion which psycho-analysts drew from the works of Peters and Němeček and from that of Kowalewski, an error into which these authors themselves fell, is based upon the equally erroneous assumption that the pleasant and unpleasant experiences are equal in number. There has been, as far as I know, no systematic attempt at the quantitative investigation of this question with the exception of that of J. C. Flügel. The results of Flügel's work have not been published, and I have to rely upon an abstract of a paper communicated to, and read before, the British Psychological Society, March 24, 1917, entitled "A Quantitative Study of Feeling and Emotion in Everyday Life":—

"Six subjects made records of the feelings experienced by them during the whole of their waking consciousness

for a period of not less than thirty days, according to the following instructions :—

> ' Suppose that 0 corresponds to a state of complete Indifference, in which you feel neither Pleasure nor Unpleasure ; that + 100 corresponds to the most intense Pleasure which you have ever experienced ; that — 100 corresponds to the most intense Unpleasure which you have ever experienced. Then you will divide up this total scale of Feeling (ranging from + 100 to — 100) into seven grades as follows :—
>
> + 3. Any state between + 100 and + 66.
> + 2. „ „ „ + 66 „ + 33.
> + 1. „ „ „ + 33 „ 0.
> 0. A state of indifference ; or one in which Pleasure and Unpleasure are equally balanced (or very nearly so).
> — 1. Any state between 0 and — 33.
> — 2. „ „ „ — 33 „ — 66.
> — 3. „ „ „ — 66 „ — 100.'

" The subjects made entries in their records according to this plan at frequent intervals during each day, and at the end of the period of observation the following results were calculated, indicating (in percentages) the proportion of the total period during which each intensity of Feeling was experienced.

Distinguishing Numeral of Subject.	+3.	+2.	+1.	0.	−1.	−2.	−3.	$\frac{-}{+}$	$\frac{\text{Weighted} -}{\text{Weighted} +}$
1833	1·205	5·340	55·705	14·985	20·250	2·285	0·280	0·46	0·39
1076	0·995	6·635	37·815	44·240	9·695	0·625	0	0·23	0·20
3693	1·050	9·390	43·600	19·040	24·720	2·040	0·160	0·50	0·45
9621	1·510	14·160	41·725	36·050	5·550	0·950	0·050	0·12	0·12
2028	0.790	11·805	24·270	40·995	17·340	4·435	0·365	0·60	0·54
7649	2·920	17·625	33·755	17·235	20·715	6·920	0·830	0·53	0·49

" The figures in the last two columns represent what might be termed the ' Algedonic ratio,' i.e. the proportion of Unpleasure to Pleasure, for each subject. In calculating

the weighted ratios in the last column, the values for + 2 and — 2 have been multiplied by 2, and those for + 3 and — 3 multiplied by 3."

Flügel's results then confirm my contention as stated above.

It must, however, be borne in mind that Flügel's "Algedonic ratio" refers to *duration*, whilst the work done upon feeling and memory to *numbers of experiences*, whose durations may vary greatly. However, I do not think that this affects the issue.

I have next to deal with a subject of the utmost importance in Psycho-analysis, namely, the "*Unconscious.*" What is meant by Unconscious? Literally it means non-conscious, absence of consciousness. I am moving a finger without looking at it and I am conscious of the movement; without movement I am conscious of the position of my feet under the table; I am conscious of the varied and manifold experiences I derive from the smoking of my pipe, and so on. But I am unconscious of the working of my brain, of the beating of my heart, of the digestion going on in my stomach and intestines, of the secretions of my liver and kidneys, and of many more organic functions. I was unconscious before I was born, and expect and hope to be unconscious when I am dead. I have been unconscious in a swoon and under an anæsthetic, and in dreamless sleep. I am at this instant unconscious of all that of which I am not conscious. This may sound like a Hibernicism, but it is true for all that. Now that the instant during which I wrote the preceding words is past and gone, let me try to enumerate what this unconscious is. Of course, it can only have reference to mental processes that *might* have taken place during that instant, and the number of these is evidently infinite. However, they can all be referred to a limited number of classes, and I shall now endeavour to classify these, the non-existent.

Hellpach [1] enumerates eight classes, viz.: (1) the Unremembered; (2) the Unintended; (3) the Unobserved; (4) the Mechanized; (5) the Reproducible; (6) the Productive; (7) the Psychic Real; (8) the Absolute. I shall not follow this author into his classification, which would involve me in metaphysics, for of these I intend to keep clear.

I would classify the Unconscious as follows:

A. Impossible of Consciousness.

(*a*) *By peripheral excitation:* all those non-existing psychic processes that could not happen owing to the inability of the respective stimuli exciting my sense-organs. E.g. the sound of the sneezing of a man in Glasgow; the smell of a flower that has not yet bloomed; the colour of a new analine dye that has not yet been discovered; and so on *ad inf.*

(*b*) *By central excitation:* all those non-existing processes that would have been revivals of processes which, however, never happened before.

B. Possible of Consciousness.

(*a*) *By peripheral excitation:* all those non-existing processes whose stimuli reached the respective sense-organs, but were too feeble to excite them, or, being able to excite them, failed to excite the central neurones.

(*b*) *By central excitation.*

(i) *Unreproducible:* all those non-existing processes that would have been revivals

[1] Willy Hellpach: *Unbewusstes und Wechselwirkung. Zeitschr. f. Psych.*, 1908, Bd. 48, S. 241.

of processes that have previously occurred, but whose neural vestiges have been completely obliterated (but these might equally well have been included under A (*b*) above).

(ii) *Reproducible*—

(1) With ease,

(2) With difficulty.

Since I have adopted the principle of dichotomy in my classification it follows that all would-be, or might-have-been, psychic processes, but which did not exist at that moment, can find a place in that scheme. It must, however, be borne in mind that often the word " unconscious " is used for " unintended." Here the action itself was the result of, or accompanied by, a psychic process, but there were no psychic processes by which the end in which the action resulted was conscious as purpose.

It must also be pointed out that there are psychic processes (i.e. there is consciousness) which may be entirely forgotten, that cannot possibly be ekphored; but they therefore do not cease to be psychic (i.e. conscious) processes at the moment of the occurrence. A man may dream and betray this beyond doubt to an onlooker by talking and moving, yet on waking he may assert most positively that he has not dreamed: there is no memory of it. I have seen it stated[1] that in twilight-sleep at childbirth there is no analgesia, because the patient complains of pain and reacts to it, but on recovery from the morphin and scopolamin there is complete amnesia as regards the pain.

There are other kinds of psychic processes that require careful consideration, all the more so as they may with some pretence to consistency be construed into that monstrosity: " the unconscious psychic process "—a

[1] C. Henry Davis: *Painless Childbirth*, London, 1920, p. 47.

psychic or mental process is a process of consciousness, hence an unconscious psychic process is an unconscious process of consciousness, and is about as intelligible as a "resting movement." It is a contradiction in terms, simply pure nonsense.

The element of a psychic process in its cognitive aspect is what psychologists term a "*Sensation*." It is generally taught that a sensation has in reality no existence, and that the psychologist arrives at its conception by the way of abstraction. This latter part of the statement I believe to be generally true, but I am inclined to dispute the correctness of the former part. I believe that sensations do have existence, but by the very fact that they are merely sensations they have no significance in the mental life, they pass, so to speak, unheeded. They are heeded as soon as they are assimilated, connected up to the main stream of consciousness, apperceived, but then they are no longer sensations, but have become thereby perceptions. However, this being so does not prove the non-existence of mere sensations. In fact, they can, under certain conditions, be observed in retrospection by the psychologist. I will give an example, and I am sure that others have observed similar instances, although they may have viewed the occurrence from a different point. On my way home in the evening from the laboratory, or the library, I am generally absorbed in my thoughts, chewing the cud of wisdom acquired during the day. My surroundings have then very little significance for me: the visual, auditory, and other stimuli produce central excitations that go but little beyond mere sensations, having but few and feeble associations that would make them perceptions; they form the fringe of the conscious stream, as already explained above (p. 21). Now, it has happened more than once, sitting thus absorbed in my thoughts in the railway-carriage, that the train has stopped at a station without

my giving attention to it. Then, suddenly, I became aware that the name of the station had been called out, but at the moment of my becoming aware of the fact the sound had already died away. The *primary memory-image* which was then in the focus of consciousness was, however, already a *percept*, but by retrospection I could form an idea of what a *sensation* would be like.

That the *fringe of consciousness*, as it is generally accepted, consists of experiences of low intensity and vividness, may be true enough, but I believe that the fact that they are practically merely sensations, whose associations, that would tend to make them perceptions, are hardly excited, is of greater importance than the intensity and vividness.

It follows, then, from these considerations that there are psychic processes that are of very slight significance, during their happening, to the total mental life; they are obscure, but this does not render them unconscious, for if they were so they would cease to be psychic processes. It also follows that such experiences can only be in the nature of sensations, and hence they are of no value to the psycho-analyst who wants "ideas" or "thoughts."

There is still another point to be considered in this connection. I need not go here into a detailed account respecting the formation and the constitution of the "Self" or "Ego"; any modern textbook on psychology will give this. As I have already referred to it above, suffice it to say that it is a complex or constellation of experiences that is normally always present, a constant eddy in the main stream of consciousness. All other parts of this stream have a reference to, are related to, or connected with, this eddy. Not affecting it, and not being affected by it, means running in a different channel, and this is a figurative description of a "Split Personality." If the splitting is complete, then each self is ignorant of the existence of the other. They do not exist simultane-

ously, but alternate. I do not think that any authentic cases of "Automatic Writing," for instance, disprove this statement. If this automatic writing be done whilst the subject is said to be in a trance or sleep, we have no means of eliminating fraud, and the psychologist need not concern himself with it. When, however, the automatic writing is done whilst the subject is engaged, say, in a conversation, or argument, or otherwise *completely* occupied, we should have a case of a simultaneous existence of two personalities, of two simultaneous streams of consciousness, each with its own eddy of the respective self. That each self should then be unconscious of the consciousness of the other self in the same way as I am unconscious of the consciousness of the man sitting next to me in a railway-carriage is to be expected, or there would not be a split personality. However, although such cases have been recorded by eminent physicians, physicists, and others, I do not know how far the conditions have been successful in excluding fraud. The assurance of the operator respecting the subject's honesty must be received with the greatest caution. Be this as it may, and let us, for argument's sake, assume that the records are in accordance with actual facts, yet they do not furnish any evidence of a manifestation of *unconscious psychic processes*. This atrocious violation of common-sense logic is, and remains, a contradiction in terms, a non-sense, like a "resting movement." There is just as much evidence, i.e. none whatever, of the continued existence of thoughts, ideas, etc., out of consciousness as there is for the continued existence of the individual after death.

II

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND THE "UNCONSCIOUS"

> Allem lässt sich abgewinnen
> Eine Seite, die da glänzt,
> Und was kein Verstand aussinnen
> Kann, hat Phantasie ergänzt.
>
> FRIEDRICH RÜCKERT.

IN the preceding part I have endeavoured to give succinctly an outline of those points of Scientific Psychology which, I believe, are required by the general reader to follow me in the critical examination of the psycho-analytic doctrine.

What is Psycho-analysis? Psycho-analysis is *not* what the literal meaning of the word purposes to convey, namely an analysis of the psyche or soul, as explained above.[1] In psycho-analysis there is not even the pretence of an analysis of mental processes as understood by the psychologist; and to answer the question, "What is psycho-analysis?" I think it expedient to give a short historical survey of the rise and development of this doctrine.

In 1893 Dr. Joseph Breuer and Dr. Sigmund Freud, both of Vienna, published in the *Neurologische Zentralblatt*, Nos. 1 and 2, a paper entitled "Über den psychischen Mechanismus hysterischer Phänomene" ("On the Psychic Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena"), reprinted as the first paper in their *Studien über Hysterie*, Leipzig

[1] P. 13.

and Wien, 1895. In this paper these two writers came to the conclusion that in hysteria the various symptoms of the disease stand in close and stringent relationship to the cause which is to be regarded as a " psychic trauma," for, according to their statement, they found that the different hysterical symptoms disappeared immediately and without return when it had been possible to revive to its full extent the memory of the provoking occurrence, and with it the accompanying emotion (p. 4). It becomes evident, the authors say again (p. 7), that these memories correspond to traumata which have not been sufficiently " worked off " (*abreagiert*).

In a theoretical paper by Breuer, which follows, it is stated that, " if the memory of the psychic trauma has to be regarded in the manner of a foreign body which a long time after its penetration remains as an actually effective *agens*, and if in spite of this the patient has no consciousness of these memories and their reappearance, we have to admit that unconscious ideas are existent and active."

To summarize: A highly unpleasant experience occasions a psychical shock, or wound, or trauma, which gives rise to certain reactions. The occurrence itself is forgotten, as far as consciousness is concerned apparently obliterated, for it cannot be revived or recalled by ordinary means. It, the memory of the occurrence, continues, however, to exist unconsciously, it is jammed in, and acts like a foreign body in a wound. It manifests itself by the continuance of the original reactions, which thus become hysterical symptoms. Bringing the memory of the occurrence back into consciousness is like extracting the foreign body from the wound. The emotion, which at the occurrence of the shock had had no opportunity to " work itself off," and so was jammed in, was strangulated, can do so now, and the hysteric symptoms cease to recur. This is called Breuer's Cathartic Method.

Freud takes this as a starting point, and erects upon it his magnificent structure of Psycho-analysis. In the cathartic method recourse was had to hypnosis in order to revive the memory occurrence that gave rise to the trauma. Freud discarded this later. He told the patient to lie down and concentrate his thoughts, whilst he, Freud, kept on urging him to recollect. Freud found that he could gradually get the patient to recollect occurrences further and further back. " By such experiences," Freud writes in his paper, " *Zur Psychotherapie der Hysterie*," [1] " I gained the impression that it might indeed be possible to bring to light by mere insistence those pathogenic series of ideas which surely existed, and since this insistence demanded an effort from me and suggested to me the interpretation that I had to overcome a resistance, the state of affairs translated itself to me immediately into the theory, that by my *psychic work* I had to overcome in the patient a *psychic force*,[2] which resisted the becoming conscious (remembering) of the pathogenic ideas. A new understanding seemed to open itself to me when it occurred to me that this might perhaps be the same *psychical force* which helped to create the hysterical symptoms and which at that time prevented the pathogenic idea from becoming conscious. What force could there be assumed to be effective and what reason could have made it so? I could easily form an opinion on this, as there were already several complete analyses at my disposal in which I had discovered examples of pathogenic and forgotten ideas that were forced out of consciousness. From these there appeared to me the general character of such ideas. They were all of a disagreeable nature, appropriate to produce the emotion of shame, of reproach, of psychical pain, the experience of moral injury; all of the same kind, such as one does not like to experience, as one would much rather forget. Out of all this arose,

[1] Loc. cit., p. 234.

[2] The italics are mine.

as it were by itself, the idea of defence. . . . An idea had approached to the 'Self' of the patient, proved to be incompatible, and evoked a force of repulsion on the part of the Self, whose purpose was the *defence* against his incompatible idea. This defence was, in fact, successful, the respective idea was forced out of consciousness and out of memory, its psychical track was apparently undiscoverable. Yet this track surely existed. When I endeavoured to focus the patient's attention upon it, I got to feel the same force as *resistance* which at the genesis of the symptom had manifested itself as *repulsion.*"

In his American lectures, *Über Psychoanalyse,* Freud gives a succinct description of the theory of psycho-analysis. He says that hysterical patients are suffering from reminiscences (p. 10). With the *Repression* of the idea the emotion, which had no opportunity *to work itself off* (*abreagieren*), is *jammed in, strangulated* (*eingeklemmt*), and then *Hysterical Conversion* (*hysterische Konversion*) takes place (p. 13). In trying to bring the idea into consciousness again we encounter a *defence* (*Abwehr*) in the form of a *Resistance* (*Widerstand*) (p. 20). The idea is *repressed* (*verdrängt*), and continues to exist in the *Unconscious* (*Unbewusste*) (p. 24). That part of our past experience which has thus been repressed and cannot be brought back into consciousness by ordinary means constitutes the "*Unconscious*" (*Unbewusste*), that which can be ordinarily recalled the *Preconscious* (*Vorbewusste*). The repressed idea and its emotion find, however, a way of escape and manifest themselves thus as *Symptoms.* If the escaping energy of the strangulated idea is made use of for a noble purpose, we have *Sublimation* (*Sublimierung*) (p. 25).

These preliminary and succinct remarks give not a very complete account of psycho-analysis. The mechanisms enumerated and explained above are by no means all that are said to be active in the human mind. Others

will be considered later, but these suffice, I believe, to give the reader a general idea about the subject to be examined in the following pages. Although the illustration is taken from pathological psychology, yet the mechanisms referred to are asserted to obtain also in the normal individual, where they manifest themselves in acts of forgetting, in dreams, in jokes or puns, in slips of the tongue, slips of the pen, slips of the hand, and other erroneous acts. All these we shall consider in turn in greater detail.

We see, then, that in psycho-analysis *analysis* has not the technical psychological meaning, does not mean analysis of mental processes of the mind or psyche. It means searching for so-called repressed ideas which are unconscious and unable to become conscious in the ordinary way, yet which influence or determine an individual's thought, speech, or action. In the words of one of Freud's exponents, "Psycho-analysis is a scientifically grounded method devoted to neurotic and mentally deranged persons, as well as to normal individuals, which seeks by the collection and interpretation of associations, with the avoidance of suggestion and hypnosis, to investigate and influence the instinctive forces and contents of mental life lying below the threshold of consciousness." [1]

The first conception of Freud's, then, that I intend to deal with is that of the "Unconscious," and, incidentally, of the "Preconscious." For simplicity's sake, we may here consider cognitive psychic processes simply and shortly as ideas, or as thoughts. To speak, then, of an "unconscious idea," i.e. an unconscious conscious process, is, as I pointed out above on page 42, simply nonsense.

Freud, however, *does* talk about "unconscious ideas," and although he and his followers repeatedly protest

[1] Oskar Pfister: *The Psycho-analytic Method.* Translated by C. R. Payne, London, n.d., p. 20.

that their doctrine does not violate any conceptions of modern psychology, yet their whole nomenclature and speech do so. On perusing the literature of the subject one cannot help conceiving the "Unconscious" as a vast region, a Hades into which ideas and thoughts, desires and affects, etc., are relegated, and from which they try to escape. To give an example: "On tracing the unconscious thoughts as far as possible—using a technique, known as psycho-analysis, specially devised for the purpose—he (i.e. Freud) found himself in a strange mental world quite foreign to that of consciousness, and to this he refers under the name of "the Unconscious." [1] And again, this time from an adherent of the Zürich School: "We can conceive of a preparatory stage in the history of an idea that precedes its appearance in consciousness. . . . The force that reveals itself as interest wells up from the deeper levels of the psyche, or in other words . . . the unconscious can be identified with source. In the dream consciousness descends, as it were, from the focussed arena of waking life to the unfocussed planes beneath it. And here it meets nascent interest under the form of a symbol. It meets that which is coming up, and it meets it in that form that belongs to the stage of development and that particular level of the psyche. It [2] is embryonic thought or feeling, and as it passes upwards towards consciousness it develops progressively until it assumes a form that is immediately comprehensible to the conscious life. . . . Whatever we neglect or avoid, whatever we dislike or fear, whatever disgusts or irritates us, tends to pass out of consciousness. We may put it out by a forcible process of *repression*, or it may disappear as the result of a process that is not directly conscious. . . . Where does the repressed material go? It goes into the

[1] Ernest Jones: *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, London, 1918, p. 2.
[2] Evidently not consciousness is meant, but that which is coming up.—A. W.

marginal or into the unconscious psyche.[1] And so on. What is the sense of all this? I am sure I do not know. For me it has none whatever—it seems mere psittacism. How can an embryonic thought be feeling, and what is the sense of " feeling assuming a form that is immediately comprehensible to consciousness? " This psychoanalytic literature is really appalling in quantity and quality! But let us return to Freud.

Now, it is true enough that Freud explicitly states that he admits the basis of all psychic life to be the central nervous system, and that his statements are to be understood to refer to the central nervous system functioning in such a way *as if* this or that were happening in the unconscious. Thus, e.g., when speaking of the dissociation of an idea and its accompanying affect, he says: " Perhaps it would be more correct to say: these, after all, are not processes of a psychical nature, but physical processes whose psychical consequence manifests itself in such a manner as if that which is expressed by the phrase, ' Separation of the idea from its affect ' had really happened." [2]

It may be contended that the objection to the " Unconscious " is a quixotic fight against wind-mills, that the " Unconscious " is merely a short and convenient form of expression for neural processes producing such and such result. However, " *All too easily one gets into the habit of thought of assuming behind a substantive a substance, of gradually understanding by consciousness an entity. If, then, one has got used to employing local relations metaphorically, as, e.g., ' Subconscious,' as time goes on an idea will actually develop in which the metaphor has been forgotten, and which is as easily manipulated as a material thing. Then mythology is complete.*" This is an admirable state-

[1] Maurice Nicoll: *Dream Psychology*, 2nd ed., 1920, pp. 174–6.

[2] Freud: *Neurologisches Zentralblatt*, 1894, p. 404; from Muthmann: *Zur Psychologie und Therapie Neurot. Symptome*, Halle a/S, 1907. p. 15.

ment upon which I cannot possibly improve. It has been made by no less a person than Breuer, Freud's colleague,[1] and applies to no one more than to Freud and psycho-analysts in general.

The desire to distinguish scientific fact from metaphor and myth may probably have existed in Freud's mind at the beginning, but soon his assurances strike one as mere lip-service to scientific psychology, whilst most of his epigones and followers would now generally repudiate with indignation the very suggestion that the "Unconscious" and other conceptions of Freud's should be merely convenient terms or phrases for "neural disposition" and such-like. In fact, many of these conceptions could not thus be interpreted. For instance, by no amount of ingenuity would it be possible, so it appears to me, to translate into neural terms the passage I quoted above,[2] where Freud states, "by my *psychic work* I had overcome in the patient a *psychic force*, which resisted the becoming conscious (remembering) of the pathogenic ideas. . . . It occurred to me that this might perhaps be the same *psychical force* which helped to create the hysterical symptoms, and which at that time prevented the pathogenic idea from becoming conscious. . . . An idea had approached to the 'self' of the patient, proved to be incompatible, and evoked a force of repulsion on the part of the 'self,' whose purpose was the defence against this incompatible idea. This defence was, in fact, successful, the respective idea was forced out of consciousness and out of memory, its psychical track was apparently undiscoverable. Yet this track surely existed. When I endeavoured to focus the patient's attention upon it, I got to feel the same force as *resistance* which at the genesis of the symptom had manifested itself as repulsion." Again, take the passage, also quoted above, from Freud's

[1] Breuer and Freud: *Studien über Hysterie*, 2te Aufl., 1909, p. 199.
[2] P. 47.

American lectures "*Über Psychoanalyse.*" Here he says "that part of our past experience which has thus been repressed and cannot be brought back into consciousness by ordinary means constitutes the Unconscious, and that which can be ordinarily recalled the Preconscious." Here then the repressed *material* itself *constitutes* the Unconscious and the Preconscious respectively. When I come to deal with Freud's "*Traumdeutung*" it will be seen that the ideas repressed into the "Unconscious" have to pass through the "Preconscious" before emerging into consciousness, which is also not reducible to neural terms. The fascination of the pictorial has prevailed again.

Many more examples might be cited, and we shall meet with some later, when I discuss, for instance, the "Endopsychic Censor" and "Symbolism" in Freud's "*Traumdeutung.*" On the other hand, as I have shown in the first part, all the phenomena of memory, of ekphory, or forgetting are quite explicable by "neural disposition"; and the existence of ideas in the "Unconscious," or the "Preconscious," are gratuitous and unwarranted assumptions of the mythopæist

III

DREAMS

Dein redseliges Buch lehrt mancherlei Neues und Wahres,
Wäre das Wahre nur neu, wäre das Neue nur wahr!
J. H. Voss.

It was at the end of the last century that Freud's book "*Die Traumdeutung*" first appeared. It seems that in competent scientific circles the book fell flat. It would have been *totgeschwiegen*, killed by silence, as Freud puts it in the preface to the second edition, had not the general public taken to it kindly; to them it appealed, and was probably primarily meant to appeal, as is the case with most of Freud's other writings.[1]

"In my opinion," says Ernest Jones,[2] "the *Traumdeutung* is one of the most finished pieces of work ever given to the world; it is in any event noteworthy that in the twenty years that have elapsed since it was written only one other investigator, Silberer, has been able to make any addition, and that only a very minor one, to the theory, while not one constituent element of the theory has been disproved." Now, I beg leave to differ from Dr. Jones's last statement. But, of course, what is a complete confutation for the unbiassed may fail to impress the partisan. I should like to point out, too, that it is a strange procedure to evade the *onus probandi*, and to try and throw upon the party to whom the argument is

[1] The references here to the *Traumdeutung* are to the 3rd edition, Wien, 1911.

[2] *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, London, 1918, p. 188.

addressed the *onus confutandi*. If I assert that on the other side of the moon, on the side that is constantly turned away from the earth, there exists a green cow that is walking on its horns, and Dr. Jones is unable, as in fact he is, to disprove my assertion, does it therefore become true? Dr. Jones would doubtless ignore my assertion as devoid of proof, and that is exactly what psychologists, on the whole, have been doing with respect to Freud's *Traumdeutung*. The few criticisms which have been made by competent writers have been ignored by Dr. Jones.

The *Traumdeutung*, judging from the above quotation, appears then to be that of Freud's writings which is considered by his followers to be the most important, and to contain all the elements of what is termed by them "Freud's Psychology." As regards my own appreciation of this and other works, I must confess that although I got plenty of *Freud* (i.e. amusement), I could discover but little psychology. But let me proceed to examine the *Traumdeutung*.

Freud begins with a survey of the scientific literature of the dream-problem, and proceeds by illustrating his method of dream-interpretation by means of the analyses of a sample dream. This dream is one of his own, and as usual, is a gallimaufry of recent events strung senselessly together. By arranging these arbitrarily, taking away and adding equally arbitrarily, he arrives at the conclusion that *the dream is a wish fulfilment*. He counters the objection that there are dreams which, apparently, do not belong to this category, by the assertion that such dreams are disfigured, distorted (*entstellt*), and that the *manifest dream-content* has to be distinguished from the *latent dream-content*. This he calls the *FACT of dream-distortion* (Tatsache [*sic*] der Traumentstellung). But where have we fact? Where? Where a proof? Nowhere! Nowhere in the whole of the vast amount of psycho-

analytic literature is there a scientific proof, not a shred of one! In a footnote on page 99 Freud seems to get quite angry: "It is absolutely incredible, he says, with what obstinacy readers and critics turn a deaf ear to these considerations, and disregard the fundamental distinction of the manifest from latent dream-content." But I could construe the story of Romeo and Juliet, or Queen Mab, or any other into that of Bluebeard, into one of the Gospels, or what not. It would not require a great amount of ingenuity The assurance of Freud, and the gullibility, and want of criticism, in his followers is truly astounding. I must, however, confess to my everlasting shame that I too was at first captivated by Freud's earlier writings until I came to read his "*Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensen's Gradiva*" ("The Fancy and the Dreams *in W. Jensen's Gradiva*"), Leipzig and Wien, 1908. In this book Freud takes the dreams of the hero of W. Jensen's novel and analyses and interprets them like real dreams, shows them to be expressions of unfulfilled wishes, etc. Now, the hero and his dreams are all creations of the novelist, and Freud's "latent" and "manifest" dream-contents were evidently not in the artist's mind when writing his novel; yet Freud manipulates the manifest dream-content and constructs a latent dream-content out of it. This means that the latent dream-content stands to the manifest dream-content in casual relation, not as antecedent to consequent, but as consequent to antecedent. The manifest dream-content is there, and it is not the consequent of the latent dream-content, but rather its antecedent. The latent dream-content is the product of Freud's own imagination, his own brain-web. In short, it shows that Freud's method can be applied to anything, and that one can always get a result satisfactory to the uncritical. Of this I will give further examples later. This discovery came as a great shock to me. What proof was there that condi-

tions were different in the analyses and interpretations of real dreams? I turned again to the *Traumdeutung* and other writings of Freud, but in vain. Nowhere could I find a trace of proof, but only, over and over again, confident assertions.

Freud anticipates criticism of this sort on pages 352 *seq.* of the *Traumdeutung*. He writes: "There is another series of objections to our method in dream-interpretation to which we shall have to attend now. We proceed in this way, that we relinquish all end-ideas (*Zielvorstellungen*) which usually govern our thinking, that we direct our attention to a single dream-element, and then note the spontaneous thoughts that occur to us. Then we take up another part of the dream-content, repeat with it the same process, and allow ourselves, unconcerned about the direction in which the thoughts are drifting, to be led by them, thus getting, so to speak, to a thousand and one different things. We entertain at the same time the confident expectation that in the end, quite without any of our help, we shall get to the dream-thoughts from which the dream originated. To this critics may object somewhat as follows: It is nothing wonderful to get anywhere from any single element of the dream. Something can be connected associatively to every idea; what is strange is that with the aimless and arbitrary thought-sequence one should arrive just to the dream-thought. This is probably self-deception. The chain of associations is followed from one element until it is observed that it breaks off for some reason or other. If, then, a second element is taken up, it is only natural that the original freedom of association is now restricted. One still remembers the earlier chain of thoughts, and will, therefore, during the analysis of the second dream-idea, more easily come upon ideas which have something in common with ideas of the first chain. Then one imagines to have struck a thought which forms a junction between two

dream-elements. Since one allows oneself every liberty of thought-combination, and, in fact, only excludes the transition from one idea to another that assert themselves during normal thinking, it will eventually not be difficult to concoct something out of a series of 'intermediate thoughts' (*Zwischengedanken*), they are called the dream-thoughts, and, unwarrantedly, since they are otherwise unknown, are passed off for the psychical substitute of the dream."

To these imagined objections Freud replies[1]: "If such objections should be really advanced, we can parry them off by appealing to the *Impression* of our dream-interpretations, to the *Surprising connections* with other dream-elements, and to the *Improbability* that something is completely congruent with, and exhaustingly explicative of, the dream, as our dream-interpretations could be obtained otherwise than by tracing previously established psychical associations. We could also cite for our justification that the procedure of dream interpretation is identical with that of the *reduction of hysterical symptoms*, where the correctness of the procedure is demonstrated by the appearance and disappearance of the symptoms on the spot, where, therefore, the interpretation of the text finds support in the interpolated illustrations. We have no reason to avoid the problem why, by the prosecution of such an arbitrarily and aimlessly running chain of thoughts, we arrive at a pre-existing goal, because we cannot solve this problem, but are able to abolish it completely.

"For it is *demonstrably false* that we abandon ourselves to an aimless thought-process when, as with the dream-interpretation work, we drop our voluntary thinking and allow play to involuntary ideas. It *can be shown* that we can only renounce these end-ideas that are known to us,

[1] The *italics* in the following lines are mine. Those words are italicized that will serve as points of attack of my criticism.

and that with the cessation of these there rise to power immediately end-ideas that are unknown, or, as we *incorrectly* say, *unconscious*, and which determine the process of involuntary ideas. A thinking without end-ideas cannot possibly be produced through our own influence on our psychic life. . . ."

Let me recapitulate the various points to which Freud appeals in justification of his dream-interpretation. They are :—

(1) The *Impression* that is produced upon the subject by the interpretation of the dream.

(2) The *Surprising Connections* between the various and apparently disconnected dream-elements of the manifest dream-content.

(3) The *Improbability* that the interpretation of the dream which so completely covers and explains and fits into the life of the subject could be obtained otherwise than by tracing back previously established associations.

(4) The procedure in dream-interpretation is identical with that of the *Reduction of Hysterical Symptoms*, where the correctness of the procedure and the truth of the theory is demonstrated by the immediate disappearance of these symptoms.

(5) When *allowing thoughts to drift*, it is *demonstrably false* that we abandon ourselves to aimless thinking ; that it *can be shown* that we renounce only the *known* end-ideas, and that there rise immediately end-ideas that are *unknown, or, as we incorrectly say, unconscious*, and these determine the sequence of involuntary ideas.

Now let me examine each point in turn and ascertain what it means and what it is worth.

(1) What evidentiary value can the *Impression* that the interpretation of a dream produces on the subject

possibly have? None whatever, I hold, for the impression will depend entirely upon the prestige of the interpreter and the suggestibility and criticality of the subject. The neurotic patient whose will is impoverished and whose intellectual powers are impaired, who looks for amelioration or cure of his troubles to psycho-analysis, will, I have no doubt whatever, be greatly impressed when presented with what is purported to be an interpretation of his dream. But the normal individual, who has his wits about him, will simply smile at the presumption and fatuity of the interpreter who tells him that his dream where he walked up a staircase to visit his grandmother expresses his unconscious wish for sexual intercourse with her. The impression then, which the dream interpretation makes upon the subject, proves nothing whatsoever respecting the truth of the interpretation.

(2) There is absolutely nothing surprising in the "*Surprising Connections*" of disconnected dream-elements, or any other disconnected ideas. Very little ingenuity is required to connect any two or more ideas by interpolating but very few new ideas. What is really surprising is Freud's assurance in citing this as evidence.

(3) We come next to the *Improbability* that the interpretation of the dreams which so completely covers and explains and fits into the life of the subject could be obtained otherwise than by tracing back previously established psychical associations. What does this mean? I take it to mean this: In the subject there is an unconscious idea (*sit venia verbo*) "A" which is the latent dream-content. This gives rise to a series of other unconscious ideas, "B," "C," "D"; and "D," let us say, becomes conscious in the dream as the manifest dream-content. In the interpretation of the dream the psychoanalyst is told of "D." The subject is then required to let his thoughts drift, and it is supposed that the series is retraced: "D" produces "C," "C" produces "B,"

and " B " finally produces " A," where the process breaks off, and " A " is then revealed as the latent dream-content. In a similar series, " A," " K," " L," " M," the only manifest dream-element, " M," is taken up by the psycho-analyst, and " M," " L," " K," " A," is retraced, confirming the previously discovered " A." We are told times out of number in psycho-analytic literature that the subject is left entirely to himself in retracing these chains of association, and receives no assistance from the psycho-analyst. I will not question here the accuracy of this statement, since I shall deal with it on another occasion, and show it to be absolutely false, but will take it, for the sake of argument, for granted. It seems quite a feasible theory, and if it can be demonstrated that it is improbable " that something which is completely congruent with, and exhaustingly explicative of, the dreams could be obtained otherwise than by tracing previously established psychical associations," some proof will have been adduced towards the probability of this statement. The retracing of these chains of associations, of course, the subject himself has to do and no one else. The psycho-analyst, in whose mind the chain has never occurred, could not possibly do it for him. But in analysing the *Gradiva* dreams, where there was no actual dreamer to retrace the chain of associations, Freud himself has shown that he could arrive at something which is completely congruent with, and exhaustingly explicative of, the imaginary dream. Freud himself has sat in judgment upon his theory and pronounced the verdict. It is then absurd to talk about the *improbability* of arriving at a result by any other means. I will give another example later.[1]

(4) The procedure of dream-interpretation is identical with that employed in the *Reduction of Hysterical Symptoms*, and the correctness of this procedure is assured

[1] P. 95.

by the disappearance of the symptoms, and the correctness of interpretation thereby confirmed. Putting it the other way round, the contention is: There is a certain procedure which causes hysterical symptoms to disappear; this procedure professes to trace the causes of the hysterical symptoms, and, therefore, it is correct to say that the found professed causes are the real causes, and that their discovery effects the removal of the symptoms. The procedure in dream analysis is identical with the procedure of tracing the causes of hysterical symptoms, and, therefore, the ideas and thoughts traced are the latent dream-content. It is quite superfluous to examine this more than questionable logic of the later inferences, it suffices to point out that there is a *fallacy of non sequitur* at the very beginning. As there are other procedures that cause hysterical symptoms to disappear than that of tracing their alleged causes, it does not follow in the least that the traced alleged causes are the real ones. The tracing of " causes " is a case of *suggestion*, pure and simple, and as this is the simpler, and by far less presumptuous, theory, it deserves, and receives, the preference of the psychologist and the psychotherapist. I shall revert to this again later.[1]

(5) Last, not least, Freud says, it is *demonstrably false* that we abandon ourselves to an aimless thought-process when, as with the dream-interpretation work, we drop our voluntary thinking and allow play to involuntary ideas. It *can be shown*, he continues, that we can only renounce those end-ideas that are known to us, and that with their termination there rise immediately to power end-ideas that are unknown, or, as we incorrectly say, unconscious, and which determine the thought-process of involuntary ideas. But this is exactly what Freud undertook to do, to demonstrate the falsity of aimless thought and to show the existence of unknown end-ideas. But where is the demonstration and the proof? They

[1] *Vide* Chapter VII.

are again conspicuous by their absence. As usual, he merely asserts and reiterates his assertions.

Having shown that there is no real foundation upon which Freud's elaborate structure rests, it would appear superfluous to examine this in greater detail, but as, here too, numberless absurdities and contradictions exist I will return to a description and examination of the "*Traumdeutung.*"

I have dealt above [1] with Freud's chapter on "dream-distortion," which he calls there a *fact*, without even offering the pretence of a proof. The next chapter concerns "the dream-material and the dream-sources." He discusses here successively "Recent Events or Indifferent Matter in the Dream," "The Infantile as Dream-source," and "The Somatic Dream-sources." He comes here to the conclusion that "the dream-work is compelled to work up into one single combination all simultaneously existing dream-impulses. "The dream appears . . . as a reaction to all that which is simultaneously actually present in the sleeping psyche." "The stimuli during sleep are . . . worked up into a wish fulfilment whose other constituents are the psychic residues of the day that are known to us." "The dream is the protector of sleep, not its interrupter." . . . "The actual sensation is woven into a dream in order to deprive it of its reality. . . . The wish to sleep must thus each time be counted as reason of the dream-formation, and every completed dream is a fulfilment of it." [2] Freud finishes the chapter by giving samples of typical dreams, and enlarges upon the notorious Oedipus-Complex, with which I shall deal later. That the "dream is the protector of sleep, not its interrupter!", that the function of the dream, as Ernest Jones says,[3] is to protect sleep by stilling the activity of the unconscious mental processes that would otherwise disturb it, appears to me to be about as intelligible as if

[1] P. 55. [2] Loc. cit., pp. 165 *seq.* [3] Loc. cit., p. 35.

I were told that the function of the bath was to keep the bather dry by letting the water run over him. But, I suppose, I am too simple.

> Denn ein vollkommener Widerspruch
> Bleibt gleich geheimnisvoll für Kluge wie für Toren,

says Goethe's Mephistopheles. When I went to bed, say, at half-past eleven and hardly had time to switch off the light before I fell asleep in a certain position, and then suddenly—brrrrrr !—" Oh ! bless it ! there is that wretched alarm already ! "—I awakened in the same position in which I fell asleep, after seven hours of dreamless uninterrupted sleep, then my poor sleep had *not* been protected. But when I had turned from being on my back on to the left side, and from the left side I tossed on to the right ; when I breathless tried to scale a wall, or to run away from a big red lobster that pursued me ; when I flew through the air and expected to drop down every moment, or was sure that I had committed a murder and was going to be arrested and hanged—then I now know that my sleep was protected. I wronged in my ignorance the lobster mayonnaise and falsely accused the cucumber salad of the previous night's dinner. Well, we live to learn !

" The fact that sometimes a horrid dream may not only disturb sleep, but may actually wake the sleeper, in no way vitiates this conclusion," remarks Ernest Jones anent it.[1] " In such cases the activity of the endopsychic censor, which is diminished during sleep, is insufficient to keep from consciousness the dream-thoughts, or to compel such distortion of them as to render them unrecognizable, and recourse has to be had to the accession of energy the censor is capable of exerting in the waking state ; metaphorically expressed, the watchman guarding the sleeping household is overpowered, and has to wake

[1] *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, p. 222.

it in calling for help." In the halcyon days of Sophistry no finer example of specious reasoning could have been found. Again, no proof is adduced anywhere, and one cannot here again resist the conclusion that the pictorial conception of the watchman, of the disguise of the latent dream-thoughts, and so on, preceded the formulation of the " psychological " statement.

The next chapter is entitled " *Die Traumarbeit* " (" Dreamwork," or " Dream-making," as it has sometimes been translated). " Dream-thoughts and dream-content lie before us as two representations of the same content in two different languages, or better, the dream-content appears to us as a translation of the dream-thoughts into another expression, whose signs and laws we have to decipher by comparison of the original with the translation. The dream-thoughts are immediately comprehensible to us as soon as they are known to us. The dream-content is, as it were, given in a picture-writing, when characters are to be singly translated into the language of the dream-thoughts. One would evidently be misled if one were to read these characters according to their picture-value instead of according to their character-relation. Suppose I have a picture-puzzle (rebus) before me : a house, on the roof of which a boat is to be seen, then a single letter, then a running figure whose head is replaced by an apostrophe, and so on. I might then criticize this and declare the whole and its constituent parts to be senseless. A boat has nothing to do on top of a house ; a person without a head cannot run ; also the person is bigger than the house, and if the whole has to represent a landscape, the different letters which do not occur in the open country are out of place there. The proper view on the rebus is only attained when I do not raise these objections against the whole and its parts, but endeavour to replace each picture by a syllable or a word, which, in some way or other, can be represented by the picture. The words

which I thus put together are no longer senseless, but may represent the finest and deepest poetical expression. Such a picture-puzzle now is the dream, and our predecessors in the field of dream-interpretation have committed the mistake of judging the rebus as a picture-composition. As such it appeared to them nonsensical and valueless."

It is such specious reasoning by faulty analogy that captivates the uncritical (I shall give other instances later) [1]; they see some resemblances, but fail to see how superficial they are, and take the whole for a proof, the absence of which they do not then miss. Nor do they ever notice that in the whole of Freud's writing, or in those of his advocates and followers either, there is never a particle of proof, but instead assertions and abuse of those who dare to approach the subject in a critical and scientific spirit.

In a rebus the composer has a definite idea. Say he wishes to represent the first line of Hamlet's soliloquy in this way. He puts down first " b b," then a " door preceded by an apostrophe," then a " knot," the " 2," then a " bee," and the person who wishes to solve the picture-puzzle can with more or less ease decipher the intended meaning. But suppose I take an illustrated dictionary, open it at random and put down a number of pictures or signs, e.g. a church, a nigger, two parallel lines, and a stone. No one would be able to construe this series into a sentence of any meaning, in the same way as it can be done with the first, because these latter pictures were thrown together haphazard, whilst with the former this was not the case. If, however, I fill up any occurring gaps and have recourse to symbolism, I can make anything I like out of this row of pictures. I may, e.g., say that the church has a steeple, and thus has some phallic significance; it has rooms and a door, and thus represents *pudenda mulieris*; the nigger is a primitive man and

[1] P. 212.

stands for the Infantile; two parallel lines always go together, co-ire, coitus, and so on with the stone, etc. Or, I might say, the nigger has a seedy look, he is ill. Putting this together with the church I get Churchill. The stone suggests πετρα, and the parallel lines are *Zwei Grade*,; this gives me Petrograd, and with a little more ingenuity I may get some meaning into it that has some reference to Mr. Churchill's Russian adventures. This latter example of rebus-interpretation corresponds to Freud's dream-interpretation, whilst he pretends it is the process of the former example.

To enable him to fish for his latent dream-material in all possible directions Freud invents some mechanisms which, he asserts, are in operation in forming the manifest dream-material from the latent-material.

(*a*) *Die Verdichtungsarbeit, the work of Condensation*, is the first of these expedients. By this is meant that an element of the manifest dream-content is in reality a compound of a number of elements of the latent material. E.g., the church of our example above, which would be a condensation of male and female sexual organs.

(*b*) *Die Verschiebungsarbeit, the work of Displacement*, consists, so it is alleged, in that elements which in the latent dream-content centre round some constituent, group themselves around other constituents of the manifest content. E.g., the seedy-looking nigger of the manifest content is a displacement of the "ill" of Churchill.

(*c*) *Die Darstellungsmittel des Traumes, the mise-en-scène of the dream.* The dream generally represents an action, a dramatization. "We are often reasoning, arguing, reflecting, thinking in a dream, but here, we are told, appearance is deceptive; when one undertakes the interpretation of such dreams, it will be found that all this is dream-material, not the representation of intellectual activity in the dream. The content of the dream-thoughts is given by apparent thinking in the dream, and not the

relations of the dream-thought to one another in the ascertaining of which the thinking consists. . . ."

" The dream has two ways of representing the causal relations, but they are essentially the same. When the dream-thoughts are as follows: because this was so and so, this or that has to happen, then the more frequent mode of representation consists in giving the subsidiary sentence as fore-dream and the principal sentence as the principal dream."

In a picture-puzzle or rebus there can, of course, be no action, and I cannot illustrate this *mise-en-scène* from the above example, but in the interpretation of a dream which I shall give later I will do so. There the stepping out of the water of the seven lean and ill-favoured kine and their swallowing the seven fat and well-nourished ones is an illustration of the point under discussion.

(*d*) *Die Rücksicht auf Darstellbarkeit, the regard for representability*, is the next topic discussed by Freud, and announced as the third mechanism (the two others being condensation and displacement) operative in dream-work.

(*e*) Examples: *Reckoning and Speaking in Dreams*, and

(*f*) *Absurd dreams, the intellectual achievements in dreams*, need not detain us here. With reckoning and figures I shall deal later.

(*g*) *Die Affekte im Traume, the Affects in Dreams.* Freud tells us: " Analysis teaches us that the '*Vorstellungsinhalte*' (? manifest material) have experienced displacements and replacements, whilst the affect remains unmoved " (p. 309). " Where there is an affect in the dream there is one also in the dream-thoughts, but not vice versa. The dream is generally poorer in affects than the psychic [*sic*] (? latent) material from which it is derived " (p. 313). " I could say that through the dream-work a repression of the affect is effected " (p. 313). " The Affect-inhibition would then be the second result of the dream-censor, just as the dream-distortion was its first "

(p. 314). "Thus the effects in the dream appear as combined from several contributories and as overdetermined with reference to the material of the dream-thoughts; Affect-sources that can give rise to the same affect combine in the dream-work for its formation" (p. 323). "In the psyche of the sleeper there may be present an affective propensity—what is called a mood—as a dominating element. This mood may be the product of the experiences and thought-processes of the day, it may have somatic sources; in both cases will it be accompanied by its corresponding thought-processes" (p. 328)

Dr. Ernest Jones,[1] treating of the same subject, says: "The affect appears in the same form in the latent as in the manifest content, although through the mechanisms of transference and displacement it is in the latter differently associated than in the former. It should, however, be remarked that a given affect in the manifest content may represent its exact opposite in the latent content, but on closer analysis it will be found that the two opposites were already present in the latent content and were both of them appropriate to the context; as is so often the case in waking mental life, exactly contrasting mental processes in dream-thoughts are intimately associated with each other. In such cases of inversion of affect, although both occur in the latent content, the one present in the manifest content always belongs to a more superficial layer of the unconscious, so that it is the inverted affect that yields the underlying meaning of the dream. Thus a repressed death-wish may be masked by grief in the manifest dream, and fear in the latter is one of the commonest coverings for repressed libidinous desire." This is obviously like "heads I win, tails you lose." If in the dream I experience joy at anybody's death, the fact that I desire the death stands openly revealed; if I experience grief at the event, the case is no less proven,

[1] Loc. cit., p. 207.

as the death-wish has merely been masked by mutation of the affect.

(*h*) *Die sekundäre Bearbeitung, Secondary Elaboration.* This Freud considers to be a fourth factor concerned in dream-formation. He says (p. 329): "Not all that is contained in the dream proceeds from the dream-thoughts, but . . . a psychical function, which it is impossible to distinguish in our waking thinking, can furnish contribution to the dream. The question now is, does this happen only quite exceptionally, or has the psychical function (*Instanz*), which is otherwise only active as Censor, a regular share in dream-formation? One has to decide without hesitation in favour of the latter. It is beyond any doubt that the "Censoring Function" (*Zensurierende Instanz*), whose influence we have until now only known by its restrictions and omissions in the dream-content, also occasions interpolations and additions to it."

This is very accommodating of the Censoring Function, and how convenient for the Psycho-analyst! It rather reminds me, though, of the man who boasted that he had been wearing the same pair of boots for a number of years, only he had had new soles put on twice, and the uppers had been replaced once. As I will show later,[1] the "Endopsychic Censor," which, I suppose, is the same thing as the "Censoring Function," has been defined by Ernest Jones as the "sum total of repressing inhibitions." But if this Censor is intended to be nothing more nor less than "the sum total of repressing inhibitions," how can these repressing inhibitions make interpolations and additions?

In the last chapter of "*Die Traumdeutung*," which deals with the "Psychology of the Dream-processes," the first part is devoted to—

(*a*) *The Forgetting of Dreams.* Freud says (p. 344): "If the report of a dream seems at first difficult to under-

[1] P. 84.

stand, I ask the narrator to repeat it. This is seldom done with the same words. The places, however, where the patient changed the expressions are thus indicated to me as the weak points of the dream-disguise; they serve me, as the embroidered mark on Siegfried's gown served Hagen. The narrator has been warned by my request that I intend to bestow special pains on the solution of the dream. Under the pressure of the resistance he quickly protects the weak places of the dream-disguise by substituting for the betraying expression one that lies farther away. He thus draws my attention to the expression he had let slip. From the pains that are taken to frustrate the solution of the dream I can infer the great care with which the disguise of the dream has been woven."

All this, though very pretty metaphor, is nothing but assumption and assertion. One would have thought that those points of the dream which Freud fails to interpret are just the strongest, and not the weakest, of the dream. The whole is merely a clever device to increase his material from which to concoct an "interpretation," and, by turning minor details into important ones, to draw the attention away from the salient points to the new ones that can be more easily construed into something. The modifications which the dream suffers by being told Freud regards as a continuance of "secondary elaboration" and the further modifications introduced by being retold reveal the weak spots of the dream-disguise. Doubt as to the accuracy of the dream when telling it must not be allowed to interfere, on the contrary, psycho-analysis has here to be very diffident. "Whatever impedes the continuation of the work is a resistance" (p. 346). "A convincing proof [*sic*] for the strongly biassed nature of the forgetting of dreams, which favours resistance, is obtained during the analysis from the appreciation of a preliminary step in forgetting. It is not at all rare

that in the midst of the work of interpretation an omitted piece of the dream suddenly comes up which is described as forgotten until then. This part of the dream that has thus been snatched from oblivion is every time the most important. It lies on the short cut to the interpretation of the dream, and was therefore most exposed to resistance" (p. 346). "If we then take into consideration the play of the psychic forces, we have to declare that the dream would never have taken place if the resistance had held sway at night as it does during the day. Our conclusion is that it (the resistance) had lost part of its power during the night. We know that it was not abolished, for we have demonstrated [*sic*] its share of the formation of the dream as dream-distortion. But we are forced to admit the possibility, that the resistance was diminished during the night, that through this reduction of the resistance the dream-formation became possible, and we can thus understand that with the waking reinstated in its full force it (the resistance) gets at once rid of that which it had to tolerate so long, as it was too weak. Descriptive Psychology teaches that the essential condition of dream-formation is a state of sleep of the soul. We can only add this explanation [*sic*]: Sleep makes the dream-formation possible by diminishing the endopsychic Censor" (p. 351). We are further told that "Every time that a psychical element is connected to another one by an objectionable and superficial association, there exists also a correct and deeper-reaching connection between the two, which is subjected to the resistance of the censor" (p. 354).

Wonderful psychology this is! Association is the connection between psychic elements due to complete or partial simultaneity, and all so-called Laws of Association are reducible to this.[1] There are, e.g., three psychical

[1] A. Wohlgemuth: "Simultaneous and Successive Association," *Brit. Journ. of Psychology*, 1915, vii, pp. 434 *seq.*

elements, A, B, C, that occurred in the sequence indicated. B was partially simultaneous with A, and then C was partially simultaneous with B. When B occurs again on a future occasion, it may give rise to A, or C, or both. This connection, or association, itself is not a psychical element, although all thought depends upon it. How, then, can this mere connection be objectionable, or superficial, or correct, or deeper reaching? This is perfectly meaningless. The association may be strong or weak, but that is all that can be predicated of it.

Next Freud deals with—

(*b*) *Regression.* By this term he means, as far as I am able to make out, the production of dreams by psychical processes that go in the opposite direction to that in waking life. Here he accepts the physiological theory called the "dynamogenic law," which has been stated as follows: "Every stimulus has a dynamogenic or motor force. . . . Every state of consciousness tends to realize itself in an appropriate muscular movement." I have already taken exception to this so-called law.[1] But we may here grant it for the sake of argument. In dreams, then, the excitations, instead of going from the perceptual side towards the motor side, go in the direction from the motor side towards the perceptual one. I must, however, confess that I cannot follow Freud in his reasoning, and lest I be charged with not representing him fairly, I decide to let him state his own case. I need not apologize to the reader for the lengthy statement that follows, for it will serve another purpose, viz. of illustrating Freud's "consistency in logical thought," his "closeness of thought," "preciseness of expression," his "familiarity with psychology," or rather the absence of all these. He says[2]: "We view the psychic apparatus as a com-

[1] A. Wohlgemuth: "Pleasure-Unpleasure," *Brit. Journ. of Psychology*, Monograph Supplement, vi, 1919, p. 9.

[2] Loc. cit., pp. 358 *seq.*

pound instrument, the component parts of which we will call '*Instanzen*,' or, for the sake of clearness, '*Systems*.' We may then expect that these systems have perhaps a constant special orientation one to another, somewhat like the various systems of lenses behind one another in a telescope. Strictly speaking, we do not require the assumption of a really special arrangement of the psychical systems. It is sufficient for us, if a fixed order is established by this, that with certain psychical processes the systems are traversed by the excitation in a definite temporal sequence. This sequence may experience an alteration with other processes; such a possibility we may keep open for ourselves. Of the constituents of the apparatus we shall henceforth, for the sake of brevity, speak of as 'ψ-systems.'

"The first thing to attract our attention is that this apparatus, composed of ψ-systems, has a direction. All our psychical activity proceeds from (external or internal) stimuli and ends in innervations. Thus we ascribe to the apparatus a sensory (*sensible*) end and a motor-end. At the sensory-end there is a system which receives the perceptions (*Wahrnehmungen*), and at the motor-end another system that opens the doors to motility. The psychical process runs generally from the perception-end to the motility-end. The general scheme of the psychical apparatus would then have the following aspect:—



FIG. 5.

"But this is only the fulfilment of the well-known demand that the psychical apparatus must be built like a reflex-apparatus. The reflex-process remains the model for all psychical function.

"We have now reason to admit at the sensory-end a first differentiation. Of the perceptions that come to us there remains in our psychical apparatus a trace which we may call 'Reminiscence-trace' (*Erinnerungsspur*). The function that has reference to the reminiscence-trace we call Memory. If we are in earnest about the intention to connect the psychical processes to systems, then the reminiscence-trace can only consist in permanent changes in the elements of the systems. As has already been pointed out from another side, there are evidently difficulties if one and the same system has to preserve changes in its elements faithfully, and yet is required to meet new occasions for changes in a fresh manner and be capable of receiving them. According to the principle that directs our attempt, we shall distribute these two functions to different systems. We assume that the foremost system of the apparatus receives the perception-stimuli (*Wahrnehmungsreize*), but does not retain anything of them, i.e. it has no memory; and further, that behind this, there is a second system which transforms the momentary excitations of the first into permanent traces. Then the diagram of our psychical apparatus would be:—



Fig. 6.

" It is admitted that of the perceptions which act on [*sic*] system P we permanently retain something else besides their contents. Our perceptions show themselves as in memory connected one with another, and above all according to their some time meeting in simultaneity [*sic*] (*nach ihrem einstigen Zusammentreffen in der Gleichzeitigkeit*). We call this the fact of Association. It is then clear, if the P-system has no memory whatever, that it cannot retain the traces of the association. The various P-elements would be intolerably hampered, if a remnant of previous connections were to assert itself against a new perception. We must, therefore, assume as the basis of association rather the reminiscence-systems. The fact of association consists then in this, that in consequence of diminished resistances and facilitations of one of the R-elements the excitation passes rather to a second than to a third R-element.

" On closer consideration it is found necessary to assume not one but several such R-systems in which the excitation that is propagated by the P-element experiences different kinds of fixation. The first of these R-systems probably contains the fixation of the association through simultaneity ; in the more distant R-systems the same excitation-material is arranged according to other kinds of concurrence, so that perhaps relations of similarity, etc., are represented by these later systems. It would, of course, be idle to indicate by words the psychical significance of such a system. Its characteristic would lie in the closeness of its relations to elements of the Memory-raw-material, i.e., if we wish to point to a more thorough theory, in the gradations of the conductivity-resistances towards these elements.

" An observation of a general character, and which perhaps points towards something important, may be inserted here. The P-system which is unable to preserve changes, i.e. is without memory, yields for our conscious-

ness the whole manifoldness of sensory qualities. On the other hand, our reminiscences are in themselves unconscious, even the most deeply ingrained ones not excepted. They may be rendered conscious; but there is no doubt that even in the unconscious state they manifest all their effects. What we call our character depends upon the memory-traces of our impressions, and the impressions that have affected us the strongest are just those of our early youth, such which almost never become conscious. But if reminiscences become conscious again, they possess no sensory quality, or only a very slight one as compared to the perceptions. If it could now be confirmed that *memory and quality for consciousness exclude one another at the ψ-Systems*, a much promising insight into the conditions of neurone-stimulation is opened up.

"What we have up to now assumed about the composition of the psychical apparatus at its sensory (*sensible*) end has been done without reference to the dream, and those psychological explanations that may be deduced from it. But for comprehension (*Erkenntnis*) of another piece of the apparatus the dream will furnish us the proof. We have seen that it was impossible to explain the dream-formation, if we did not venture to assume two psychical functions (*Instanzen*),[1] of which the one submitted the activity of the other to criticism, which resulted in the exclusion from becoming conscious.

"The criticizing function (*Instanz*), we concluded, entertains closer relation with consciousness than the criticized function. It stands between the latter and consciousness like a guard. We further found support in identifying the criticizing function with that which guides our waking life and decides with regard to our voluntary

[1] Freud uses the term "*Instanz*"; I have translated it by "function," thus making, I believe, his meaning clearer. Freud had probably in mind the legal term, e.g. "*erste Instanz*," "*höhere Instanz*," etc., which have their English equivalent in "the court below, higher court, court of appeal," etc.

conscious actions. If we now replace these functions, in the sense of our assumptions, by systems, the criticizing system is then by the last-named comprehension (*Erkenntnis*) put at the motor-end. We insert now the two systems in our schema and express by the names we give them their relations to consciousness.



Fig. 7.

" The last system at the motor-end we call the ' *Preconscious* ' in order to indicate that the excitation-processes in it can, without further hindrance, become conscious, provided certain conditions are fulfilled, e.g. the attainment of a certain intensity, a certain distribution of that function which has to be called attention, and so on. It is likewise the system which holds the key to voluntary motility. The system behind it we call the ' *Unconscious,*' because it has no access to consciousness, *except through the Preconscious,* during which passage its excitation-process has to submit to alterations.

" Into which system do we now put the impulse to dream-formation ? For simplicity's sake into the system of the ' Unconscious.' From later discussions we shall find that this is not quite correct, that the dream-formation is obliged to get connection to dream-thoughts which belong to the system of the ' Preconscious.' We shall also learn at another place, when we shall treat of the dream-wish, that the driving-force of the dream is

furnished by the ' Unconscious ' ; and for this last reason we shall assume the ' Unconscious ' system as the starting point of dream-formation. This dream-excitation will now, like all other idea-formation, tend to pass into the ' Preconscious ' in order to gain from there access to consciousness.

" Experience teaches us that this way which leads through the ' Preconscious ' to Consciousness is during the day blocked to the dream-thoughts by the resistance-censor. During the night they obtain access to consciousness ; but the question arises in which way, and owing to what alterations. If this (i.e. the gaining access) were made possible for the dream-thoughts by the diminution of the resistance, we should get the dreams in the material of our ideas which would not show the hallucinatory character which at present interests us. . . .

" What happens in the hallucinatory dream we cannot describe otherwise than by saying : The excitation takes a regressive direction. Instead of towards the motor-end of the apparatus, it propagates itself towards the sensory-end, and arrives at last at the system of perceptions. If we call the direction in which the psychic process passes from the ' Unconscious ' during waking life the *progressive*, then we may say of the dream that it has a *regressive* character.

" This *regression* is then certainly one of the most important of psychological peculiarities of the dream-process ; but we must not forget that it is not confined to the dream alone [*sic*]. Also, the intentional remembering and other part processes of our normal thinking correspond to a going back in the psychical apparatus from any ideational process (*Vorstellungsakt*) to the raw material of the memory-traces that form its basis. During waking this going back never reaches beyond the memory-images ; it is unable to produce the hallucinatory animation of the perceptual images [*sic*]. Why is this different in

the dream? When we spoke of the condensation-process of the dream we could not avoid coming to the conclusion that by the dream-process the intensities attached to the ideas were transferred completely from one to the other [*sic*]. It is probably this alteration of the remaining psychical process which makes it possible to charge the P-system to full sensory vividness from the thoughts. . . .

"Owing to what alteration is this regression, which is impossible during the day, rendered possible? Here we have to be content with surmises. . . .

But this must suffice. Let us now look a little more closely at Freud's construction. As quoted above, on page 74, he says: "At the sensory end (of the apparatus) there is a system which *receives the perceptions.*" What Freud probably means is, expressed in psychological language, that the innervations arriving here become, or give rise to, perceptions. Freud then points out that, since a memory-image of a previous perception is not a new perception, it is reasonable to assume that different systems function. This may or may not be the case, we do not know. It appears to me, however, more probable, for it is the simpler assumption, that it *is* the same system, since the difference between a perception and its memory-image can quite satisfactorily be explained by the different directions from which the innervations arrive. If the innervations come from the sense-organs passing through certain synapses, we have a perception, whilst in the case of the corresponding memory-image the innervations arrive from other quarters over other synapses and dendrites. However, to insert in his "apparatus" Reminiscence or Memory-systems which would function *later* than a perception-system is not only quite unwarrantable, but seems to me totally unfeasible. On page 75 Freud again talks about *perceptions acting on* the P-systems, thus showing how hazy are his psychological conceptions. But this haziness is not confined to

subjects purely psychological, for a few lines further he says: "Our perceptions show themselves as in memory connected one with another, and above all according to their some time meeting in simultaneity" (*nach ihrem einstigen Zusammetreffen in der Gleichzeitigkeit*), as if such a meeting could be in anything else than in simultaneity. "It is clear," Freud continues, "if the P-system has no memory whatever, that it cannot retain the traces of the association. The various P-elements would be intolerably hampered, if a remnant of previous connections were to assert itself against a new perception." What is precisely the meaning of this? I am unable to say; this, however, appears to me quite clear that Freud has not grasped the meaning of "perception," for, as I have pointed out above,[1] a perception implies already association and assimilation. A little later,[2] when discussing the necessity of assuming several reminiscence-systems, Freud says: "the first of the R-systems probably contains the fixation of the association through simultaneity, in the more distant R-systems the same excitation-material is arranged according to other kinds of contiguity, so that perhaps relations of similarity, etc., are represented by these later systems," thus showing how complete a stranger he is to the psychological literature on the subject, for all association is, as I have pointed out above,[3] due to complete or partial simultaneity, and nothing else.

"An observation of a general character, and which perhaps points towards something important, to use Freud's words, is here inserted."[4] This something important is, that "*Memory and quality for consciousness exclude one another at the ψ-systems.*"[5] Whether this can be confirmed or not is of secondary consideration; in the first place one has to understand what is expected, or desired, to be confirmed. Now, "Memory," in the

[1] P. 42. [2] *Vide* p. 76. [3] P. 26. [4] P. 76.
[5] The italics are Freud's.

restricted psychological sense in which Freud uses it here, refers just to the ekphory of past psychical processes, i.e. conscious processes. Memory, of course, is in itself not a conscious process, but is merely a name for the potentiality of certain conscious processes, viz. of those that have a certain reference to past psychical experiences. That "Memory and quality for consciousness exclude one another" is, in the present universe of discourse, nothing but a contradiction in terms. I said, in the present universe of discourse, because "Memory," in the more extended meaning, is, in Ewald Hering's words, a "universal function of all organized matter." [1]

Freud's conception of the "Unconscious" and "Preconscious" has been explained above. He proceeds here to place these as systems in his psychical apparatus as indicated in Fig. 7.[2] The "Preconscious" he identifies with the "*Kritisierende Instanz*," the criticizing court, or function, i.e., as far as I can see, the famous "Censor." But then we are told elsewhere that "Consciousness" exerts a "censor"-influence over the dynamic process of the "Unconscious," over the latent dream-thoughts, and even over the manifest dream-content, etc. Constant mention is also made of the "Endopsychic Censor," which, I believe, as I said before, then to be identical with the "*Kritisierende Instanz*," the "criticizing function" of the "Subconscious," and with the same function of the "Conscious." Now, this "Endopsychic Censor" is evidently something very extraordinary, of an intelligence that manifestly far exceeds that of the person who owns the Censor, if one judges by reports we get from the psycho-analysts. Take the following example [3]: "Mere stupidity and lack of imagination will come then under the heading of intense resistance, and a man whose mind

[1] Ewald Herring: *Über das Gedächtnis als eine allgemeine Funktion der organisierten Materie*, Wien, 1870.
[2] *Supra*, p. 78.
[3] Maurice Nicoll: *Dream Psychology*, London, 1920, pp. 91 *seq.*

resembles a piece of wood will be regarded with grave suspicion as a person concealing a mass of highly sexual material. It is simpler, and perfectly legitimate, to see in such a case an inability to link up the abstract with the concrete. A literal, narrow mind has this constant difficulty. Correspondences make no comprehensible appeal. Allusion and metaphor is not caught. He argues, for example, that he has never hung over a cliff, and therefore the dream has nothing to do with him. Of course, you may take the view that this way of arguing is all due to inner complexes and repressions. In some cases it certainly is. But when a man with a perfectly flat occiput a high narrow forehead, and small bright eyes that rarely move, sits before you, it is possible that one is dealing with a type that has natural limitations. We are at liberty, then, to take the dream in our own hands, and see how it can be applied to the patient's situation. I have said the patient was not what is called a morphino-maniac. He took morphia partly because of a spell of insomnia induced by war-strain. . . . This patient dreamt: 'I was hanging by a rope a short way down a precipice. Above me on the top of the cliff was a small boy who held the rope. I was not alarmed, because I knew I had only to tell the boy to pull and I would get to the top safely.' . . . He (the patient) gave no associations. The boy was unknown to him. The precipice he had never seen. He made no connection himself between the symbols of the dream and any facts of his experience. . . ."

"The boy holds the rope, from which the dreamer is suspended over the void. The boy is small; if he let the rope go, presumably the dreamer falls. Therefore, with these considerations, we may say the symbol of the boy stands for something small which intervenes between the dreamer and certain disaster. Now, the patient observed at one point in the first interview that without morphia

he could not sleep. The boy then may symbolize the small excursion into morphinism, in which case the precipice would symbolize the danger of insomnia. Sedatives frequently prevent mental breakdown. This is a fact of experience. But to this rendering of the dream there is an objection," and the discussion, very ingenious, I admit, goes on for another ten pages. But the formation of the dream from the patient's "unconscious thoughts" is still more ingenious and indicates a high grade of intelligence. Thus we have, then, a person who on his conscious side is decidedly of a low intellectual level, because he cannot perform the easy task of grasping the dream-metaphor, whilst on his unconscious side he was able to perform the difficult task of expressing his thoughts in the metaphor of the dream. Comment is superfluous.

What then is this wonderful "Endopsychic Censor," which displays a far greater intelligence than its happy, or shall we say unhappy, possessor? Dr. Ernest Jones tells us[1] that "considerable objection has been raised . . . to Freud's use of the word Censor, but so far as I can see it is rather to the word than to the conception. It is not to be imagined that Freud understands by this term anything in the nature of a specific entity; to him it is nothing more nor less than a convenient expression to denote the *sum total of repressing inhibitions*."[2] Now, how a "Sum total of repressing inhibitions" can manifest a greater intelligence than the individual in whom it is active is beyond my understanding. On the very next page, too (p. 217), Ernest Jones says: "Instead of subsequently altering this weak place (in the dream), the censor may act by interposing doubt in the subject's mind as to the reliability of his memory about it." How can a "sum total of repressing inhibitions" interpose a doubt in the subject's mind? And again, a little further on the same page: "An interesting way in which the censor

[1] *Psycho-analytical Papers*, p. 216. [2] Italics are mine.

may act is by the subject receiving the assurance during the dream that 'it is only a dream.' The explanation of this is that the action of the censor has set in too late, after the dream has already been formed; the mental processes which have, as it were unwittingly, reached consciousness are partly divested of their significance by the subject treating them lightly as being 'only a dream.' Freud wittily describes this afterthought on the part of the censor as an *esprit d'escalier*."

A "sum total of repressing inhibitions" with an *esprit d'escalier* is rather good! Above[1] I drew attention to the asserted ability of the "Censoring Function" to interpolate in, or to add to, a dream; rather difficult, I should think, for "a sum-total of repressing inhibitions" to do this. These examples could be multiplied *ad libitum*. Freud invents convenient entities with which to work, and thinks to escape the charge of mysticism and obfuscation by declaring that these entities are not entities, but physiological processes which act in such a way *as if* such entities were present. But that will not do, it is simply hunting with the hounds and running with the hare.

Here is another difficulty. We are told that the "Unconscious" contains nothing but repressed thoughts, thoughts that are unpalatable to the "Conscious." They would, however, fain escape from their dungeon, but are prevented by the watchful "Endopsychic Censor," who is stationed at the entrance from the "Unconscious" to the "Preconscious." During sleep, however, the "Endopsychic Censor" seems to be dozing also, and now is the chance for the "Repressed" thoughts. Still, the Censor appears to be sufficiently awake to recognize his wards and to prevent their escape. They then resort to a ruse, they don a disguise, assume the cloak of an innocent thought, and thus evade the impaired scrutiny

[1] P. 70.

of the Censor; they get into the "Preconscious" and thence into the "Conscious." But how can the Censor possibly be deceived? He (or she, or it?) knows that in the "Unconscious" are none but wicked repressed thoughts, and therefore no innocent ones can possibly emerge from there! If we disregard here the difficulty raised above respecting Freud's "Regression," and assume that the "Repressed" thoughts can go backward via the Reminiscence-systems towards the Perception-System, then they need no disguise, for here is no censor. Therefore, through the "Preconscious" no "Repressed Thoughts" whatever can escape, a disguise being useless, and "regressively" the "Repressed Thoughts" need no disguise, for there is no "Censor." Hence the manifest and the latent dream-content are identical, or Freud's Phantasy requires overhauling.

After this digression to the "Endopsychic Censor," let me return to the "Unconscious" and "Preconscious," which were inserted in Freud's psychical apparatus, page 78 above. Freud assumes "the unconscious system as the starting point of dream-formation. This dream-excitation, he continues, will now, like all other idea-formation, tend to pass into the 'Preconscious' in order to gain access to consciousness." This way is, however, during waking life blocked to the dream-thoughts by the censor. But at night they do attain access to consciousness in the hallucinatory dream, which is all Freud here discusses. Although there is a diminished vigilance or resistance of the Censor, this access is not obtained through the "Preconscious," so he argues, for then the dream would be in the material of our ideas and would not show the hallucinatory character. The diminution of the Censoring activity between the "Unconscious" and "Preconscious" can only explain dreams where the dream-thoughts have experienced changes or modifications, but not hallucinatory dreams. The hallucinatory dream can only be explained

by the dream-thoughts going backward in the direction in which they came, i.e. in the direction back towards the perceptual end of the apparatus ; they regress.

I have tried very hard indeed to understand all this about the arrangement of the " psychical apparatus," but absolutely without success. I tried to put myself, as I always do in such cases, in the author's position and endeavoured to understand it by looking at the question from his side, but even then I failed to get any sense out of it. An innervation arrives at the Perception-system of the apparatus and becomes *ipso facto* a perception. Here it leaves no trace. It then progresses through several Reminiscence-Systems, where it leaves traces subserving the function of memory. Next it gets into the realm of the " Unconscious," from which, we are told, egress is very difficult. Nevertheless it passes into the " Subconscious," for it has to get to the motor-end of the psychical apparatus. But here is no consciousness, because a movement is not conscious except by new afferent innervations from the receptors in the muscles, joints and tendons, etc. And how in regression can an idea arriving at the Perception-system give rise to hallucinatory perception when no trace has been left there ?

Here is another shining example of the speciousness of Freudian thinking : " This regression . . . is one of the most important of psychological peculiarities of the dream-process, but . . . it is not confined to the dream alone," a most important *peculiarity* (of the dream-process) that is *not confined* to it ! And another specimen of looseness of expression : " the hallucinatory animation of the perceptual images (*die halluzinatorische Belebung der Wahrnehnungsbilder*) ! " And again, " by dream-process the intensities attached to the ideas were transferred completely from one to the other." What is an intensity attached to an idea ? And where is it after it is detached from one idea and before it is reattached to another idea ?

All this is taken from one short paragraph of a little more than a dozen lines. Freud's writings abound with such specimens. If I understand Freud correctly, dreams may then be produced by regression, as well as progression, that is, they may reach the " Conscious " through the door at the motor-end, i.e. through the " Preconscious," or at the door at the perceptual-end. It seems to me that Freud is here closely following both Greek and Roman Mythology.[1] Thus Homer sings [2] as translated by Pope :—

> Immun'd within the silent bower of sleep,
> Two portals firm the various phantoms keep :
> Of ivory one ; whence fit to mock the brain,
> Of winged lies a light fantastic train :
> The gate opposed pellucid valves adorn,
> And columns fair encas'd with polish'd horn :
> Where images of truth for passage wait,
> With visions manifest of future fate.

Virgil has [3]

> . . . Two gates of sleep there are ;
> The one of horn, 'tis said, by which the dreams
> Of true fulfilment easy exit find ;
> The other, wrought of ivory glistening white ;
> But false the dreams that to the upper air
> Through it are wafted from the Powers below.
>
> HENRY SMITH WRIGHT.

I have bestowed a great deal of time and trouble upon regression, but not because it is in any way important. I picked out this part of Freudian " Psychology " quite at random to show in what a superficial and cavalier manner the whole subject is treated and what a *terra incognita* the field of scientific psychology is to Freud.

Next is treated the subject—

(*c*) *Of Wish-Fulfilment.* It was this part of Freud's dream-interpretation that appealed to me very much at the beginning, as it seemed *a priori* so feasible. However, on

[1] Cf. J. Potters, *Archæologia Græeca*, Edinburgh, 1832, vol. i, ch. 13.
[2] *Odessey*, XIX, v. 562. [3] *Æneid*, VI, v. 893.

closer examination and scrutiny, I had to go back on my opinion. My reasons were the unrestrained use of symbolism, the unwarranted licence in interpretation, and the total absence here, as everywhere else in his writings, of any proof whatever.

However, it is not the ordinary conscious unfulfilled wish that is realised in the dream, such a wish as a child would realize in his play, e.g. to be a soldier, if a boy, and a mother, if a girl. It is a repressed, or unconscious, wish. Freud holds "that only then can a conscious wish become the originator of a dream when it is possible for it to rouse a corresponding unconscious one with which it can strengthen itself."[1] "The wish that presents itself in the dream must be an infantile one" (p. 370). "The dream is a piece of the past life of the infantile soul" (p. 377). "As long as the sleep lasts we know as surely that we dream, as we know that we sleep," says Freud on page 380. This has a truly Delphian sound!

If the patient is told by the psycho-analyst that he, the psycho-analyst, has been successful in unmasking, in unearthing, an infantile wish—the unsympathetic critic says concocting, fabricating—then there are two possibilities: the patient may admit that he may possibly have had such a thought, remembering or not remembering it, or he may deny that he ever had the wish, or that even the thought ever occurred to him. If, then, he admit it, there is the proof; if he deny it, this very denial indicates a resistance, and the stronger the denial, or resistance, the greater the proof of the exactness of the analysis. Therefore the analysis is correct in every case. Q.E.D.!

(*d*) *The Waking through the Dream. The Function of the Dream. The Anxiety or Fear-dream,* are the subjects to which Freud devotes the next section. The first two topics I have already dealt with above, in so far as they appeared interesting. As regards the third, Freud holds that

[1] Loc. cit., p. 369.

neurotic fear has sexual sources, and that he is, therefore, able to submit fear-dreams to analysis in order to demonstrate the sexual material in their dream-thoughts (p. 387).

(*e*) *The Primary and Secondary Process. Repression.* Here is restated a great deal of what I have already discussed. Freud reiterates that the hypermnesia of the dream and the disposal of infantile material have become the corner-stones of his doctrine. In his dream-theory he has attributed the rôle of the indispensable driving-force (Motor) for the dream-formation to the wish emanating from the Infantile" (p. 391). "We do not admit," he says, "as a special dream-source the subjective state of excitement of the sense-organs, which appears to have been demonstrated by Trumball Ladd, but we know how to explain it by the regressive animation of the reminiscences which operate behind the dream" (p. 392). "The most complicated mental operations are possible without the help of consciousness" (p. 394.)

In the thought-sequence in the "Preconscious" which, under the influence of the infantile wish in the "Unconscious," tend to form the dreams, a number of psychical functions can be noted. There is first *Compression*; through the free transferability of intensities and in the service of compression, "Middle-ideas" are formed which are "Compromises." These ideas have the most superficial relations one to another, and may exist side by side, although they may contradict one another. Reverting to his "Psychical Apparatus," described above, Freud explains the "Wish": "The accumulation of excitation is experienced as unpleasure and sets the apparatus going, in order to produce the experience of satisfaction (*Befriedigungserlebnis*), where the diminution of the excitation is experienced as pleasure. [This is mere tautology.—A.W.] Such a streaming in the apparatus proceeding from unpleasure and tending towards pleasure we call a wish." There follows a lengthy, wordy, and anything but clear phantasy of which it must

suffice to quote one or two conclusions: "Among these wish-impulses which emanate from the infantile, which are imperishable and cannot be inhibited, there are to be found then also such, the fulfilment of which has become antagonistic to the goal-ideas of the secondary thinking. The fulfilment of these wishes would no longer produce a pleasure-affect, but an unpleasure-affect. And it is just this change of affect which constitutes the essence of that which we designate as "Repression," and in which we recognize the infantile precursor of condemnation (the rejection by judgment)." . . . "We have previously found empirically that the described incorrect processes only take place with thoughts that have been repressed. . . . These incorrect processes are those that are primary in the psychical apparatus. They occur wherever ideas that have been abandoned by the Preconscious investment (*Besetzung*) have been left to themselves, and that can replenish themselves with unimpeded and outlet-seeking energy from the 'Unconscious'." . . . "If we will content ourselves with a minimum of fully assured increase of knowledge, we can say that the dream proves to us that the repressed also continues with the normal individual and remains capable of psychical performances." . . . "Dream interpretation is, however, the *Via regia* to the knowledge of the 'Unconscious'"—*of the psycho-analyst*, I would suggest adding.

(*f*) *The "Unconscious" and The "Conscious." The Reality.* A few remarks must be made on this concluding paragraph of the *Traumdeutung*. Freud reverts to the psychologist's objection to *Unconscious psychical processes* which I have maintained above.[1] As I said when a psychic, i.e. a conscious, process ceases, there remains a neurone-disposition which may, and generally does, influence subsequent psychic (i.e. conscious) processes. Now, there would be no harm done if we decided to call these neurone-dispositions "Unconscious ideas," etc., provided we always kept well in

[1] Pp. 42, 44, 51, *seq.*

mind that we were using merely metaphorical language. Freud's early colleague, Breuer, whom I quoted above,[1] has put this very pointedly indeed. Freud, too, in the beginning, paid lip-service to this scientific view, but it was, as I said, mere lip-service. Instead of remaining on the tortuous and plodding path of experimental science, it was easier for Freud to create entities and to let his imagination run riot, culminating in the statement: "The Unconscious is the properly real psychical. Its inner nature is just as unknown to us as the Reality of the outer world, and given to us just as incompletely through the data of consciousness as the external world through the information of our sense-organs." *Ça suffit.* . . . "What rôle remains in our exposition for the once all powerful, all over-shadowing consciousness? No other rôle than that of a sense-organ for the perception of psychical qualities." Comment is needless!

The characteristics of this only psychical Reality, the "Unconscious," are:—

(1) It consists of repressed mental material.
(2) It is dynamic in nature.
(3) It stands nearest to the crude primary instincts.
(4) It is of infantile nature and origin.
(5) It is illogical, or rather it has the logic of the emotions.
(6) It is predominantly sexual.

"A typical example," says Ernest Jones,[2] "of an unconscious mental process . . would be the wish of a little girl that her mother might die so that she could marry her father."

I have not dealt here with symbolism, which is so indispensable to dream-interpretation, as I shall devote a separate chapter to this subject. Further, I have almost entirely confined myself to Freud, and taken no account

[1] P. 52.

[2] Loc. cit., p. 126.

of his numerous competitors, imitators, disciples, and exponents; for if the Freudian edifice collapses because the fundaments upon which it is erected are shown to be fallacious, any variations of it will likewise come to the ground.

When the psycho-analyst is very hard pressed, he generally falls back upon the great number of dreams analysed, as a proof of the correctness of the psycho-analytic doctrine. Thus Stekel boasts that he has analysed thousands of dreams. But this is just as much a proof of the ease with which one can concoct anything out of a dream, or out of anything else for all that, by the psycho-analytic method. Surely it is no proof whatever that a dream has a particular meaning.

The looseness with which facts are often handled by psycho-analysts is fitly illustrated by Jung in a paper "*L'Analyse des rêves.*"[1] Jung analyses Gretchen's song in Goethe's *Faust*, "*Es war ein König in Thule*," and finds that the dypsomaniac king of the song who was faithful to his mistress stands for Faust, whom she wishes to be as faithful as the king. Psycho-analysis would reveal the secret of Gretchen's love, her pregnancy, etc., etc. As it happens, however, first, the mistress of the king in the song was dead; secondly, Gretchen sings the song before she finds the Jewels, before she had become Faust's mistress, before she was pregnant. Gretchen had seen Faust just once when he accosted her on her way home from church and she had sent him about his business, as a nice young lady should do. But such trifles apparently do not matter with psycho-analysts.

The final appeal of the psycho-analyst, when everything else has failed him, is to his personal conviction, which practice and experience, he says, forces upon him. "For I have always invariably found if an otherwise quite intelligent man understands absolutely nothing about the human psyche, but literally, absolutely nothing, that he is surely

[1] *Année Psychologique*, 1909, xi, pp. 160–167.

a professional psychologist or—a psychiatrist." Of course, that settles the question—for Sadger, at least. If cornered in an argument, says Carlyle, the only thing to do is to call your opponent a fool. Just before the above statement Sadger writes: "Although I have listened for several sessions to Freud lecturing on the theoretical part of his method, I required nevertheless about three years to overcome all difficulties." [1] This means that Sadger would require one to spend about four to five years before he would allow the competency to give an opinion! What would become of scientific progress? Before I bestow—perhaps waste—my time in such a pursuit I examine dispassionately the literature. Alas! this is too vast in this case—so at least the principal literary production of the shining lights of the movement. I grant their honesty and do not question their facts. What do I find? In trying to follow their reasoning I come to gaps, unwarranted inferences, wild jumping to conclusions, assertions, speculations, but nowhere any proof, not a shred of one. Scientific method I find scorned, and instead of the application of the law of sufficient reason, unrestrained play of imagination and reckless indulgence in phantasy and anthropomorphic tendencies. If this is accompanied, if not by ignorance, at least by ignoring the accepted teaching of psychology, then I believe I am justified in declining to follow Sadger's suggestion and waste five years. The acquirement of the method would never upset my logic or make me accept for scientific deduction what is merely assertion and contrary to the results of psychological experiment. There is no "*aprioristischer Weisheitsdünkel,*" aprioristic self-conceit, or priggishness, as Sadger is pleased to call it, but merely scientific sifting of facts and cold unemotional reasoning.

The critic's objection to psycho-analysis is often explained by its opponents as being due to "complexes." The critic's "Unconscious" is such a hideous and repulsive

[1] Sadger: "Über die Freudsche Methode." *Zentrabl. f. Nervenh. und Psych.*, 1907, pp. 42 *seq.* A. Muthmann: *Zur Psychologie und Therapie neurotischer Symptome*, Halle a/S, 1907, pp. 4–5.

affair that on no account must it be brought to light of day. Hence the antagonism. This reminds me of a pretty little fairy tale of Hans Andersen's called "The Emperor's New Clothes." The tale is too well known to require retelling. Suffice it to remind the reader that two impostors undertake to weave for the Emperor a magnificent cloth for his robes from costly material with which he furnishes them. They pretend that the cloth has the property of being invisible to all those who are incompetent for their respective posts. The impostors steal the costly material and merely pretend to weave, and everyone, from the Emperor and his ministers of state down to the servants and to his subjects, not seeing any cloth, and being afraid of showing himself incompetent for his post, pretends that he sees it and admires its excellence. Similarly the psychoanalyst taunts the psychologist, and "No one should tell his dreams in society" is the advice given by Pfister.[1] My advice, however, is: Never hesitate to tell your dreams, if you are asked to do so, unless they are manifestly indecent; their interpretation will give you a sure indication of the type of mind of the interpreter. "With the pure thou wilt show thyself pure; and with the froward thou wilt show thyself unsavory," says the psalmist.

From my observations above in answer to Sadger's remarks about the critics of Freud, it must not be inferred that I have stood aloof from the interpretation of dreams. This would not be true. I will therefore proceed to give the reader just one example of my attempts.

The Dream: "I stood by the river, and there came up out of the river seven well-favoured kine and fat-fleshed, and they fed in a meadow. And seven other kine came up after them out of the river, ill-favoured and lean-fleshed, and stood by the other kine upon the brink of the river. And the ill-favoured and lean-fleshed kine did eat up the seven well-favoured and fat kine."

[1] Loc. cit., p. 359.

There may be a familiar ring about this dream for some readers, but that need not disturb them. Let me get on with my analysis. "I stood by the River." I closed my eyes and gave myself up to free associations. There was a distinct visual image of a landscape. A really good English landscape, nothing Egyptian about it, a landscape resplendent with green, spring-time or early summer, glorious sunshine and a beautiful azure sky. A silvery stream was winding its tortuous course through the fresh meadows full of buttercups and daisies. The thought occurred "by the river," that is on the bank of the river. "A bank—"I know a bank thereon the wild thyme blows"—"Shakespeare"—a very faint image of a volume of Virtue's Imperial Shakespeare bound in red morocco—Idea of a pastoral poem—Shenstone—Herrick—Herrick's love poems—"Show me the hill where smiling love doth sit." Faint memories of, and conative tendencies towards, bucolic or sylvan love episodes—Hill—Bank—Bank of England—Deutsche Reichsbank—Memory image of its building in Berlin—Bank of Monte Carlo—Image and memories of the Casino—Bankrupt. Here then appeared to be a stop—the thought occurred that I had exhausted the associations, or, rather, that the analysis had yielded two results along two different lines: the one from the river bank—hillock to *love episodes*, the other from river bank—joint stock bank to *money matters*.

I began again with "River": renewal of the visual image of the landscape, but the river was constantly in prominence, in the foreground of consciousness. Ideas and thoughts of flowing—Passing on—*Strom der Zeit*—River of time—Pleasant experience of relief—Thought: This *is* it. Thought: The Zurich people say that water symbolizes what they term *Libido* and Nicoll suggests to call *Interest*. This is the case here—Judgment. Both is meant here, and *the river symbolizes the flow of time and the change of interest with it.*

Return to the dream: seven well-favoured kine and fat-fleshed. Idea: this is important, where shall I begin? Well-favoured and fat-fleshed, that means *wohlgenährt.* Thought: this is very important, the first two syllables being identical with the first two syllables of my name. —Very strange—slight emotion of astonishment: *Wohlge —nährt*: Associations: *nährt—nähren*—food—eating—mouth—muth (the last syllable of my name has repeatedly been mispronounced and misspelled on addresses, etc., as —mouth). Hence *well-favoured and fat-fleshed is symbolical of myself.*

I then turned to "seven kine," but, however many and varied lines of associations I pursued and which I need not give here, there were none that led to any result—there appeared to be a most powerful resistance. I attempted over and over again, but every time my endeavour ended in failure.

I gave up this part of the dream for the time being and occupied myself with the next part: seven other kine came up ill-favoured and lean-fleshed. Ill-favoured and lean-fleshed is "*mager*" in German, so we get *Kine-mager*, that is *Kinemager* or *Kinema-ger*. *Ger*, from the Latin *gerere*, to carry, perform, to be engaged, is a Latin suffix signifying *bearer*, e.g. *armiger*, and as stem it appears in *gerant*, an active partner, or manager, in a business concern. Thus *Kinema-ger* is the manager or partner of a Kinema or Moving-Picture-Show. Immediately there recurred to consciousness an episode that happened about three years ago. It must have been in 1916.[1] I met an acquaintance whom I had not seen for a year or so. He looked exceedingly snug and well groomed and comfortable, vastly different from what he used to look before the war. I expressed my satisfaction at seeing him looking so well and prosperous, remarking that the hard times we were then passing through

[1] I may state here that I vouch for the absolute accuracy of all the incidents here referred to. They are true as narrated, and I indulged in no poetic licence,—A. W.

did not appear to have affected him. He owned that he had been and was still very well, making "piles of money." I retorted that that was not astonishing with eggs at eightpence each. This was a little dig at him, having reference to a communication he had made to me on a previous meeting that his wife had taken up poultry-farming. He smiled, taking my banter good-humouredly, and said it was not that where he had been making money, and proceeded to inform me that he with two friends who were financing the concern had formed a sort of syndicate, as he termed it, to buy up moving-picture-shows all over the country that had failed during the war. They generally got these for "a mere song," renovated and refurnished the building and restarted the entertainments, working them "for all they were worth," and when they were going well resold them at a high profit. This had been going on for some time, and he had made "thousands." In the subsequent course of conversation he intimated that if I liked I could have "a finger in the pie," as he expressed himself. Not caring for these "short cuts to fortune"—not because I have any particular dislike of money, but merely because I have found that they, the "short cuts," generally end in a bog from which the too enterprising explorer is glad to extricate himself—I thanked him for his kind offer and told him that to my great sorrow I must decline it. So I got a Kinema-proprietor, but what about him? Of course: seven, sept, σηπτικός, putrid, rotten—as clear as daylight. The undertaking to which the proposal of the Kinema-proprietor referred was a rotten one; I had to keep away from it. A warning from Pharaoh to me! An unconscious repressed wish of his to pass this warning on to me! I had already acted in accordance with it long before I had analysed the dream, three years before in fact. And all this time I thought I had arrived at the decision, not to have anything to do with the offer, through experience, reflection, and judgment; but now I see it was nothing of the sort. I

merely followed the promptings of my "Unconscious." My reflection was an illusion. But this opens up a far wider field of investigation and throws fresh light upon my family history. For how could this warning idea be in my "Unconscious" unless I am a lineal descendant of that Pharaoh who over 3,600 years ago had the dream recorded in Genesis? The germ-plasm of Pharaoh passed this unconscious warning on to his offspring, and so on, from generation to generation, until it reached me, for whom it had been intended. I acted upon it in A.D. 1916, and did not discover the fact until A.D. 1920. For is not my surname clearly indicated symbolically in the dream? And again: Pharaoh = *Φαραώ*. Here are five letters. The same number of letters occurs in my Christian name, "Adolf." Further, both names have the A — *α*, o — *ω*, ph or f — *φ*, in common. Of the dissimilar latters *ρ* is the seventeenth letter in the Greek Alphabet and *α* the first: 17 — 1 = 16. In the Latin alphabet *d* is the fourth letter and *l* the twelfth: 12 + 4 = 16. And did all this not happen in 1916? This is surely too much to explain away as a mere coincidence! I feel sure that Professor Freud and his followers will hail this great discovery with satisfaction, and I have no doubt that their fertile minds will soon be able to elucidate the apparent mystery of the case.

But I must return to my dream, or rather Pharaoh's dream. Having satisfactorily explained the latter part of it, I tackled again the beginning, but found the same stubborn resistance as before. Then suddenly it occurred to me that such resistance was characteristically indicative of a deep sexual complex, deep down in the "Unconscious," which the Censor would not allow to be approached. Then there fell from mine eyes as it had been scales and I received light forthwith. I looked out for a sexual complex which I had not thought of before. Unfortunately, however, as Dr. Ernest Jones has it, the complex thus reached was of so intimate a nature that discretion forbids the publishing of

it. Simultaneously with the complex there was revived in consciousness the contents of a passage I had read about five years previously in *L'Ile des Pingouins*, by Anatole France, at the end of chap. viii, p. 374. I then turned up the passage and found the fateful "Seven" again: "Il (Paul Visive) conduisait furtivement Eveline dans un petit hôtel, près de la Gare du Nord, où ils restèrent jusqa à la nuit. Après leur départ, la fille de l'hôtel, en changeant les draps du lit, vit sept petites croix tracées avec une épingle à cheveux, près du chevet, sur le mur de l'alcôve." This must suffice.

To many readers this analysis will probably appear too fine spun. In my opinion, however, to quote Dr. Ernest Jones' [1] opinion on a similar occasion, "they underestimate the combination of delicacy and rigour with which unconscious and preconscious processes are determined, a conclusion which can readily be confirmed by a painstaking study in similar material."

[1] Loc. cit., p. 52.

IV

SYMBOLISM

Eye nature's walks, shoot folly as it flies.
POPE: *Essay on Man.*

WHEN discussing the dream in the preceding chapter I have avoided entering upon the subject of symbolism, because this subject in psycho-analysis is of such paramount importance that it requires a more detailed examination than it could have received in conjunction with the dream; and I intend now to devote a special chapter to its consideration.

As we have seen, Freud distinguishes the "manifest dream-content" from the "latent dream-thoughts." The manifest dream-content is the dream as it appears to us. But, says Freud, all this which appears as dream is merely disguise, is the symbolic expression of the latent dream-thoughts. A man dreams that he is walking up a flight of stairs; although he may have been doing this dozens of times every day, yet in the dream this is a symbol of coition; an umbrella, a stick, a lamp-post, etc., stand for a penis; a box, a trunk, a room, etc., are symbols of the vagina, and so on. This symbolism is, however, not confined to the dream, it obtains also in waking life, where it finds expression in *lapsus linguæ*, in symptomatic actions, etc., not only of the patient, but also of the normal individual. But lest I be suspected of exaggeration let me quote Freud himself.[1] "The Emperor, the Empress (King and Queen),

[1] *Die Traumdeutung*, 3te Aufl., 1911, pp. 210 *seq.*

represent, indeed, generally the parents of the dreamer; he, or she, is the prince, or princess. All objects that are stretched out, sticks, tree-stumps, umbrellas (on account of the opening which is comparable to the erection), all long and sharp weapons: knives, daggers, pikes—represent the male organ. A frequent symbol of it, not quite understood, is a nail-file (on account of the filing and scraping?) —tins, boxes, cases, wardrobes, stoves, correspond to the female body—rooms (*Zimmer*) in dreams are generally women (*Frauenzimmer*); the description of their various entrances and exits does not offer any difficulty to the interpretation. The interest, whether the room is 'open' or 'locked,' is easily understandable from the context. . . . What key is needed to open the room need not be expressly stated. . . . The dream of passing through a suite of rooms is a brothel or harem-dream. Steps, ladders, and staircases, respectively, the going up of them, not only upwards but also downwards, are symbolic representation of the sexual act. (*Footnote.*—I repeat here what I have stated elsewhere, '*Die zukünftigen Chancen der psycho-analytischen Therapie*,' *Zentralbl. f. Psycho-analyse*, 1, Nr. 1/2, 1910). A little while back it became known to me that a rather unsympathetic (*ein uns ferner stehender*) psychologist had remarked to one of us that surely we were exaggerating the secret sexual significance of dreams. His most frequent dream was to walk up a flight of steps, and surely there was nothing sexual in that. Having by this observation our attention drawn to it, we applied ourselves closely to the occurrence in the dream of steps, stairs, and ladders, and were soon able to ascertain that the step (and that which is analogous to it) represents an undoubted coitus-symbol; the basis of its comparison is not difficult to find. In rhythmic steps, with increasing dyspnœa, one arrives at a height, and in a few quick leaps one may be down again. Thus the rhythm of the coitus is represented in mounting stairs. Do not let us forget to consult colloquial speech. It shows us that

'*steigen*' (mounting) is another description of the sexual act. That man is a '*Steiger*,' is a usual way of speaking. In French the step of a staircase is called '*une marche*,' ; '*un vieux marcheur*' is exactly equivalent to our '*ein alter Steiger*'—smooth walls over which one climbs, fronts of houses which one descends—frequently with terror—correspond to erect human bodies, and repeat in the dream probably the reminiscence of the little child climbing up parents or guardians. The 'smooth' walls are men; on the projections of the houses one generally holds fast in the dream fright—tables, laid tables, and planks, are also women, probably on account of the antithesis, which abolishes here the roundness of the body. 'Wood' appears in general, according to its linguistic relations, representative of the female material (matter). The name of the island Madeira signifies in Portuguese 'wood.' Since 'table and bed' make up matrimony, we find that in the dream frequently the former is put for the latter, and, as far as it is possible, the sexual ideation-complex is transposed to the eating complex. As to articles of dress, the hat of a woman is very frequently, and with certainty, to be interpreted as genitals, namely those of a man. In the dreams of males one finds very frequently the necktie is the symbol of the penis, probably not for the reason that it hangs down and is characteristic of the man, but because one is able to choose them to one's liking, a liberty which with reference to the original of the symbol is not admitted by nature. Persons who use these symbols in their dreams are in waking life very extravagant with their ties and possess regular collections of them. All complicated machinery and apparatus of the dream are very probably genitals, in whose description dream-symbolism shows itself as indefatigable as the '*Witzarbeit*' (making of jokes, puns, etc.). Similarly, many landscapes of dreams, especially those with bridges, or with wooded mountains, are easily to be recognized as descriptions of the genitals. Finally, in the case of incomprehensible

new-formation of words one may think of the composition of parts with sexual meaning. Likewise, children signify in the dream nothing else but the genitals, as men and women are wont to speak of their genitals caressingly as 'little one.' As a quite recent dream symbol of the male organ the airship may be mentioned, which is justified not only by its relation to flying, but also by its form—to play with a little child, to beat it, etc., is frequently the dream-representation of 'masturbation.'"

Criticizing some observations of W. Stekel, that dream-symbols can generally be interpreted both as male or female genital organs, Freud says: [1] "Besides symbols which may stand as often for male as for female genital organs, there are others which signify essentially, or almost without exception, one of the sexes, and still others of which only the male or only the female significance is known. Phantasy does not permit using long, strong objects and weapons as symbols of the female organs, or hollow boxes, cases, or tins, as symbols of the male organ."

Anyone still harbouring any doubt about Freud's claim may gain conviction by considering the following: So universal and deep-rooted a principle as that of sexual symbolism should manifest itself everywhere, in the economic, the artistic, the industrial life of mankind. Does it do so? Let the sceptic ascend the Dome of St. Paul's, or the London Monument, and glance around. An endless sea of chimney-pots reveals itself to his gaze. The contrivance for leading the smoke away from the hearth, or the furnace, has been given by the hand of man, owing to this unsuppressible Freudian Principle, the phallic shape. Are not the numberless and ubiquitous lamp-posts, electric standards, telegraph-posts, nay even the London Monument itself, an expression of the same principle? And who can fail to be struck by the resemblance of the very Dome of St. Paul's to the glans penis? Even the Thames could not help

[1] Loc. cit., p. 212.

itself, but had to follow a sinuous serpentine course, and that the serpent is a phallic symbol is vouched for by psycho-analysts. We thus find this Freudian Principle confirmed in every path of human endeavour. Could we wish for more convincing proof? Hardly! yet there are still more. Chimney-pots are a comparatively modern contrivance, but the Freudian Principle was already unconsciously acted on long before their invention. In the days of our forefathers, and still to-day among primitive peoples, the smoke accumulated under the roof of the dwelling-place and thence escaped by a hole. But is not a hole, as every psycho-analyst knows, the symbol for the kteis, the female organ? When the savage builds his hut, and indeed civilized man also, he symbolizes the sexual act by digging a hole in the ground and inserting the post. Of course, he does not know this, he does it unconsciously, the Freudian Principle makes him act thus. When our children rush unto the yellow sands during their seaside holiday to dig holes, when the lady who tends her garden pushes a pole into the ground to support her flowers, we have only the manifestation of this world principle. And still this is not all. The tree, as is well known, is a phallic symbol. Trees were, however, according to the Mosaic cosmogony, created before man, and those also who believe in the theory of Evolution assert that trees preceded human beings on our globe. But this does not invalidate the Freudian Principle, but only proves that the Freudian Principle, consciously or unconsciously, actuated the Creator, or that it pervades even the principle of evolution.

Why is it that women do not generally engage in the trades of builders, bricklayers, or carpenters? They appear to have little desire for these vocations, and we find only men taking to them with a liking. The idea that the work is too heavy for women will not stand investigation, for we find women following callings that require just as hard work and more arduous application. The real reason why

only men apply themselves to the building of houses is, that in their erection, i.e. in the erection of houses, rooms and doors and windows are fashioned, and these, as is well known, are all symbols for the female organ.

Another significant fact to be mentioned in this connection is this : whereas women never, or seldom, have any pockets, and then but very few, men's garments are full of them. This is fully explained by the Freudian Principle, for is not the function of the pocket that of having something put into it, and is it not therefore a symbol of *partes muliebres* ?

The cynical sceptic may smile and possibly object that if this Principle be correct, why do we not find only women in parks and woods and wherever there are trees, for is not the tree, as we have seen, a phallic symbol ? But this objection will not disconcert the psycho-analyst. Quite right, he retorts, the objection may appear valid to the superficial reasoner, or the uncritical observer, for when we go to Hyde Park or Kew Gardens we do indeed find quite as many men as women. But *exceptio probat regulam*, and this seeming incongruity proves the Freudian Principle, and proves it to the hilt. Quite simple ! These men that frequent parks and woods are Inverts. They may not know it, and doubtless would repudiate with indignation such a statement. But that does not matter, for has not their " Unconscious " actually revealed the fact by their choice in resorting to places where there are phallic symbols ?

Next let me apply the Symbolism of Freud to the interpretation of a dream. This is the dream : " Very scantily clad, I am going from a flat on the ground floor up the staircase to another floor. In doing this I am jumping over three steps every time, and am pleased that I can mount stairs so quickly. Suddenly I become aware that a maid-servant is coming downstairs, that she is coming towards me. I am embarrassed and wish to hurry, and now occurs this, being impeded (*gehemmtsein*). I am glued on the stairs and cannot move from the spot." What is

the meaning of this dream? "Generally speaking, we are not in a position to interpret the dream of another person," says Freud,[1] "if that person does not want to deliver up to us the unconscious thoughts that lie behind the dream-content. . . . Except," he adds in a footnote, "*those cases in which the dreamer makes use of the symbols that are known to us in the presentation of the latent dream-thoughts.*"[2] According to Freud's acknowledged symbolism this dream is then a coitus-dream pure and simple, and nothing else. The object of the dreamer's sexual desire is doubtless the person represented by the maid-servant. The latter part of the dream Freud concedes, for Freud himself is the dreamer of this dream,[3] to be exhibitionistic, and it need not concern us further. What is, however, interesting is Freud's own Analysis. Here it is: "The situation of the dream is taken from every-day reality. In a house in Vienna I occupy two flats that are connected only by the general staircase. My professional rooms and my study are on the ground-floor, whilst my private suite is on the next floor. After having finished my work at a late hour I go up the staircase to the bedroom. On the evening preceding the dream I had gone this short way somewhat unconventionally clad, i.e. I had taken off my collar, tie, and cuffs. In the dream this had been turned into a higher degree, but as usual an indefinite state, of nakedness. Mounting several steps at a time is my usual way of going upstairs, by the way, an admitted wish-fulfilment in the dream, for with the facility of this performance I had consoled myself respecting the state of the functioning of my heart. Further, this manner of going upstairs is in effective contrast to the inhibition in the second half of the dream. It demonstrated to me, although this did not require any proof, that the dream has no difficulty in representing to itself motor-actions in full perfection; one need only think of the flying in dreams!

[1] Loc. cit., p. 174. [2] The italics are mine. [3] Loc. cit., p. 173.

"But the stairs I am mounting are not those of my house. I fail to recognize them at first, and only the person who is coming towards me enlightens me on the locality. For this person is the maid-servant of the old lady whom I visit twice a day to give her injections; the stairs are also quite similar to those which I have to go up twice a day.

"How do these stairs and this female get into my dream? The embarrassment on account of not being fully dressed is evidently of a sexual character. The maid-servant of whom I dream is older than I, peevish and anything but sexually exciting. To these questions nothing else comes to my mind but this: When I pay my morning visit at this house I have generally to clear my throat, and the product of expectoration gets on the stairs. For on these two floors there are no spittoons, and I hold the view that the keeping clean of the stairs has not to be done at the expense of my convenience, but by the provision of spittoons. The female caretaker, likewise an elderly and peevish person, but of cleanly instincts—this much I am willing to concede to her—has different views upon this subject. She lies in wait for me to see whether I am taking the liberty aforesaid and after having ascertained this I hear her audibly grumbling. After this she will refuse me for days when we are meeting the respect due to me. On the day preceding the dream the faction of the caretaker had received reinforcement by the maid-servant. I had visited the patient as quickly as usual when the maid stopped me in the anteroom with the remark: 'Doctor, you might have wiped your boots before coming into the room. The red carpet is again quite dirty with your footmarks.' This is all that stairs and maid-servant can possibly account for appearing in the dream.

"There is a close relation between my flying-up-the-stairs and the spitting-on-the-stairs. Pharyngitis and heart trouble are both intended to be punishments for the vice of smoking, on account of which I do not enjoy the reputation

of excessive cleanliness, either in the one house or in the other, both of which the dream has amalgamated into one structure."

I will not dilate upon the ethical, social, or hygienic aspects of Freud's habit to which he so unblushingly owns. I would have preferred to pass the matter over in silence and to confine myself to the scientific consideration of his dream had I not met repeatedly with derogatory reference, not only to the psycho-analytic doctrine on account of this, but also to medical practitioners in general on the Continent. To cite but one example: Rose Macaulay, in one of her widely read novels,[1] describing one of her characters, says: " If any one had asked her (Mrs. Hilary) what she knew about psycho-analysis, she would have replied, in effect, that she knew Rosalind, and that was enough, more than enough, of psycho-analysis for her. She had also looked into Freud, and had been rightly disgusted. ' A man who spits deliberately on to his friend's stairs, on purpose to annoy the servants . . . that is enough, the rest follows. The man is obviously a loathsome and indecent vulgarian. It comes from being a German, no doubt, which settled that. Mrs. Hilary, like Grandmama, settled people and things very quickly and satisfactorily; and if anyone murmured ' an Austrian,' she would say, ' It comes to the same thing in the question of breeding.' "

However, Mrs. Hilary, and people like her, may rest assured that Freud is not a fair specimen, and that the filthy habit referred to is just as little indulged in on the Continent as it is here.

Let us then return to the analysis of Freud's dream. The dream, on Freud's own showing, is a coitus-dream. This is confirmed by Freud's reference in his own analysis to spittoons and the product of expectoration, for being a hollow vessel the former is evidently symbolic of the female sexual organ, and the latter stands on account of its

[1] *Dangerous Ages*, London, 1921, p. 29.

similarity in colour and viscosity, etc., for the seminal fluid. This receives a further confirmation by the fact that the "product of expectoration" is destined for the spittoon, deposited in it. Freud's preference for depositing it elsewhere has doubtless a definite significance, for nothing is meaningless in the dream; but I need not go too closely into this here. That it is a common custom to place a wet umbrella into a spittoon in the absence of an umbrella stand seems also significant, and thus the dream appears over determined, for Freud has told us the symbolic meaning of an umbrella. Nor must it be overlooked that Freud went to that house twice a day to give an "injection," and the psycho-analytical meaning of this requires hardly any explanation. Freud's insistence that the caretaker was older than he, that she was peevish and anything but sexually exciting (*keineswegs anreizend*) is, as so often in such dreams, *camouflage*, and serves to confirm the analysis. The inhibition Freud experiences in the dream he calls *Gehemmtsein*; that his latent dream-thoughts probably meant a "*Gehemd-sein*," being only clad in a nightshirt, means merely another over-determinization. *Was sich neckt das liebt sich*, says the German proverb. "Teasing is a sign of affection," and Freud's playfulness in depositing the "product of expectoration" on the stairs in order to tease the caretaker is nothing but an application of this proverb. Had the caretaker been indifferent to Freud he would never have thought how to tease or annoy her. However, what is a still more probable interpretation of the two elderly females of the dream is that they represent the dreamer's mother, or grandmother, or both. We have here then evidently an Œdipus-dream.

But enough of this banter.

The number of symbols that are supposed to be met with in dreams seems to be legion, and it appears to be futile to try and examine all those mentioned in psycho-analytical writings. I will, therefore, content myself with

a more detailed examination of only one or two, choosing for this purpose the most definite ones.

Let us take, e.g., the walking upstairs and downstairs, which happens to every one dozens of times every day. Why should this always be a symbolic expression of coitus, especially when actual coitus-dreams do take place now and again? As a matter of fact, as I have shown above, Freud himself after having dreamt that he was walking upstairs, does not interpret this act as a symbolic expression of coitus. Umbrellas and trunks are articles of such common occurrence that it would hardly be profitable to choose these for closer examination as symbols of the phallus and kteis respectively. It is different with, say, the Serpent, as probably few dwellers in large cities will have met with live Serpents except in zoological gardens or in the windows of dealers in reptiles and fishes. "This" (i.e. the Serpent), says Ernest Jones,[1] "is one of the most constant symbols of the phallus, and from experiences and thoughts in connection with this object (i.e. the phallus I suppose is meant) the general conception of 'sexuality' is largely derived. According to the Jung-Silberer school, the image of a serpent in a dream will symbolize the abstract idea of sexuality more often than the concrete idea of the phallus, whereas to the psycho-analytical school it only *symbolizes* the latter, though of course it is commonly *associated with* the former; the practical difference this makes is that, according to the latter school, any meaning of the dream-context which is expressed in terms of the general idea is secondary to, derived from, and dependent upon, a deeper meaning of the unconscious which can only be expressed in terms of the concrete. Again, the unconscious assimilates the general idea of knowledge in terms of the more specific idea of sexual knowledge, which in its turn is assimilated as sexual power; the association is indicated in the Biblical phrase 'to know a woman.' For this reason the idea of

[1] Loc. cit., p. 170.

a serpent has become associated, especially in the East, with that of knowledge, so that it commonly serves as an emblem of wisdom (as do many other sexual symbols, e.g. salt). But to say that a serpent may 'symbolize' *either* a phallus *or* wisdom is to confound two entirely different psychological processes. . . ." The terms emblem and symbol are certainly not entirely synonymous, although in many cases they are quite interchangeable; but that they involve two *entirely different* psychological processes I should not feel inclined to admit. Ernest Jones, it seems to me, has got hold of the wrong end of the stick. If by "sexuality" we mean sexual desires, sexual pleasures, etc., then the phallus has been a symbol of sexuality; and as the serpent has been made the symbol for the phallus, it becomes *ipso facto* a symbol of "sexuality." However this may be, the value of these hairsplitting distinctions and the polemics between these rival schools reminds me of the value and mode of the discussions of the schoolmen: "How many angels can find room on a needle point," and other similar and equally important subjects.

Besides, Ernest Jones a few pages before makes the serpent also a symbol of fear, horror, and disgust: "This" (i.e. the serpent symbol), he says,[1] "symbolizes at the same time the phallus itself by means of the objective attributes common to both (shape, erectibility, habits of emitting poison, and of creeping into holes, etc.), and also a subjective attitude towards it, compounded of fear, horror, and disgust, that may in certain circumstances be present, e.g. when the subject is a prudish virgin and the object belongs to a distasteful person."

If we turn, however, still a few pages further back[2] we find this: "The idea of a snake, which is never consciously associated with that of the phallus, is regularly so in dreams, being one of the most constant and invariable symbols: in primitive religions the two ideas are quite obviously

[1] Loc. cit., p. 165.

[2] Loc. cit., p. 143.

interchangeable, so that it is often hard to distinguish phallic from ophitic worship. . . ." With regard to the last sentence I shall presently give [1] an opinion of Tylor's on that subject.

Let me next quote another writer on this subject, Pfister. He says: [2] "That there are typical symbols, I will show first in a neat example: the picture of a serpent. The phallic significance of the serpent runs through wide stretches of religious history: Dietrich relates that in Greece, on certain feasts, a phallus or a serpent was placed in a chest. The serpent cult of the negroes of Haiti and Louisiana bears a phallic character. Among the Arrhetophorians, pastry in the form of phalli and serpents was thrown into the chasm during the Thesmophoria in order to obtain fruitfulness in children and harvests. The serpent, besides other objects known to the analyst as sexual symbols, is the symbol of Hecate Aphrodisias." This is mixed, muddled, and inaccurate. From the ancient Greeks Pfister turns to American negroes and then to the Arrhetophorians, apparently another tribe, American or African, for him. I shall show presently that the serpent in the Grecian mysteries was not, and could not have been, intended as a phallic symbol. But let me go on. After having arbitrarily interpreted a poem of Möricke's, nay wantonly misinterpreted it, he quotes Lessing incompletely. Lessing in his *Laokoon*, ch. ii, explains the dream of the mothers of Aristomenes, Aristodamas, Alexander the Great, Scipio, Augustus, Galerius, who during their pregnancy dreamt of serpents, by the fact that the serpent was an attribute of godhead, and that the statues of Bacchus, Apollo, Mercury, Hercules, etc., were seldom without this symbol of their divinity. "The honest women," Lessing writes, "had feasted their eyes during the day on the statues of the God, and the confusing dream called up the image of the serpent.

[1] *Vide* p. 115.

[2] *The Psycho-analytic Method*, authorized translation by Dr. Charles Rockwell Payne, p. 286.

I thus save the dream and expose the interpretation which the arrogance of their sons and the assurance of sycophants gave to it. For there must be a reason why the adulterous phantasy always was a serpent." I do not complain that Pfister makes three mistakes in the spelling of the names, but I do complain about his want of honesty in quoting Lessing in support of his theory, whilst omitting Lessing's very likely and probable explanation. If we meet with such arbitrariness in quotations from, and references to, authors that can be checked, what licence and manipulation may we not suspect in material and protocols that cannot be verified! Next Pfister gives Goethe's 12*te Römische Elegie*, where reference is made to the *cistæ mysticæ* and serpents. But who would cite Goethe for this? Pfister then says: "It is not necessary to tell more clearly what serpent and casket signify." Evidently wishing to insinuate that they symbolize the phallus and kteis respectively. But this is not intended to be the case in the poem. Goethe merely refers to them as symbolic objects used in the Greek Mysteries, and that such interpretation as Pfister puts upon them is wrong, I shall endeavour to show presently. Then follow some serpent dreams which are just as wantonly and arbitrarily interpreted as the rest. After the serpent has thus been made out, to Pfister's own satisfaction, to be a typical phallic symbol, we have this statement on page 291: "the serpent appears also as feminine symbol"; and on page 292: "At all events, the simple symbol of the serpent is in general of many meanings, and it is awkward and stupid to identify the serpent every time with the phallus." Finally, on page 293: "He who denies typical symbols as a matter of principle may quietly investigate and analyse as if they did not exist. He will soon perceive his error." This is a slovenly written, amateurish book, and the translation is in keeping with it, for there is evidence that the translator is neither a psychologist nor sufficiently conversant with the language he attempts to translate.

As I have pointed out above, most town-dwellers have no, or very little, acquaintance with serpents, except what they have read about them, or through pictures. There is no similarity in the shapes or forms of the serpent and the phallus to suggest one another, so that even Thomas Inman, who in his *Ancient Faiths embodied in Ancient Names* endeavours to trace most, if not all, religious emblems and rites to sexual organs and processes, is compelled to admit it. For in the above-named work, under the heading "Serpents," [1] he says: "For a very long period I was unable to see any significance in the adoption of the serpent as an emblem, nor did I recognize it until I conversed with a gentleman who was familiar with the cobra in India. He told me that this snake and the Egyptian cerastes are both able to inflate the skin around the head, and to make themselves large and erect. In this they resemble the characteristic part of man; consequently the serpent became a covert name and a mystic emblem." As this experience has not been accorded to Europeans individually, it cannot have served them in the recognition of a similarity between the phallus and the serpent.

Since, then, there is not in the ontogenetic experience, i.e. in the experience of the individual, that which is necessary to make the serpent a phallic symbol, it should be found in the phylogenetic experience, i.e. in the experience of the race, and I presume it is upon this that psycho-analysts mostly rely. Let me examine how far this is borne out by fact. In doing so I must quote Tylor, who says: [2] "Serpent worship unfortunately fell years ago into the hands of speculative writers, who mixed it up with occult philosophies, Druidical mysteries, and that portentous nonsense called the 'Arkite Symbolism,' till now sober students hear the very name Ophiolatry with a shiver."

A fact which I will first consider is the sloughing of

[1] Vol. ii, p. 710.
[2] Edward B. Tylor: *Primitive Culture*, 5th ed., London, 1913, 2 vols., vol. ii, p. 239.

serpents. This occurs very frequently. The reticulate rocksnake, or Anaconda, the Ularsawa of the Malays, *Python reticulatus*, casts its skin almost regularly every month. Sir John Fayrer and V. Richards state that the captive cobras in India do so every month, even in winter.[1] To the artless and unsophisticated mind it appears as a new snake crawling out of the old one, as an act of rejuvenation, thus giving rise to the belief in the immortality of serpents, which becomes strengthened by the longevity of these reptiles, and the fact that they can be severely mutilated without destroying them. Hence it would be quite natural to adopt the serpent as an emblem, or symbol, of immortality, and we find it therefore as an attribute given to practically every deity of the ancients. From this constant association with their gods the meaning of the symbol becomes extended to divinity. There is so far nothing phallic about the Serpent, its presence in most of the representations of the gods is quite satisfactorily accounted for; also the dreams of those mothers of heroes of antiquity, to which I have referred above[2] when I animadverted upon Pfister's garbled quotation from Lessing, are easily understandable, and Lessing's explanation appears perfectly satisfactory. It likewise accounts for the serpents in certain forms of the Caduceus or Kerykeion, the herald's wand or staff, as carried by Mercury or Hermes, the messenger of the gods. To what extravagant perversions the monomania of some authors may lead them is instanced by the following quotation: "The caduceus represents two copulating serpents. To describe the caduceus is to describe the mechanism of love among the Ophidians. The bifurcated penis penetrates the vagina, the bodies interlace in many turns whilst the two heads straighten up fixating each other's eyes." [3]

Being a symbol of juvenescence and immortality, it is

[1] Cf. Brehms Tierleben: *Neubearbeitet v. Franz Werner*, Leipzig, 1913, vol. ii.
[2] P. 113.
[3] Remy de Gourmont: *Physique de l'amour*, Paris, 1903, p. 112.

feasible that, by extension, the serpent should be adopted as a symbol also of health, for health is essential to long life, and the ageing, infirm, and sick wish to attain health again, to be rejuvenated. Thus we find the serpent a constant attribute of Asklepios, or Æsculapius, as the Romans called him, the god of the healing art, and of his daughter Hygieia, the goddess of health. Hygin relates that a serpent brought Asklepios a resuscitating herb, and Zeus, fearing that he would make man immortal, slew him with his thunderbolt. Of the numerous temples dedicated to the god, the one in Epidauras was the most splendid, and Asklepios was honoured there in the shape of a serpent. Serpents were kept in his temples and were found about healing springs.

A long life is necessary to acquire experience; hence wisdom can only be possessed by age, and we find this an indispensable qualification, among others, in order to be admitted to the ruling body in a republic, or to the advisory body of the King in a monarchy. We have the *Elders* of the Old and New Testaments, the Roman *Senate* (from senex = old), the Athenian *Archons* (from *ἄρχων, ἀρχαῖος*), the *Gerontes* (from *γέρων*) of the *Gerusia*, which already in Homer's time formed the Council of Agamemnon. All these names indicate that the members were old men. That they were wise men is shown by the name of the *Witenagemot* (A.S. *witan* = to know, *wita* = a man of wisdom). A wizard was a wise-ard. How much wiser then must the immortal serpent be! Hence the serpent becomes a symbol of wisdom. In Genesis i. 3 we find: "Now the serpent was more subtile than any other beast of the field"; and again Matthew x. 16, "Be ye . . . wise as serpents." Bacon,[1] speaking of heraldry, says: ". . . for the Escutcheon of Pretence each noble person bears the Hieroglyphic of that virtue he is famous for, e.g. if

[1] *New Atlantis*, London, 1660, pp. 23 and 24; from E. Durning-Lawrence: *Bacon is Shakespeare*, p. 151.

eminent . . . in Dialectica she (a slender virgin) holds a serpent in either hand." Neugebaverus, in his *Selectorvm Symbolorvm Heroicvm Centvria gemina*, Frankfurt, 1619, gives, among others, the following emblems in use by English Sovereigns: Richard II, a serpent twined about stalks of laurel and palm, that form an oval wreath with a crown above *Regis victoriæ ac virtutibus*, For the King's victory and virtues. In *Symbola divina et humana*, ed. 1673, p. 302, Queen Anne Boleyn has for device a star shining within a serpent-circle, surmounted by a crown, and on the scroll, *Fato Prvdentia Major*.[1] Many more examples might be cited.

This appears to me a very simple and natural hypothesis, of the probability of which there can be little doubt, whilst the explanation of Dr. Ernest Jones, as given above,[2] is grotesque and extravagant, and carries anything but conviction.

Up to now I have considered the serpent as emblem, or symbol, and as attribute, although, as we have seen, Asklepios was worshipped at Epidauros in the form of a serpent. There remains now to be considered the worship of the Serpent in general as a deity. Lord Avebury [3] points out that "In considering the wide distribution of serpent-worship it must be remembered that in the case of the serpent the name is applied to the whole order of animals, and that serpents occur all over the world, except in very cold regions; whilst other animals, like the lion, bear, bull, etc., have less extensive areas, and consequently their worship could not be so general. If, however, we compare, as we ought, serpent-worship with quadruped-worship, or bird-worship, or sun-worship, we shall find that it has no exceptionally wide area."

It seems to me that if in anthropology a clear difference

[1] From *The Mirrovr of Maiestie*, 1618, edited by the Holbein Society, 1870.

[2] P. 112.

[3] *Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man*, 7th ed., London, 1912, pp. 229–230.

between "*Analogues*" and "*Homologues*" be made, as it is in the Natural Descriptive Sciences, e.g. Botany and Zoology, it would lead to clearer conceptions in many of its branches. Structures which have common origin, which are derived from the same ancestral form, are said to be *homologous* one with another, although they may differ in their functions; whilst structures which subserve the same function, but are derived from different ancestral forms, are called *analogous*. The tuber of the potato is homologous with a branch of the stem, but analogous with a fleshy root, such as that of a carrot. The tendrils of the pea, to give another example, are morphologically leaflets, i.e. they are the homologues of leaves; but the tendrils of the vine are morphologically stems, therefore the tendrils of the pea and the vine are analogues. Wings of birds and bats are homologues of the fore-limbs of other vertebrates, but they are the analogues of the wings of the flying lizards, which are formed from greatly protruding ribs. The wings of insects have a totally different origin, and are therefore also analogues of the wings of birds and of flying lizards.

Let me now apply this conception to ophiolatry. In regions where there abound poisonous serpents, they strike terror into the mind of the people. The stealthy approach, the sudden unexpected attack, the insignificant-looking wound of the bite, yet its sure and swift fatal effect, are all calculated to produce fear and awe. Owing to his anthropomorphic tendencies, man, whilst at first probably trying to fight such an insidious enemy, will also endeavour to placate and humour him: flattery and presents, which become worship and sacrifice, are resorted to. In other regions where serpents are non-poisonous and harmless, they generally prove exceedingly useful, as they destroy all kinds of vermin, such as rats, mice, etc. They are, therefore, protected, reverenced, and eventually worshipped.

We should then have here two identical forms of ophiolatry which, however, are merely analogous with one another,

for the one is the outcome of fear, whilst the other is produced by gratitude and reverence. On the other hand, the worship of, say, the lion is the homologue of the former, and the adoration of, e.g., the cow, is homologous with the latter.

I am, of course, not prepared to assert that the serpent has nowhere been adopted as a phallic symbol, but the *onus probandi* surely rests with those who maintain the phallic symbolism of snakes. I am, however, now going to disprove one of the most constant examples brought forward by the advocates of mythological phallicism and which is persistently reproduced by psycho-analysts. I refer to the *cistæ mysticæ* and their contents, carried in the processions of the Dionysiæ and some other Greek mysteries. Among the contents of the caskets was a serpent. By the unreflecting and superficial minds the casket and serpent are said to be symbolical of the kteis and phallus, the yoni and lingam. No reasons are given, except perhaps that a reference is made to the licentiousness which later on accompanied those mysteries. But let us look more closely into the matter. If objects have to be carried about hidden from the gaze of the vulgar multitude, they must, of necessity, be enclosed in something. Cigars and chocolates are packed in boxes, and not in symbolical female pudenda. Unless the caskets were intended to represent the kteis, it is illogical to assert that they were symbolical expressions of it. To such a one as maintains this, every box and casket is a female sexual symbol; but that is his own misfortune, no one can help him. It merely shows what is foremost in his own mind.

The other contents of the casket besides the serpent were the egg and the phallus. Rolle[1] gives as contents of the mystic cistæ branches of the myrtle, rods, different sorts of cakes, salt, poppies, the serpent, the sacrificial

[1] P. N. Rolle: *Recherches sur le Culte de Bacchus*, 3 vols., Paris, 1824, vol, iii, p. 153.

knife, but the principal object was the phallus. As the phallus itself is a symbol of the generative power, a concrete object representing an abstract idea, surely the serpent cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be construed as a symbol of this other symbol actually present!

Vollmer[1] regards the serpent in these *cistæ mysticæ* as the guardian of the other contents, viz. the egg and the phallus, but I do not think this to be correct. I am rather inclined to accept Cory's view,[2] which is that the serpent was the emblem of the spirit which pervades the universe, for which reason it symbolized the Knelph, Neph, Nef, or Chnoubys of the Egyptians and the Agathodæmon of the Phœnicians. Similar views are held by Knight:[3] "In his relation to the sun, as lord of Heaven, demiurge and Father of Creation, Bacchus was denominated *Πυριπαις*, or Son of Fire, and was represented with the phallic symbolism; as was Zeus with that of the serpent, denoting the essential spirit which preceded all things. Hence in the mystic cista or ark which was opened to the view of the epopta or seer, were exhibited the egg, the phallus, and the serpent, typifying the primeval essence, the demiurgic power, and the organic substance which were rendered operative—thus constituting a symbolism as lofty in sentiment, or as gross in sense as the mind of the person witnessing the spectacle." And again[4]: "As the organic substance was represented by the symbol of the egg, so the principle of life, by which it was called into action, was represented by the serpent, which, having the property of casting its skin, and apparently renewing its youth, was naturally adopted for this purpose. We sometimes find it coiled round the egg to express the incubation of the vital spirit; and it is not only the constant attendant upon the

[1] W. Vollmer: *Vollständiges Wörterbuch der Mythologie alter Nationen*, Stuttgart, 1836, p. 1054.

[2] Isaac Preston Cory: *Mythological Inquiry*, London, 1837, p. 39.

[3] R. P. Knight: *The Symbolical Language of Ancient Art and Mythology*, New York, 1892, p. xxiv.

[4] Loc. cit., p. 13.

guardian deities of Health, but occasionally employed as an accessory symbol to almost every other god, to signify the general attribute of immortality."

Numerous other instances can be cited demonstrating that besides the deity in general, the serpent was symbolic, or a personification, of earth deities, chthonic deities, fire deities, water deities, *genii loci*, tribal ancestor, evil principle and good principle.

The serpent is a frequent symbol of the Sun,[1] and it is hence constantly associated with Mithra. This is on account of the shape of its path across the heavens.

The well-known representation over the porticoes of all the ancient Egyptian temples of the winged disc of the Sun placed between two hooded serpents is variously interpreted. According to R. P. Knight,[2] the serpent represents the attributes of motion and life, but it appears to be as often held that they stand for the Good and Bad Principles.

"In the Vedic hymns," says Gubernatis,[3] "the black monster (krishnas), the growing monster (râuhin), the full-grown monster (piprus), the monster coverer (vritras), the monster that dries up (cushnas), the monster that keeps back (namuéis), generally appears with the name and shape of a serpent; or if it has not always the form of a serpent, it is assimilated to it, and certainly inclines to become so from its office of a constrictor, its black colour, and other characteristics which it possesses in common with the serpent (Ahis)."

The serpent is a constellation, and in the books of Zoroaster it is called the Mother of winter, and is looked upon as the bad principle which brings the ills of winter.

[1] Macrobius quoted by Montfaucon: *L'Antiquité expliquée*, etc., 2me ed., 5 vols., Paris, 1722, vol. i, p. 370. Mrs. Murray-Aynsley: *Symbolism of East and West*, London, 1900, p. 137. Dupuis: *L'origine de tous les Cultes*, 7 vols., Paris, an III, vol. iii, p. 552.

[2] *Symbolical Language of Ancient Art and Mythology*, New York, 1892, p. 15.

[3] Angelo de Gubernatis: *Zoological Mythology*, London, 1872, vol. ii, p. 392.

Dupuis, in his work *L'origine de tous les Cultes*, quoted above, is mainly concerned with the tracing back of all religions to the heavenly bodies.

Tylor [1] says: "In ancient times we may ascribe this character (of personification of evil) perhaps to the monster whose well-known form is to be seen on the mummy-cases, the Apophis-serpent of the Egyptian Hades [2]; and it unequivocably belongs to the destroying serpent of the Zarathustrians Aze Dahâka [3], a figure which bears so remarkable a relation to that of the semitic serpent of Eden, which may possibly stand in historical connection with it. But whilst the serpent of the Garden of Eden is generally regarded as evil principle or devil tempting Eve to sin, the Ophites, a branch of the Gnostics, looked upon the implacable jealous Jehovah as a demiurge and the real evil principle, and the serpent as His antagonist who came to teach man wisdom; they regarded the serpent as the personification of Christ and adored it as such."

"The Egyptian serpent of goodness, the Cobra," says Hulme,[4] "is often represented with a human head. It stands erect upon its folds, whilst the serpent of evil creeps along the ground." Many more instances could be cited.

I have just referred to the belief of the Ophites in the snake as an embodiment of Christ. Another instance of the serpent as scapegoat held among Gipsies is given by Wlislocki.[5] With certain ceremonies the body of a serpent, enclosed in a box, is carried in procession and thrown into a river. "They (the Gipsies) believe that by performing this ceremony they dispel all the illnesses that would otherwise have afflicted them in the course of the year, and that

[1] Edward B. Tylor: *Primitive Culture*, 5th ed., London, 1913, vol. ii, p. 240.

[2] Lepsius: *Totenbuch*. [3] Spiegel: *Avesta*, l, 66, vol. iii, p. lix.

[4] F. E. Hulme: *The History, Principles, and Practice of Symbolism in Christian Art*, London, 1891, p. 117.

[5] H. v. Wlislocki: *Volksglaube und religröser Brauch der Zigeuner, Münster*, 1891, p. 65. Quoted by Frazer: *The Golden Bough*, The Scapegoat, p. 208.

if any one finds the vessel and opens it out of curiosity, he and his will be visited by all the maladies which the others have escaped."

Many instances could be given to show that serpents were regarded as an embodiment of the *Genii loci*, but suffice it to quote Services[1]: "*Nullus enim locus sine genio est, qui per anguem plerumque ostentibur*," and to refer to Grimm[2]: ". . . Paganism venerated kind and benevolent serpents, whilst in the Christian view the idea of malevolent and diabolical serpents prevails." Grimm gives them many examples of stories where serpents brought happiness, good luck, riches, protection, and so on to people. Milk was offered them as food, and they were regarded as helpful charitable household spirits or penates (*Genii loci, ὀιχουροι ὄφις*). "The serpent appears," continues Grimm, "as an inviolable animal that brings good luck, and absolutely suitable for the pagan cult." . . . "The old Prussians kept a large serpent for their Potrimpos, and the priests guarded it carefully. It slept under corn-ears and was fed with milk. The Letts call the serpents milk-mothers (peena mahtes). They were under the protection of a higher goddess called Brehkina (the shouting one), who shouted to those who entered, that they should leave her peena mahtes undisturbed. Also the Lithuanians venerated serpents, kept them in the house and sacrificed to them. The Albanian vittore is a household god, thought to be in the shape of a small serpent."[3]

It is, I think, quite likely that in some instances the veneration of serpents as household gods has originated in the idea that they were the reincarnation of ancestors, for the belief was held widely by Greeks and Romans, and obtains also in America, Africa, Central and Northern

[1] *Comp. ad Aen*, v. 95.

[2] Jacob Grimm: *Deutsche Mythologie*, 4te Aufl., Berlin, 1876, ii, p. 569.

[3] Grimm, loc. cit., III, p. 197. Cf. also Felix Liebrecht: *Zur Völkerkunde*, Heilbronn, 1879, pp. 327–332. Frazer: *The Golden Bough*, Balder the Beautiful, vol. ii, p. 43.

Australia.[1] Frazer likewise suggests that the serpents fed at the Thesmophoria may have been deemed as reincarnations of the dead.

I said above that I was not prepared to assert that the serpent has nowhere been regarded as a phallic symbol. Gubernatis, in his *Zoological Mythology*[2] cites it as such, but then it is not the only one mentioned there. It finds itself in the goodly company of the butterfly, the cuckoo, the nightingale, the sparrow, the pigeon, the woodpecker, the halcyon, the parrot, the blackbird, the cock, the goose, the pike, the dolphin, the eel, the haddock, the herring, the codfish, the tortoise, the goat, the ass, the bull, the horse, and the mouse.

However this may be, I think I have sufficiently demonstrated that the serpent was anything but a *typical* phallic symbol. If a further proof were necessary, I think it can be found in the representation of erotic scenes where the serpent is conspicuous by its absence. They are given in A. L. Millin : *Galerie Mythologique*, 2 vols., Paris, 1831. The following description of these scenes is a translation of Millin's text :

Plate XLV, No. 199.—" Cupid and Psyche are on a bed before a three-legged table on which there is a fish, the animal which the ancients regarded as proper to excite to sexual pleasures. Cupid offers the cup to the spouse whom he holds in his arms, whilst Amor offers them a dove, the symbol of their mutual love. There is near the table another Amor who plays with a hare, the symbol of fertility, while he holds a bunch of grapes. A follower of Cupid and one of the women of Psyche are playing, the one the lyre and the other an instrument similar to our théorbe ; the latter is sitting on a seat of wicker, or flexible wood. Among other followers are the four seasons who are bringing their products. Spring

[1] Frazer : *The Golden Bough*, Adonis, Attis, and Osiris, vol. i, pp. 82–106.
[2] London, 1872, 2 vols.

presents eggs, the symbol of the being that will arise; Summer holds a vase and a thyrsos; Autumn fruit and nets for trapping birds; Winter brings the hare, indicating the hunt. Below there is a peacock, symbol of the changing seasons. This unpublished bas-relief is at present in the British Museum, into the possession of which it passed with the collection of Mr. Townley, to whom I am indebted for the sketch." There is no serpent!

Plate LXVI, No. 246.—"Lectisternum of Bacchus, Ariadne, and Hercules. The three deities are lying on a sumptuous bed; Bacchus is in the middle, Ariadne to the left, and Hercules to the right. Over the bed there is a branch of vine which announces a cradle. Bacchus holds in his right hand a rhyton of spiral form and in the other a cup. He is looking at Ariadne, who holds in her right hand a thyrsos ornamented by a banderole and in the other a cantharus; above her there is floating the Genius of the Mysteries. Hercules is sitting at the foot of the bed, the least honoured place. The lion's skin is on his head and falls down on his back, the front legs of the animal are tied in a knot on his chest. His right hand is resting on his club and the left elbow on the knee of Bacchus. Two women, of whom one holds a thyrsos, are to the left and to the right of the group.—Millin: *Peintures de Vases*, i, 36." There is no serpent!

Plate LXVI, No. 263.—"The bearded Bacchus supported by a young Faun is conducted towards a couch upon which there are a man and a woman; near by is a round table on three legs. A young Faun loosens Bacchus's footgear; behind, another Faun holding a *pedum* dances to the sound of Silenus's double flute; where the drapery finishes a Bacchant is to be seen who seems to carry an *uter*. A drunken Bacchante who holds a *tympanum* is supported by an old satyr, whose head is crowned with a *Kredemnon*. Behind them is the statue of Priapus on an altar.—*Mus. Pio. Clem IV*, 25." There is no serpent!

It is also important to note that J. A. Dulaure, in his well-known work *Des Divinités Génératrices*, Paris, 1885, makes no mention whatever of the serpent as a phallic symbol, although he gives prominence to the Bull and Goat as such.

Before leaving the subject of the serpent I must make mention of a remark by Boettiger.[1] He conjectures that the serpents in the temples of Asklepios, and those which were kept in the homes as toys for women,[2] were trained and used by them for sodomy. As proof is here given a quotation from Sueton, *Vita Augusti*, cap. 94, where it is said of Atia, the mother of Augustus: "I find in the theological books of Asclepiades the Mendesian, that Atia, upon attending at midnight a religious solemnity in honour of Apollo, when the rest of the matrons retired home, fell asleep on her couch in the temple, and that a serpent immediately crept to her, and soon after withdrew. She awaking upon it, purified herself, as usual after the embraces of her husband; and instantly there appeared upon her body a mark in the form of a serpent, which she never after could efface, and which obliged her, during the subsequent part of her life, to decline the use of the public baths. Augustus, it was added, was born in the tenth month after, and for that reason was thought to be the son of Apollo." [3]

To begin with, the story told of Atia is quite satisfactorily explained by Lessing, as shown above,[4] and it is absurd to draw from it conclusions such as Boettiger's, nor do the other quotations give any grounds for such belief. Glancilla may twine an icy snake round

[1] C. A. Boettiger: *Sabina oder Morgenszenen im Putzzimmer einer Römerin*, 1806, Bd. ii, p. 454.

[2] References given by Boettiger: Plinius, *Hist. Nat.*, lib. xxxix, ch. 4: "Anguis Æsculapius Epidauro Romam advectus est, vulgoque pascitur et in domibus." Martial, lib. vii, Epigr. 87: "Si gelidum collo nectit Gracilla draconem." Cf. Lucian Alexander, *Oper.*, t. iv, p. 259. Philostratus, *Heroic*, lib. viii, ch. 1.

[3] Translated by Dr. Alexander Thomson, London, Bell & Sons, 1906

[4] P. 113.

her neck, but she is not likely *draconem gelidum in vaginam inducere.*

A few observations upon Phallic Worship may not be inopportune here. Westropp[1] distinguishes three stages in the representation of the phallus: (1) As an object of veneration; (2) as an object affording protection; (3) as an object of licentiousness. This view appears to be borne out by Sir Harry H. Johnston,[2] who states that "in the Lower Congo, as far as Stanley Pool, phallic worship in various forms prevails. It is not associated with any rites that might be called particularly obscene; and, on the coast, where manners and morals are particularly corrupt, the phallus-cult is no longer met with."

Speaking of Phallus Worship, Rolle[3] says: "The Indian Lingam which represented the active and passive principles of generation of all beings had both sexes: these representations were, therefore, merely allegorical. When they were introduced in Greece the grossness and simplicity of the people made them in no way dangerous to them. They regarded the symbolic expression of the two powers of nature as quite natural. When the simplicity of the customs disappeared, these rites, however bizarre and indecent they may appear to us, inspired only the sentiment of respect, because they were consecrated by religion, and because the imagination could only be moved by things to which one was accustomed from an early date to regard as nothing but holy objects. But these rites had very great dangers when they were introduced to peoples already corrupt, especially since these rites did not form part of an ancient public cult, and since they had not, as with the Greeks and Orientals, the respect of ages due to a long habit of good manners and holiness. Still further, the exaggera-

[1] H. W. Westropp: *Primitive Symbolism*, London, 1885, p. 41.
[2] Sir H. H. Johnston: *The River Congo from its Mouth to Bolobo*, 4th ed., London, 1895, p. 276.
[3] P. N. Rolle: *Recherches sur le Culte de Bacchus*, 3 vols., Paris, 1824, vol. ii, p. 45.

tion of eclectic philosophers who have tried to represent these ceremonies as the master school of philosophy and spiritualism is just as ridiculous as that of ecclesiastical writers who have tried to construe a public cult, the object of veneration of an enlightened people and of men noted for their virtue and mind, into a thing of debauchery and prostitution."

"Ancient paganism (i.e. the ancient ethnical worships) says R. P. Knight,[1] described by writers like Ovid and Juvenal, by what it had become in its decline, is like an individual or system in the period of decay. The loftiest ideas are sure to degenerate in the hands of sensual persons into a gross sensualism or superstition."

The office of canephore or basket-bearer, at the processions of the Greek mysteries, was a great honour and much coveted by virgins of the noblest families. These baskets or mystic cistæ, as we have seen, contained with the implements of sacrifice mystic symbols, among which the phallus was important; the phallus was likewise carried open in procession. All this is evident, e.g. from a passage in Aristophanes' comedy *The Archanians*[2] Dikaiopolis, an Attic peasant, is preparing for a Dionysian family festival, assisted by his wife, daughter, and slaves. The honour of the canephora is given to his virgin daughter, whom the mother fondly praises. Xanthias, the slave, is told to hold the phallus more up, and Dikaiopolis sings his phallus-song in honour of Bacchus. If another instance be needed, I would refer to the murder of Hipparchus, brother of the tyrant Hippias and son of Peisistratus, by Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Hipparchus, jealous of Harmodius, wishes publicly to offend him. He causes Harmodius' sister to be summoned to the office of canephora at a mystery-festival and there publicly refuses her this office as being unworthy. Harmodius and Aristogeiton, incensed at the insult, kill Hipparchus.

[1] Loc. cit., p. xv.

[2] Act 1, sc. 8, ll. 241–279.

The phallus thus publicly venerated was as sacred to the Greeks of those days as the cross is to the Christian to-day, it is itself a symbol, the symbol of fertility, and therefore at this stage has no other symbol. I can only conceive of a symbol for the phallus in the last of Westropp's three stages, viz. when the phallus has become an object of licentiousness. That is very late indeed in the phylogenetic development of the psyche, and too recent to have affected the nervous system, as e.g. the snake has done in the anthropoid apes, where its sight arouses fear without any individual experience.

A great deal of confusion among writers on phallic symbolism and among psycho-analysts is due, it seems to me, to the fact that they have never clearly thought out their subject and have apparently failed to distinguish between *The Phallus Symbol*, i.e. the phallus as a symbol of fertility, and *A Phallic Symbol*, i.e. a symbol for the phallus, as e.g. the pine-cone may possibly be.

Stone pillars, pyramids, obelisks, and church-spires were symbols of the sun. "The large obelisks of stone," says R. P. Knight,[1] "found in many parts of the North, such as those at Rudstone and near Boroughbridge in Yorkshire, belonged to the same religion; Obelisks, as Pliny observes, being sacred to the Sun, whose rays they signify both by their form and name. . . . The spires and pinnacles with which our old churches are decorated come from these ancient symbols, and the weather-cocks with which they are surmounted, though now only employed to show the direction of the wind, were originally emblems of the Sun; for the cock is the natural herald of the day, and therefore sacred to the fountain of light." The Sun itself was a symbol of fertility, like the Phallus; they may be called homologues.[2] But it is wrong to call the Sun a phallic symbol. The Sun is no more a phallic symbol than the Owl is a symbol of

[1] Loc. cit., pp. 69–70.

[2] *Supra*, p. 119.

the Serpent; both are symbols of wisdom. Fertility is symbolized by the Sun, and obelisks, etc., being symbols of the Sun, have in their turn in many instances become symbols of fertility. Such symbolism I would propose calling "Secondary Symbolism."

The following question is raised by Ernest Jones [1]: "Why it is that of two ideas unconsciously associated one always symbolizes the other and never the reverse? To illustrate by an example what is meant: a church tower in a dream, as in anthropology, often—though, of course, by no means always—symbolizes the phallus, but a phallus in a dream is never a symbol of a church tower." The answer to this is quite simple: In anthropology the church tower is not, and never was, a symbol of the phallus, and in psycho-analysis it is made one by the psycho-analyst. And if a phallus occurs in a dream it is far too precious for the psycho-analyst to construe it into a church tower.

Writers like Thomas Inman[2] and psycho-analysts generally regard the trident and the flagellum as symbols of the phallus. This, too, is wrong, for they frequently occur together with the phallus, and cannot therefore symbolize it any more than the serpent in the *cistæ mysticæ* can symbolize it. Cory [3] says: "As destruction in the material world is but change or production in another form, and was so held by almost all heathen philosophers, we find that the peculiar emblems of Siva are the trident, the symbol of destruction, and the Linga or Phallus of regeneration." And again: "Khem (Wilkinson) or Mendes (Champollion) . . . is equivalent to the Pan of the Greeks, the Amun Generator of Jamblichus, and that his great attribute is heat, the genial warmth that assists in the continuation of the various species. . . . He has two special emblems; the one, the triple-thonged flagellum, the other, the

[1] Loc. cit., p. 157.
[2] *Ancient Faiths embodied in Ancient Names*, 2 vols., London, 1869.
[3] Isaac Preston Cory: *Mythological Inquiry*, London, 1837, pp. 19 and 44.

Phallus. . . . This deity is the same as the Siva of the Indians, their Destroying and Regenerating Power; for he exactly coincides with him in all his attributes. He is the God of Heat and Generation, and, like Siva, has his Phallic emblem of reproduction; and his triple-thonged flagellum, the emblem of vengeance and of the ruler of the dead upon the monuments, I take to be but a slight variation of the trident, or the axe of Siva." Like the later Platonists, psycho-analysts and the above-mentioned writers on phallic symbolism drag in every scrap of ancient theology, distort it and construe it so as to fit into their system. To show what great care has to be exercised in the interpretation of ancient monuments I give the following extract from Stoll[1]: "If we leave antiquity and look in the later European periods for traces of analogous ideas connected with the phallus, there is first to be mentioned that in France and in Germany, in the present-day political boundaries of these countries, popular phallic customs appear to have arisen only under Roman influence. The only country in which we find again the phallus as the symbol of fertility and sexual reproductive force, independent of Roman cultural influences, is Sweden. For we read in Adamus Bremensis, *Chorographia Scandinaviæ*, p. 24: *Tertius* (*deorum*) *est Fricco, pacem voluptatemque largiens mortalibus; cuius etiam simulacrum fingunt ingenti priapo.* (The third (of the gods) is Fricco, who gives peace and voluptuousness to man, and whose image they also represent with an immense phallus.)

"This is all that we know about this phallic deity of the north. As to the other countries, it is to be remarked here that there existed for some time a tendency to abuse the ideas of the phallus and of the phallus cult. Every erect natural rock or artificially sculptured stone, with

[1] Otto Stoll: *Das Geschlechtsleben in der Völkerpsychologie*, Leipzig, 1908, pp. 668 *seq.*

which popular superstitious customs were connected, was looked upon as a phallus in the sense of an object in mystic symbolic relation to reproduction. This is, of course, going too far; for, first, popular phantasy is prone to occupy itself with unusually shaped rocks, or monolithic monuments of prehistoric time, without the generative processes playing any part in them; and secondly, there are numerous localities which popular superstition, even within Christendom, looked upon as especially efficacious against sexual sterility, and where all objects are completely absent which could even be remotely connected with the phallus. The connection of the church legend and of martyrology as they are reflected in the popular symbolic conception of the different districts has to be especially considered in the interpretation of such objects, since they contain generally the key to an otherwise incomprehensible symbolism. A few examples may illustrate this dependence of relation of certain local customs on the Church legend.

"In Disentis, in the Vorderrheintal, a stronghold of Catholicism in the Grisons, as indeed also in other Catholic districts, different saints are invoked by the people for the various changing occasions of life, correspondingly. Thus, St. Anthonius for the recovery of lost objects, St. Joseph in money matters, St. Aloysius for the safeguarding of chastity of young people, St. Barbara for a quiet death, St. Valentine in Mompè medel for the cure of weakly children, St. Placidus, who was decapitated in Disentis for this reason, for headache. The St. Monica is regarded as the patron for the education of children. The lonely chapel situated on the brink of the deep gorge of the Rhine dedicated to St. Agatha is visited by women who are either sterile or suffer from disease of the breast, and the relation to this saint to these complaints of women are at once comprehensible from the history of the martyrdom of St. Agatha herself. According to the church

legend her breasts were mutilated, according to one report they were cut off, according to another only the nipples were torn out, probably with red-hot tongs, and this saint has been represented, by the artists who concerned themselves with her, in different ways ! A painting by Lorenzo Lippi shows this saint in ecstasies offering her amputated breasts on a golden plate to heaven. This martyrdom explains sufficiently why St. Agatha is invoked for succour in diseases of female breasts and generally for diseases of women for in popular conception sterility is regarded as such.

" In Bayonne, in the south-west of France, it is St. Léon de Bayonne who is monopolized by the women of the people in a way that reminds one of phallic customs. For there is to be found a fountain with a statue of the saint which, on his nameday, is visited and venerated by the women in a peculiar manner. I am indebted to Professor G. Hérelle of Bayonne for a communication on this subject, of which the following is a translation :—

" This fountain is that of St. Léon, on the Nive, hardly a hundred metres distant from the ramparts of Bayonne. This fountain has a strange form, and it could easily be mistaken for an Arabic ' Kubba ' were it not surmounted by a cross ; the whole is whitewashed. Now, at the most hidden side of this little monument, i.e. on the side where it is dominated by the ascending hillside, is a shapeless statue of this saint without head. (St. Léon de Bayonne belongs to that class of decapitated saints who took up their head in order to carry it elsewhere.) And this statue is already so weather-worn, so defective, that I had passed it several times without noticing that it was a statue. Now this year (1905), on the feast of St. Léon, in the afternoon, I saw, when passing, eight or ten women collected around the statue, of whom several had little girls on their arms. The women murmured prayers in a low voice, touched with the back of their fingers the statue somewhere

in the pit of the stomach and kissed their fingers, and then let their little girls, if they had any, kiss them likewise. I do not know, however, whether this procedure had the purpose to ensure the fertility of the women who employed it. I only read in the history of St. Léon, the apostle of Bayonne, that women who invoked this saint in child-birth are freed from all danger, and further, that St. Léon is the patron saint of children from their birth.

" Without the necessary comment, one might in this case, where an erect weather-worn statue of a saint that has become unrecognizable, and which is evidently connected in popular conception with the obtaining of numerous offspring, easily come to the conclusion that there is here a remnant of a conception that centred round the phallus.

" Still another example. From a former student of mine, Dr. Rudolf Bielefeld, I received recently a photograph of a granite erratic block in Ostfriesland, 1·20 metres in height. Respecting this Dr. Bielefeld writes me as follows: ' The enclosed picture shows a grey Swedish granite block, which was found as a Diluvian boulder in the village of Stapelmoor (Kreis Weener) in Ostfriesland, in the Grundmoräne, and was erected in the rear building of innkeeper Oltmanns in Stapelmoor. The Catholics who have immigrated from the neighbouring Regierungbezirk Osnabrück into the East Frisian border village Diele see on this granite block the picture of the Holy Virgin draped in a veil. This hypothesis became immediately certitude since over the shoulder of this supposed female figure a cross was discerned, and at her feet an anchor. The Catholics, especially the females, regret keenly that the stone should be found in such a purely heretical village as this reformed Stapelmoor, and should now be standing in the rear building of a heretic, although a very tolerant one, who declines to sell the stone,

but gives every Sunday easy access to it. For when the Catholics go on a Sunday on their pilgrimage through Stapelmoor to the Catholic chapel in Weener, they perform, especially the women, kneeling before the stone, religious rites in honour of the Holy Virgin. On one of my geological excursions I have inspected the stone, and must confess that with some imagination the female figure, the cross, and the anchor, can be discerned. The protruding parts possessed evidently a greater degree of hardness than the other parts of the stone, and were thus able to withstand better the transport by the ice and the weather, and thus remained as markings in relief.'

"Here too, without knowledge of the relations to the figures of the Holy Virgin, one would conclude from the circumstance, that of kneeling and praying before the stone, that these were the remnants of litholatrous ideas. From the circumstance that this stone block may be interpreted as a roughly formed phallus, as also from the fact that it is visited and venerated principally by women, one might think of the remnant of phallic rites, especially if it were found that prayers respecting prolific progeny were addressed to the stone Madonna.

"On the French side of the Lac des Brenets in the Jura Mountains there is a strangely formed shore rock, in whose outlines the inhabitants believe to recognize the form of the Madonna. Whether this stone is in any way venerated I do not know.

"Occurrences such as these show that each single case has to be examined as to its own particular circumstances before it is declared as an example of the 'stone cult,' or even of phallus worship."

The extravagance of symbolism introduced into psycho-analysis appears to run riot in mysticism; there seems to be no sharp boundary line between these two. I shall not weary the reader with a critical examination of mysticism, but content myself with the exposition of an example from

Silberer,[1] whereby I intend to show that the licence of the psycho-analysts in interpreting dreams by symbolism is also shared by the mystifying mystic, and that the number of interpretations is limited only by the interest of the interpreter.

Silberer narrates a story and interprets it. Here it is :—

There was once a king who had three sons, two of whom were clever and shrewd, but the third did not talk much, was simple, and was merely called the Simpleton. When the king grew old and feeble and expected his end, he did not know which one of his sons should inherit the kingdom after him. So he said to them: "Go forth, and whoever brings me the finest carpet shall be king after my death." And lest there be any disagreement among them, he led them before his castle, blew three feathers into the air, and said: "As they fly, so shall you go." One flew towards the east, the other towards the west, the third, however, flew straight ahead, but flying only a short distance soon fell to earth. Now, one brother went to the right, the other to the left, and they laughed at Simpleton, who had to stay with the third feather where it had fallen.

Simpleton sat down and was sad. Suddenly he noticed that near the feather lay a trap door. He raised it, found a stairway, and went down. Then he came before another door, knocked and listened, while inside a voice called :—

"Maiden green and small,
Shrunken old crone,
Old crone's little dog,
Crone here and there,
Let us see quickly who is out there."

The door opened, and he saw a big fat toad and round about her a crowd of little toads. The fat toad asked what his wish was. He answered: "I should have liked the most beautiful and finest carpet." Then she called a young one and said :—

"Maiden green and small,
Shrunken old crone,
Crone's little dog,
Crone here and there,
Fetch here the big box."

[1] Herbert Silberer: *Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism*, translated by Smith Ely Jeliffe, New York, 1917, pp. 219 *seq.*

The young toad brought the box, and the fat toad opened it and gave Simpleton a carpet from it, so beautiful and so fine as up above on the earth could not have been woven. Then he thanked her and climbed up again.

The two others had, however, considered their youngest brother so weak-minded that they believed that he would not find and bring anything back. "Why should we take so much trouble?" said they, and took from the back of the first shepherd's wife that met them her coarse shawl and carried it home to the king. At the same time Simpleton returned and brought his beautiful carpet, and when the king saw it he was astonished and said: "If justice must be done, the kingdom belongs to the youngest." But the two others gave their father no peace, and said that it was impossible that Simpleton, who lacked understanding in all things, could be a king, and begged him to make a new condition. Then the father said: "The one that brings me the most beautiful ring shall be king," led the three brothers out, and blew three feathers into the air for them to follow. The two eldest again went east and west, and Simpleton's feather flew straight ahead and fell down near the door in the earth. So he went down again to the fat toad and told her that he needed the most beautiful ring. She immediately had her big box fetched and from it gave him a ring that glittered with jewels and was more beautiful than any goldsmith upon the earth could have made. The two eldest laughed about Simpleton, who was going to look for a gold ring; but they took no trouble, and knocked the pin out of an old wagon ring and brought the ring to the king. But when Simpleton showed his gold ring the father again said: "The kingdom belongs to him." The two eldest did not cease importuning the king till he made a third condition and declared that the kingdom should go to the one that brought home the fairest woman. Again he blew the three feathers into the air and they flew as before.

So Simpleton, without more ado, went down to the fat toad and said: "I have to take home the fairest woman." "The fairest woman, hey? She is not right here, but none the less you shall have her." She gave him a hollowed out carrot to which were harnessed six little mice. Then Simpleton sadly said: "What shall I do with it?" The toad replied: "Just put one of my little toads in it." So he took one by chance from the circle and put it in the yellow carriage, but hardly had she taken her seat when she became a surpassingly beautiful maiden, the carrot a coach, and the six little mice, horses. So he kissed the maiden, drove away with the horses and took them to the king. His brothers came afterwards. They had not taken any trouble to find a fair lady, but had brought the first good-looking peasant woman. As the king looked at them he said: "The youngest

gets the kingdom after my death." But the two oldest deafened the king's ears with their outcry: "We cannot allow the Simpleton to be king," and gained his consent that the one whose woman should jump through a ring that hung in the middle of the room should have the preference. They thought: "The peasant women can do it easily, they are strong enough, but the delicate miss will jump herself to death." The old king consented to this also. So the two peasant women jumped, even jumped through the ring, but were so clumsy that they fell and broke their awkward arms and legs. Then the beautiful woman whom Simpleton had brought leaped through as easily as a roe, and all opposition had to cease. So he received the crown and ruled long and wisely.

I offer first a neat [*sic*] psycho-analytic interpretation of this narrative. Like the dream, the fairy tale is regularly a phantastic fulfilment of wishes, and of such indeed as we realize, but which life does not satisfy, as well as of such as we are hardly aware of in consciousness, and would not entertain if we knew them clearly. Reality denies much, especially to the weak, or to those who feel themselves weak, or who have a smaller capacity for work in the struggle for existence in relation to their fellow-men. The efficient person accomplishes in his life what he wishes, the wishes of the weak remain unfulfilled, and for this reason the weak, or whoever in comparison with the magnitude of his desires, thinks himself weak, avails himself of the phantastic wish fulfilment. He desires to attain the unattainable at least in imagination. This is the psychological reason why so many fairy stories are composed from the standpoint of the weak, so that the experiencing Ego of the fairy tale, the hero, is a simpleton, the smallest, or the weakest, or the youngest one who is oppressed, etc. The hero of the foregoing tale is a simpleton and the youngest. In his phantasy, that is, in the story, he stamps his brothers, who are in real life more efficient, and whom he envies, as malicious, disagreeable characters. (In real life we can generally observe how suspicious are, for instance, physically deformed people. Their sensitiveness is well known.) Like the fox to whom the grapes are sour, he declares that what his stronger fellows accomplish is bad, their performance of the duty defective, and their aims contemptible, especially in the sexual sphere, where he feels himself openly most injured. The tale treats specifically from the outset of the conquest of a woman. The carpet, the ring, are female symbols, the first is the body of the woman, the ring is the vagina (Greek kteis = comb = pudenda muliebria). (The carpet is still more specifically marked as a female symbol in that the brothers take it from the body of a shepherdess. Shepherdess—a coarse "rag," coarse "cloth," in contrast to the fine carpet of the hero.)

The Simpleton is one who does not like much work. When he

also ascribes negligence to his brothers he betrays to us his own nature, in that his " feather," i.e. himself, does not go far, while his brothers' feathers go some distance. In order to invalidate this view of himself the distribution of the feathers is put off on chance, as if to a higher determining power. This has always been a favourite excuse with lazy and inefficient people.

One of the means for consoling himself for the unattainableness of his wishes is the belief in miracles. The Simpleton gains his advantage in a miraculous manner; roasted pigeons fly into his mouth.

In his erotic enterprises he sticks to his own immediate neighbourhood. He clearly bears within himself an Imago that holds him fast. [This is an image, withdrawn from consciousness and consequently indestructible, of the object of one's earliest passion, which continues to operate as a strongly affective complex, and takes hold upon life with a formative effect. The most powerful Imagos are those of the parents. Here naturally the mother imago comes to view, which later takes a position in the centre of the love-life (namely the choice of object).] Whither does he turn for his journey of conquest? Into the earth. The earth is a mother, as a familiar symbol language teaches us. Trap-door, box, subterranean holes, suggest a womb phantasy. The toad frequently appears with the significance of the uterus, harmonizing with the situation that the tale presents. (On the contrary, frog is usually penis.) The toad's big box (= mother) is also the womb. From it indeed the female symbols, in this connection, sisters, are produced for Simpleton. The box is, however, also the domestic cupboard—food closet, parcel, bandbox, chamber, bowl, etc.—from which the good mother hands out tasty gifts, toys, etc. Just as the father in childish phantasy can do anything, so the mother has a box out of which she takes all kinds of good gifts for the children. Down among the toads an ideal family episode is enacted. The mother's inexhaustible box (with the double meaning) even delivers the desired woman for the Simpleton.

The woman—for whom? Doubtless for the Simpleton, psychologically. The tale says for the king, because the female symbols, carpet, ring, the king desires for himself, in so many words, and the inference is that the woman also belongs to him. The conclusion of the tale, however, turns out true to the psychological situation, as it does away with the king and lets the Simpelton live on, apparently with the same woman. It is *clear as day* [*sic*] that the Simpleton identifies himself with his father, places himself in his place. The image, which possesses him from the first, is the father's woman, the mother. And the father's death—that is considerably ignored—which brings queen and crown, is a wish of the Simpleton. So again we find ourselves at the centre of the

Œdipus-Complex. As mother-substitute figures the sister, one of the little toads.

We have regarded the story first from the point of view of the inefficiency of the hero, and have thereupon stumbled upon erotic relations, finally upon the Œdipus-Complex. The psychological connection results from the fact that those images on which the Œdipus-Complex is constructed appear calculated to produce an inefficiency in the erotic life.

The anagogic interpretation of Hitchcock (loc. cit., pp. 175 ff.) is as follows, though somewhat abridged :—

The king plainly means man. He has three sons ; he is an image of the Trinity, which in the sense of our presentation we shall think of as body, soul, and spirit. Two of the sons were wise in the worldly sense, but the third, who represents spirit, and in the primitive form is called conscience, is simple in order to typify the straight and narrow path of truth. The spirit leads in sacred silence those who meekly follow it, and dies in a mystical sense if it is denied, or else appears in other forms in order to pursue the soul with the ghosts of murdered virtues. Man is, as it were, in doubt concerning the principle to which the highest leadership in life is due. " Go forth, and whoever brings me the finest carpet shall be king after my death." The carpet is something on which one walks or stands, here representing the best way of life according to Isaiah xxx. 21. " This is the way, walk ye in it, when ye turn to the right hand and when ye turn to the left."

The three feathers are, of course, the three principles. Two of them move at once in opposite directions [towards the east and towards the west, as many writers on alchemy represent the two principles or breaths, *anima* and *corpus*, or ☉ and ☾], and so come even at the outset away from the right path. The third, symbol of the spirit, flies straightforward, and has not far to its end, for simple is the way to the inner life. And so the spirit will speak to us if we follow its voice, at first quite a faint voice : " But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart that thou mayst do it " (Deuteronomy xxx. 14). Yet the soul is not free from sadness, as the man stands still on the lower steps of the ladder that leads up into eternal life. Simpleton is troubled in his heart, and in the humility of this affliction he discovers " all at once " a secret door, which shows him the entrance into the mystical life. The door is on the surface of the earth, in abasement, as the third feather determined it in advance. As Simpleton discreetly obeyed it, he strolled along the path that the door opened for him. Three steps, three fundamental forces. So Christ had to descend before he could rise. The hero of the story knocks as Christ knocks in the gospel (i.e. on the inner door, contrasted with the law of Moses, the outer

door). The big toad with her little ones in a circle about her signifies the great mother nature and her creatures, which surround her in a circle, for nature always returns upon herself in a cycle. Simpleton gets the most beautiful carpet.

The other two beings that we call understanding and feelings (sun and moon of the hermetic writings) look without, instead of seeking the way within; so it comes to pass that they take the first best coarse cloths.

To bring the most beautiful ring is to bring truth, which, like a ring, has neither beginning nor end. Understanding and feeling go in different directions, the Simpleton waits meekly by the door that leads to the interior of the great mother. (The appearance of this conception in the anagogic interpretation is also important.)

In the third test, the search for "the fairest woman," the crown of life, conceived exoterically as well as esoterically, the carrot represents the vegetative life (body, the natural man), and the six mice that draw it are our old friends the six swans or virtues, and the highest of these compassion—or love—goes as the enthroned queen in the carriage. The uninitiated man is almost in doubt and asks: "What shall I do with a carrot?" Yet the great mother replies, as it were: "Take one of my fundamental forces." And what do we see then? The toad becomes a beautiful maiden, etc. The man now all at once realizes how fearfully and wonderfully he is made. Filled with reverence of himself he is ready to cry: "Not my will, but thine be done!"

Still another test remains. We must all go through a sort of mystical ring, which hangs in the hall (of learning). Only one in the whole universe is in a condition to accomplish it, to endure it without injury. The beautiful delicate maid with the miraculous gift is the spirit [spiritus or ☿ of alchemy].

We shall add that the two interpretations externally contradict each other, although each exhibits a *faultless* [*sic*] finality. I should note that I have limited myself to the briefest exposition; in a further working out of the analysis the two expositions can be much more closely identified with the motives of the story.

Now let me attempt another interpretation, an oneirocritic one. The *story* is like a *dream.* The *King* is the *dreamer* who has *three sons,* three *modes of interpretation.* The *eldest son,* a rather disdainful person, is the *anagogic mode,* the *second son,* on the same intellectual level with his elder brother, is the *psycho-analytic mode of interpretation.* The *third son,* an unpretentious simple sort of fellow, who wants to do his best and is not given to

contempt and deceit like his brothers, is the *physiological or common-sense mode of interpretation.* The *three feathers* are the *manners of explanation ;* those of the bombastic brothers go far afield, that of the simple brother tries nearer home. The *earth* into which the third brother descends is *scientific observation,* the *big toad* he meets is *ascertained fact,* the *little toads* are *new facts to be observed.* The *trap-door and subterranean passage* are *study and scientific training ;* the *box* is the *storehouse of knowledge ;* the *fine carpet* is *Recent Memory,* whilst the *coarse shawls* of the brothers represent Freud's *Unconscious* and Silberer's *" Titanic Forces."* The *gold ring* are *chance associations,* and the *wagon rings* are *" Repression " and messages from God.* The *fairest woman* is *Truth,* and the *peasant wenches* are *Superstitution and Mysticism.* The *carrot* is the *Deductive Method,* and the *mice* the *Canons of Induction.* (It is true there are six mice but only five canons of induction ; probably the sixth has not yet been discovered. So this note might put logicians on their mettle). The *jumping through the ring* is the *test of experience, or verification.*

Now, I am so arrogant and vain as to assert that this oneirocritic interpretation of mine is ever so much closer, more complete, and more thoroughgoing than either the psycho-analytic or anagogic interpretation of Silberer's, as can easily be seen from the table to be given below. If any of my readers is suffering from ennui and his time hangs heavily on his hands, instead of solving the chess problem in his Sunday paper, let him try another interpretation of the story, according to his own tastes ; it may be a " cricketecritic " or a " footballic " interpretation. He will be delighted at the ease with which it can be done, and he may be sure it is correct, for are we not told over and over again that such a solution is a proof in itself of its correctness, and that such an agreement cannot be due to chance ?

To give the reader just one other example, I will venture a kreopolic [1] interpretation: "The King stands for a butcher, and the three sons for the three sorts of meat he deals in, viz. Beef, Mutton, and Pork; the youngest son, Simpleton, symbolizing Pork. The three Feathers indicate three countries of origin: The feather flying west for America (Beef); the feather flying east for Australia (Mutton), and Simpleton's feather, coming down near, for Ireland (Pork). The earth symbolizes the butcher's hearth and home. The trap-door means the butcher's shop; the subterranean passage his chopping-house; the box his pie and sausage-machines. Simpleton's carpet symbolizes pork sausages, and the brothers' coarse shawls beef and mutton sausages, which, I do not think, can be very tasty. The rings signify hams, the gold ring a real ham made from a leg of pork, and the wagon rings "pseudo-hams" made from beef and mutton. The fairest woman is a glorious pork pie, and the peasant wenches beef and mutton pies. I am not quite certain about the big toad, the little toads and the mice, but they do remind me so of those awful tales Sam Weller used to tell Mr. Pickwick about his friend the pie-man. The carrot signifies the butcher's hot-dinner trade: boiled beef and carrots. Jumping through the ring symbolizes the golden rule, "The proof of the pudding (pies, sausages) is in the eating."

To show how much more thoroughgoing my interpretations are than Silberer's I have tabulated the results as follows:—

[1] κρεο-πωλης = a butcher.

	Silberer's Psychoanalytic Interpretation.	Silberer's Analogic Interpretation.	Author's Oneirocritic Interpretation.	Author's Kreopolic Interpretation.
The king	father	man	the dreamer	butcher
The first son	malicious and disagreeable characters		anagogic	beef
The second son ..		trinity: body (understanding, feeling); soul; spirit conscience	psychoanalytic; physiological: mode of interpretation	mutton
The third son (Simpleton)	the Ego			pork
The three feathers ..	the Ego	three principles	manners of explanation	countries of origin: America, Australia and Ireland
The earth	mother	mystical life	scientific observation	hearth and home
The trap-door	mother's womb, also family cupboard	entrance to mystical life	study	butcher's shop
The subterranean passage			scientific training	chopping-house
The box			storehouse of knowledge	pie and sausage machines
The big toad	uterus		ascertained fact	doubtful: reminiscent of Sam Weller's tales to Mr. Pickwick
The little toads ..	sisters		new facts to be observed	
The carpet	body of woman		recent memory	pork sausages
The coarse shawls ..			Freud's "Unconscious"	beef and mutton sausages
			Silberer's "Titanic Forces"	
The gold ring	vagina	truth	chance associations	real ham
The wagon rings ..			repression	imitation hams made of beef or mutton
The fairest woman ..		crown of life	messages from the deity	pork pies
		highest virtue compassion	truth	
The peasant wenches ..			superstition	beef and mutton pies
			mysticism	
The carrot		vegetative life	deductive method	boiled beef and carrots
The six mice		six virtues	Canons of Induction	*vide*, above
				toads
Jumping through the ring			test of experience	the proof of the pudding is in the eating

V

THE ŒDIPUS-COMPLEX

Obstupui, steteruntque comae,
et vox faucibus haesit.
VIRGIL, *Æneid*, ii, 774.

WHEN I read for the first time Freud's exposition of the "Œdipus-Complex" I passed, as probably most people have done on like occasions, through a series of emotional states. As far as I remember there was first a violent moral shock, followed by extreme disgust, outraged self-respect, and bitter resentment turning to rage. This gave place to a transitory contempt for Freud, turning soon to sadness, pessimism, and melancholy. Quickly I reacted against this. I said to myself, if Freud's view is true, all our outcry, gesticulation, and denial will not alter it a whit, for truth is truth to the end of reckoning. We have simply to face it. The sole aim of all scientific inquiry is the ascertainment of Truth, however disagreeable and unpalatable it seems to us.

By the term "Œdipus-Complex," Freud [1] understands an incestuous desire of the child for the parent of the opposite sex, accompanied by jealousy towards the parent of the same sex, and by the wish, mostly unconscious, to get rid of him, or her, by killing. This "Complex" is said to exist not only among neuropaths, but to be common also with normal persons.

[1] S. Freud: *Traumdeutung*, 3te Aufl., pp. 190 *seq.*

Supposing this to be the case, then the name Freud chose is quite inappropriate, for Œdipus had no such desires. He slew a man in combat without knowing who he was, and it was not found out until years afterwards that he had killed his father. The same as regards his marriage with his mother. Œdipus married a woman and had three children by her, and not until they were all grown up was the terrible secret discovered. The primary factor in this "Complex" would doubtless be the incestuous love for the parent of opposite sex; the jealousy towards the parent of like sex and its resultant desire to kill him or her, the secondary factor. To illustrate the primary factor mythology has far more appropriate examples than that of Œdipus and Iocaste, to wit the story of Lot and his daughters;[1] further, the story of Jupiter's incest with his mother Ceres, and also with his daughter thus born, Libera or Proserpina. Or again, the fable poignantly told by Ovid of Myrrha and Cinyras.[2] History, too, could furnish many examples, one of the most sordid being that of Marozia, or Mariuccia, and her two sons, the elder, Alberic, and the younger, who became Pope John XI. Nero's intercourse with his mother Agrippina and that of Ninias with his mother Semiramis are other examples. But, however unsuitable Freud's appellation be for this supposed complex, it is not worth while changing it now for the rest of its existence, and I shall continue to refer to it as the Œdipus-Complex.

The Œdipus-Complex, then, to quote scripture, is come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against the mother. But however this may be, we shall not shrink nor shirk, but boldly face the truth.

What then is the evidence?

The interpretation of dreams furnishes us with examples of this complex, so we are told. But as I have shown above in the chapter on "Dreams," these are no proof whatsoever

[1] Genesis xix. 31.

[2] Book x, fable viii.

and depend in the interpretation of the supposed symbolism entirely upon the mental make-up of the interpreter. If the mind of the latter is perverted, permeated with filth, he will construe the most innocent dreams into expressions of the most revolting ideas. In fact, as I said, correcting Freud's dictum, the interpretation of dreams is the *via regia* to the Unconscious of the psycho-analyst.

There are, however, also dreams which do not require a great amount of interpretation, which appear almost self-revealed, and where symbolism need not be resorted to, but which are very disconcerting to the dreamer. I knew a case where a man dreamt repeatedly about his wife, or maybe his mother. The central figure of the dreams was not always constant, and had qualities and attributes some of which were those of the wife and others those of his mother, it was a make-up of both. Having read, or heard, about psycho-analysis, the dreamer expressed a fear that he might be afflicted with the Œdipus-Complex, and was greatly distressed at this supposed fact. Having given the matter some little thought, I was soon able to allay the distress and dissipate the fears. If I then had already had the dream of my own which I am now going to relate I should have been able to give the relief more expeditiously. The following I transcribe from my note-book: "June 6, 1921. Yesterday morning I went for a stroll with 'Chum' (Chum is my dog, a Chinese Chow-chow, then just two years old). He entered a yard in Bishopswood Road and stole a small rabbit, with which he ran off in his mouth. When I recovered the rabbit it appeared dead, and was quite limp. Its coat was fluffy and almost wholly white. I paid the owner the value demanded, viz. eighteenpence. He asked whether I would like to take the rabbit home, but I declined. I thought that the rabbit might after all prove not to be dead.

"Last night I dreamed that I was carrying the dead body of Chum by the four legs tied together; his body was limp, his coat fluffy and he was quite light. His colour was his own, yellow red. Later he came to life again, at which I was very pleased.

"We have here, then, certain qualities and attributes that went to make up the rabbit, combined with certain qualities and attributes that help to constitute Chum, making up the dream-creature, namely a 'rabbity Chum.' . . ."

As I pointed out above,[1] when discussing "meaning," an idea may, in a way, be regarded as being composed of part ideas which would constitute its qualities or attributes. Thus my idea of Chum would involve those of his heavy weight as compared with that of the little rabbit; his coarse-haired coat, yellow colour, his being alive, and other canine characters. The qualities and attributes of the little rabbit would correspondingly be its light weight, fluffy coat, white colour, being dead, possibility of coming to life again, other rabbit characters. Besides, the rabbit was carried by Chum as by a retriever, therefore there were incipient ideas of "game," which in turn were associated with the idea of being often carried with the four legs tied together.

The dream was therefore made up of material of the day's experiences. But the links, or associations, which connected the quality-ideas of the object-ideas, "Chum," "the rabbit," "game," were absent; that is to say, these quality-ideas did not combine again as in waking life to form these respective object-ideas, but some of the quality-ideas of "Chum" brought up some of the quality-ideas of "the rabbit," and some of those of "game" combined into the object-idea of the dream-creature. Putting in a schematic form under the headings "Chum," "Rabbit," "Game,"

[1] Pp. 21 *seq.*

the respective qualities that make these ideas, we get this :—



Those quality-ideas which are ekphored and combine to form the dream-creature, the " rabbity Chum," I have enclosed by a dotted line.

Lest I should be misunderstood, or rather misconstrued, and accused of dabbling in " unconscious ideas " like the psycho-analyst, let me be more precise. In the psychic experience of " Chum " a great number of neurone-groups were actively excited and association-paths established ; similarly, so with the psychic experience of " the rabbit." If in a waking state I had wanted to remember, or recall, these experiences of " Chum " and " the rabbit," very nearly the same association-paths would have come into play, and the ideas of " Chum " and " the rabbit " produced would have been very similar to the previous experiences, i.e. nearly the same neurone-groups would again have been set in activity. In the sleeping state the end-ideas were absent and the excitations spread along other association-

paths, as a consequence of which only the " yellow colour " and " other canine characters " were revived, which combined with " light weight," " fluffy hair," " dead," " possibility of coming back to life." The excitation spread even to some neurone-groups which had not been excited during the preceding day, but had some older association-paths with the idea " carried like game," namely to the neurone-groups, subserving the idea " being carried by the legs." The offer of the man that I could take the rabbit away, if I wanted to do so, was probably also concerned, as it would suggest carrying the rabbit by the legs.

Let me now return to the case of the man who had dreamt about his wife who had some distinct features of his mother. The psycho-analyst would unhesitatingly have pronounced it as revealing the Œdipus-Complex, the dreamer wished his mother to be to him like his wife, and this was indeed the interpretation the dreamer, influenced by his psycho-analytic reading, had put upon it. His wife was about eight years older than himself. I pointed out to the man that the idea of his mother and that of his wife had many subordinate quality-ideas in common, and that, as these were associated with the other subordinate quality-ideas which constituted the idea of his mother and that of his wife, it was not in the least to be wondered at that specific characters of the mother and specific characters of the wife became in his dreams connected. I may express this schematically thus :—

Mother.	*Wife.*
(*a*) mother's features	(a_1) wife's features
(*b*) ,, voice	(b_1) ,, voice
(*c*) ,, dress	(c_1) ,, dress
(*d*) ,, manners	(d_1) ,, manners

(*e*) greater age than he
(*f*) looking after the household
(*g*) looking after his welfare and comfort
etc., etc.

The idea of the mother would thus contain *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, *f*, *g*, etc., and the idea of the wife would thus contain a_1, b_1, c_1, d_1, *e*, *f*, *g*, etc. If, then, *e*, *f*, *g* are revived, *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* are as likely to be ekphored as a_1, b_1, c_1, d_1, if there is no end-idea, as would be the case during sleep. The result, therefore, would be that the dream-creature would not be constant, that whilst always containing the common characters of the wife and mother, it would vary in their specific characters. This, then, disposes of the dreams where absence of symbolism is alleged and which appear, as it were, self-revealed. As to the psycho-analytic evidence of the Œdipus-Complex outside the dream, it is just as futile and imaginary as that of the dream-analysis, and as I shall deal with this class of evidence later,[1] I pass it over here.

In justification of the Œdipus-Complex, reference has also been made to the ancestral usage which is supposed to have survived in the present-day habits of the Gorilla. A passage from Dr. Savage in the *Boston Journal of National History*, vol. v, 1845–47, p. 423, and quoted by Darwin in his *Descent of Man*, ch. xx, is usually cited. It states that all natives " agree that but one adult male is seen in a band ; when the young male grows up, a contest takes place for mastery, and the strongest, by killing and driving out the others, establishes himself at the head of the community." This does not, however, in my judgment, warrant the psycho-analyst citing it in explanation of the Œdipus-Complex, for we have no reason whatever to assume that a conception of the relationship of parent to offspring exists in the Gorilla band ; in fact, it is infinitely more likely that it does *not* exist. Not until puberty, i.e. not until the sexual instinct becomes active, does the contest among the males take place, and the antagonism of *every* male is manifest against *all other* adult males. For the young gorilla the father just happens to be merely one of the other males, and the mother merely one of the females.

[1] Chapter VII.

There seems to be here no difference from the combats for the possession of females as obtaining among other species. It must further be borne in mind that *every* male covets *all* females in the gorilla band, hence the contest. But with species where all members live in absolute promiscuity, that is where the male individual on reaching puberty has a sufficient supply of females to choose from, no such contest takes place.

The conclusion to which one is forced to come, then, is that there is no evidence whatever in the normal individual for the existence of the Œdipus-Complex, and statements such as Sadger's,[1] that in dreams an examination-test which has been successfully performed, in reality, replaces the coitus which in infancy had been successfully performed with the mother in phantasy, appears then an unwarranted and, it seems to me, ridiculous assumption.

[1] *Int. Journ. of Psycho-analysis*, vol. i, pt. 2.

VI

HOMOSEXUALITY

Amicus Socrates, sed magis amica veritas.
PLATO.

FREUD says:[1] "Man, in general, oscillates all his life between heterosexual and homosexual feeling, and it is usual that denial or disappointment on one of these sides forces him to the other."

Now this is a perfectly definite and clear statement, not made about Dr. Schreber, the patient, whose case Freud here discusses, but about man, or woman, in general. Of evidence for it I cannot discover even the vestige of a shred in the paper referred to, but only assertions, pure and simple. Quoting from the autobiography of the patient, Freud says (*ibid*): She (i.e. the wife of the patient) had until then passed daily several hours with him (i.e. the patient), and had taken the midday meals in his company. When she returned after a four days' absence she found him most sadly changed, so that he did not wish to see even her any more. Freud then quotes the patient: "Decisive for my mental breakdown was especially one night during which I had a quite unusual number of pollutions—probably half a dozen." "We can quite understand, Freud continues, that protecting influences against the attraction of the men around him emanated only from the presence of the wife. And if we admit that an occurrence of

[1] Freud: "Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia (Dementia paranoides)." *Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre*, 3te Folge, 1913, p. 235.

pollutions in an adult cannot occur without psychic co-operation, we shall supplement to the pollutions of that night homosexual phantasies *that remained unconscious.*" [1]

This passage fairly gives the game away. Yet it is possible that Freud may, perhaps, be drawing upon a store of information acquired elsewhere, although he gives no reference where to look for proof of his statement. Be that as it may, the psychologist, like any other scientific investigator, is in search of truth, and he must carefully examine Freud's assertion; and if Freud himself does not furnish any proof, he, the psychologist, must dispassionately look for evidence and put it to the test without bias. All we want is truth, and if Freud's assertion is in accordance with facts, all our indignation, or disgust, or revolt, will not alter these facts. We should have to face them fairly and squarely; blinking at them will not alter them. All the tortures of Giordano Bruno, or the reported recantation of Galileo Galilei, did not alter the movement of the earth. *E pur si muove!* And if there *are* homosexual tendencies in man, no abuse or violence will abolish them. However unpalatable the truth, it is best to know it, and to arrange one's life accordingly.

The psychologist has a very delicate instrument with which to ascertain psychic facts: This is self-observation, or introspection, as it is called. It is a delicate and powerful instrument, but to acquire competency therein a long, careful, and persevering training in the laboratory is essential. Suppose, for instance, that an ordinary person is asked the question: "Do you like plum jam?" and he answers in a second or two, yes or no, as the case may be. If the person be then requested to describe what has actually happened in his mind in the short interval between the putting of the question and his answer, his description of the psychical occurrence will be very short and poor

[1] Italics are mine.

indeed. With the trained psychologist this is different, and to give an example to the general reader I will quote from the protocols of a recent research of mine where the observer, as the person with whom the experiment conducted is called, was required to answer the above quoted question, "Do you like plum jam?" and then to describe the psychical processes that had occurred.

Expt. 186. *Question*: Do you like plum jam?

Answer: Yes.

Introspective Record: Some surprise at the question, followed by considerable muscular tension and excitement. Vague thought to the effect that I must pull myself together and answer the question. The ensuing effort to understand the question (was) slightly unpleasant. Then followed a vivid visual image of plum jam with stones in it. This was slightly pleasant, and seemed soothing after the previous emotion. Then came an image of tactile sensation of a stone between the teeth and a much slighter gustatory image of plum jam. The gustatory image increased in intensity, though in doing so it became in some way fused with the tactile image of the stone. The combined image gradually became distinctly unpleasant, and was then accompanied by the thought: "No, I don't like this," with vague and fleeting verbal images. There were present even slight sensations of nausea which were quite unpleasant. About this time there began to develop gradually a visual image of strawberry jam, and also, I think, a somewhat vaguer visual image of marmalade. These images were pleasant, and I found myself comparing the pleasantness of strawberry jam and marmalade with the unpleasantness of plum jam. Then I thought that I was not asked to compare plum jam with other jams, but to state the absolute pleasantness or unpleasantness of plum jam. I went on to think that it was not in itself unpleasant, only less pleasant than strawberry jam and marmalade. The images of straw-

berry jam and marmalade then vanished, and I experienced a very vivid visual and gustatory image of plum jam which was distinctly pleasant. While experiencing this image I answered " Yes." [1]

I decided to approach the question of Freud's statement, that homesexual tendencies are present in every normal man, with a perfectly open mind, without the least bias, and to examine it closely by introspection. Whatever the result, the question appeared to me of paramount importance for psychology. When looking at a woman and indulging in sexual phantasies it is a well-known fact that, with the normal man, the impulse of contrectation, to use Moll's term, occurs. From this I reasoned that a similar experience must occur in the homosexually disposed individual with regard to another male. If, therefore, I were to indulge in such phantasies, whilst contemplating a man, as would cause an impulse to contrectation when practised with respect to a woman, I, as a trained observer, should certainly be able to detect any incipient conative tendencies and affective experiences, if they be present. With this end in view I looked out for and seized opportunities to contemplate at ease and unobtrusively men of all sorts and conditions. These opportunities offered themselves constantly in railway-carriages and omnibuses, in the park, at theatres and concerts, at lunch in the restaurants, at dinners, meetings, and so on. I chose as objects for these experiments youthful men of varying types : the martial figure of the dashing soldier or the brainy and intellectual countenance of the thinker, the athlete, or the delicate and dreamy artist—all men who would probably please and whose exterior decidedly attracted me. I contemplated them and dwelt upon their personal advantages, having constantly in mind the purpose of the experiment. I

[1] A. Wohlgemuth : " Pleasure—Unpleasure." An experimental investigation of the feeling-elements. Cambridge, 1919, *Brit. Journ. of Psychology*, Monograph Supplement, No. vi.

imagined the preliminary period of a sexual approach; but I think it unnecessary to enter here into further details of this process, and will state at once the result of these experiments. In no single case have I ever been able to discover the slightest trace of libido, whilst I discovered invariably decided repulsion and disgust. If these experiments had turned out differently, it is quite probable that I should not have spoken so candidly about them, but would have endeavoured to induce other trained psychologists to repeat the experiments for me. As it is, however, I can state most definitely and most emphatically that I have been unable to come across the least trace of any homosexual propensity in my experiences. I may add that these experiments were performed at intervals extending over many months, so that if there should be any oscillation in my sexuality, as suggested by Freud, I might be able to detect it.

Although the evidence of my introspection seemed to be decisive, I sought nevertheless to test its reliability by some control experiments, and this appeared to me to be possible in the following manner. To the average man the vast majority of women appear generally more or less indifferent sexually, because the sexual question does not loom prominently in the foreground of their thoughts on ordinary occasions, or else daily social intercourse could not take place as it does. A great number of women exert even a repulsive effect, owing, for instance, to some deformity, some physical or moral defect, some peculiarity or ailment with which they are afflicted. Now, if such women, I argued, are made the object of similar experiments as those described above with men, and if in spite of the primary repulsion, sexual conative tendencies, an incipient libido, be detected to be present, such fact would certainly tend to prove my introspection reliable, although a negative result would not render it doubtful. I chose then as suitable subjects for these experiments women whose

exterior was decidedly repulsive. Old and decrepit women, and such as were afflicted with some nauseating complaint, women of varying degrees of cleanliness, or rather uncleanliness. In all these cases I have invariably been able to discover decided sexual conative tendencies and unmistakable libido. It was vanishingly small as compared with the colossal repulsion felt, yet it was unmistakably there. I thus satisfied myself that my introspection in the experiments on men was accurate and reliable, as I could not have missed in the one case what I was able to discover in the other. That is, in the case of men, where there was decided pleasure, an æsthetic emotion with reference to their physical advantages, there was not the slightest trace of conative tendencies towards them with reference to sexual thoughts, but marked conative tendencies to turn away and terminate such thoughts, accompanied by pronounced unpleasure of an emotion of disgust. In the case of women things were reversed; with the unpleasure of emotion of disgust and conative tendencies turning to aversion as regards their physical condition, there were faint pleasure and conative tendencies with respect to sexual thoughts. I have, therefore, no hesitation whatever in affirming that Freud's statement, that there are homosexual tendencies in every man at some time or other, to be a groundless assertion, and I am inclined to believe that the majority of men, doubtless also of women, are normally heterosexual and without a tinge of the stigma of homosexuality.

I expect, of course, that Freud and his followers will retort by saying that my experiments merely prove that no homosexual tendencies are *conscious* in me, but that by psycho-analytic technique they would be able to unravel them in my "Unconscious." This, of course, would be a quite gratuitous assertion, as their psycho-analytic method merely discovers in the patient what the psycho-analyst

has been putting there himself, which I have endeavoured to prove in the preceding chapters, and of which the following chapters afford confirmation.

It would be idle to follow Freud in further unsavory phantasies which are derived from this unconfirmed phantasy.

VII

THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC METHOD AND SUGGESTION

Mirabile vidatur, quod non rideat haruspex, cum haruspicem viderit.
CATO.

WE have seen above, in Chapter II, how the "psycho-analytic method" was evolved out of Breuer's "cathartic method," and then made acquaintance with some of its supposed mechanisms. Freud's conception of the "Unconscious" was criticized in Chapter I, and the application of the psycho-analytic method to dreams, that is, psycho-analysis by the interpretation of dreams, in Chapter III. I endeavoured not only to show that nowhere has Freud ever furnished any scientific proof for his theories, but also reduced these theories to absurdity by applying them to the interpretation of dreams with respect to a person other than the dreamer.

When faced with these facts, the psycho-analyst generally has recourse, as a last resort, to two devices. The first is to assail his critic, and the second to refer him to the numerous cures which, he asserts, have been effected by the means of psycho-analysis. I will deal with them in turn.

"It is easily demonstrable, says Ernest Jones,[1] that some of the individual objections are, so to speak, not psychologically honest, in that they are only pretexts seized for the purpose of covering deeper ones, and often

[1] *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, London, 1918, p. 363.

those who bring the objections are not conscious of the deeper roots of their antipathy to the method." And again[1]: "The normal person is shocked, and finds it incredible, when he is told of the great frequency with which in their childhood neurotic patients indulged in sexual phantasies that refer to their parents. The reason is that the same thing is true of the normal, and he is resenting the information about the neurotic because really he is being told a disagreeable truth about himself." The implication is that those who criticize psycho-analysis have an awfully corrupt "Unconscious," as indicated by the great resistance, whilst those who do not thus criticize it are comparatively decent. But are not these exactly the same tactics as those which the two imposters in Anderson's fairy tale, quoted above, adopted?[2] If you do not see our web, you are unfit for your post, say the two impostors. If you do not admit the correctness of psycho-analysis, your "unconscious mind" is simply abominable, says the psycho-analyst! I wonder whether as many have been cajoled or brow-beaten by the psycho-analyst as there were by Anderson's impostors?

"It is the people," Ernest Jones says there also, "with secret attractions to various temptations who busy themselves most with removing those temptations from other people; really they are defending themselves under the pretext of defending others, because at heart they fear their own weakness." I wonder whether the corollary holds just as good, that people with the biggest "complexes" are those who busy themselves most with removing the supposed complexes from other people?

I will now proceed to examine more closely the claim of the psycho-analyst that the numerous cures which have been effected by means of psycho-analysis constitute an undeniable proof of the correctness of their doctrine.

Let me, for the sake of argument, assume this claim

[1] Loc. cit., p. 364. [2] P. 95.

to the correctness of the psycho-analytic doctrine to be valid, and, e.g., that some hysteric trouble is due to an infantile repression, and that "mental energy is finding an outlet in the form of neurotic symptoms." Let me assume, I say, that the Freudian mechanisms and their actions are as claimed; it would then follow, as far as I can see, that the trouble could not be cured by any other means. If a cystitis is due to a calculus, no internal antiseptic or lavages will end the cystitis; the calculus itself must be removed first, and only the removal of the "complex," and nothing else, can end the neurotic symptoms. But neurotic symptoms have been cured before Freud was ever thought of, and are still being cured by other means. Hence it follows that Freud's theory as to the cause of the hysteric symptoms is wrong.

On the other hand, it seems beyond doubt that cures have been effected by the psycho-analytic method. It is also evident that those points wherein the different schools of psycho-analysis, Freud, Adler, Jung, etc., differ cannot possibly be of any consequence, since both claim to have obtained good results by their respective methods, and doubtless have done so. Thus it appears rational to assume that a common factor is active in the various methods of procedure, psycho-analytic and otherwise. And this common factor I hold to be SUGGESTION, pure and simple, and nothing else. I know the psycho-analysts are up in arms against such a view, and contend that the procedure in Suggestion is the exact opposite of that of the psycho-analytic method. "In fact," says Freud,[1] "the greatest contrast possible exists between the technique of Suggestion and that of Psycho-analysis—that contrast which the great Leonardo da Vinci expressed for the arts by the formulæ *per via di porre* and *per via di levare*. Painting, says Leonardo, works *per via di porre*, putting little lumps of colour where there were none

[1] *Kleiner Schriften z. Neurosenlehre*, 1893–1906, pp. 208 *seq.*

before upon the plain canvas. Sculpture, on the other hand, proceeds *per via di levare*; it takes away as much of the stone as covers the surface of the statue contained in the stone. Similarly . . . the technique of suggestion tries to work *per via di porre*. . . . The analytical therapy, on the other hand, does not put something on, does not introduce anything new, but wants to take away, to expel. . . ." Here, as in most of his analogies and similes, Freud betrays his superficiality and shallowness. His analogy is faulty and spurious; he seizes a few minor points of similarity, and fails to see that, carried to its conclusion, the illustration is fatal to the point he wishes to elucidate. The statue, as such, is *not* in the stone; there is no surface, the overlying parts of which are taken away, and the parts of the stone which *are* taken away do not constitute the statue, but that which remains behind forms it. The statue, as such, would be created by the artist, just as the "Complex" would be created by the psycho-analyst. We shall meet with a still better example of Freud's slipshod analogies later.[1]

Ernest Jones, too, takes exception to this view. "The criticism sometimes made of the psycho-analytic treatment," he says,[2] "that its brilliant [*sic*] results are brought about merely by suggestion, betrays a complete ignorance of what actually happens, and is easily answered by the following objective consideration. What can be accomplished by the use of suggestion depends to some extent on the physician, and few can emulate the success obtained by masters of suggestion like Babinski and Dubois. Everyone, however, may determine how much he personally can accomplish in this way, and thus has a clear standard with which to compare the results he can obtain by other methods. Like the great majority of the Freud School, I had practised for some years with various forms of suggestion and hypnotism before I learned the

[1] *Vide*, p. 212.

[2] Loc. cit., p. 346.

psycho-analytic method, and I know indubitably that I am quite unable by the use of any other form of treatment to obtain the results that this method gives me. It would be absurd to infer that suggestion is the influence at work in both cases, and that it is more successful when it is deliberately observed and neutralized than when it is the sole mode of treatment."

I am afraid the "complete ignorance" is on the side of the psycho-analysts, at least with reference to the meaning of suggestion. If I want to cure a man of constipation with castor oil, it is idle to pour it over him; I must get him to swallow the stuff. If I want to cure a man of some hysteric stigma, I must get him *to accept the suggestion.* If it cannot be done by telling him, whether in hypnosis or otherwise, that the stigma will disappear, or, *à la Coué,* by his incessant repetition that he is getting better, I may, perhaps, be more successful in making him believe that he is suffering from some "complex," and then "discover" it by the psycho-analytic method. I must get him to *accept* the suggestion, and this is the *sine qua non.* The hypnotic suggestions were not accepted by Ernest Jones' patients, whilst the suggestion that some rediscovered forgotten memory was the cause of certain symptoms *was* accepted. That's all.

Pfister, as so often, is here too the *enfant terrible* of the psycho-analysts.[1] He quotes Dubois[2]: "The nervous patient is on the way to health as soon as he has the conviction that he can be cured; he is to be considered as cured on the day when he thinks himself cured. The means for obtaining this 'fixed idea' are fairly indifferent: religious faith, suggestion by charlatans, suggestion by medicaments and physical agencies, scientific psychotherapy by the education of reason—all help if they bring about the fixed idea." In the subsequent criticism

[1] *The Psycho-analytic Method,* London, n.d., p. 439.
[2] *Die Psychoneurosen und ihre psych. Behandlung,* Bern, 1905, p. 202.

of these remarks Pfister shows that he completely confounds the *means* employed to obtain suggestion with suggestion proper, i.e. the *acceptance* of the suggested idea by the patient. As long as this confusion of ideas obtains there is no hope for the psycho-analyst. That the *acceptance* is necessary, Pfister appears to admit, without, evidently, recognizing the significance of this admission. He says [1]: ". . . with the becoming conscious and acceptance of the analytic interpretation, the manifestation will have to fade. . . . Why may other symptoms remain? One might assume that there were still deeper over-determinants than those discovered. This view is irrefutable, for one can never pursue a symptom to the absolute beginnings of all the threads in its enormously ramified network. Every analysis is incomplete." And again [2]: "One can therefore confidently say: that which is the most decisive factor in the analysis is not merely the thoroughness and correctness of the mental illumination of the unconscious, but just as much, indeed still more, the person of the analyst who temporarily accepts the life desire of the patient in order to transmit it to reality, to healthy moral life activities. Where the personality, freed from complex-illusion, can win in high degree, it will tear the fixed life-desire free from its stagnation in weak fixation, even after slight analysis, indeed without analysis (by suggestion)."

And again [3]: "It has happened to many analysts, as to myself, that a patient, in spite of careful analysis, remains for a time uncured, and somewhat later, without further artificial help, suddenly gets well. This happened especially often when a removal to other surroundings occurred." On the following page [4] Pfister says: "The question of the attitude towards life must be discussed again and again in every thorough analysis." A little

[1] Loc. cit., p. 454.
[2] Loc. cit., p. 471.
[3] Loc. cit., p. 479.
[4] Loc. cit., p. 480.

further: [1] "If the resistances against the sounding of the individual's inmost nature, against the analyst, and against the attitude towards reality, are overcome in sufficient thoroughness, then there comes about the establishment of a useful life-program, *even though many dark depths of the unconscious remain unanalysed.*" [2]

Muthmann [3] has no illusions about this point. He says: "At this process (i.e. of working off, abreaction) suggestive influences by the physician play a prominent part. A powerful suggestion which then acts auto-suggestively is especially the explanation respecting the method. The patient is informed that his illness is due to some forgotten experience. If this experience could be discovered, then his complaint would be cured . . . with a proper course of procedure the patient seizes at once the connection of the resuscitating reminiscence with his illness, and, from its very inception, there is attached to this idea the suggestion that the respective symptoms will disappear."

These quotations will suffice now. I shall presently give actual examples from an analysis conducted under Freud's supervision. Meanwhile I will draw attention to another factor which renders the psycho-analytic method absolutely valueless for scientific psychological consideration. This is the directing, or leading, nay driving, of the patient by the psycho-analyst. It is this fact which made me say that such "complexes" as the Œdipus-Complex are *created* by the psycho-analyst. This leading, too, is, of course, denied. Ernest Jones,[4] referring to the various psychotherapeutic methods, says: "In a recent monograph on the treatment of the neuroses I have graded the various methods according to the measure in which the cure is allowed to depend on the patient's own activity. As will be recognized, the psycho-analytic

[1] Loc. cit., p. 481.
[2] The italics are mine
[3] Arthur Muthmann: *Zur Psychologie und Therapie neurotischer Symptome; Eine Studie auf Grund der Neurosenlehre Freuds*, Halle a/S., 1907, p. 51.
[4] Loc. cit., p. 312.

method stands at the extreme end of this series, since the essential process of recovery is accomplished in the patient's internal psychic life, while the physician contents himself with watching over the evolution of the analysis, instead of, as in other methods, endeavouring to play the part of guide and teacher. *In place of leading the patient in a previously determined direction, the analyst accompanies him in his progress, the direction of which is entirely determined by the patient's own mental activity, and principally by the workings of his unconscious self.*" [1]

Now, I do not know anything about Dr. Jones' own procedure, but the above description of the psycho-analytic method is not correct as regards his master, for Freud himself states plainly:[2] "During the analysis he (i.e. the juvenile patient) has indeed to be told many things which he himself does not know to say, ideas have to be suggested to him which have not as yet occurred to him, his attention has to be adjusted in those directions from which the father (of the patient) anticipated that which was to come. This weakens the conclusiveness of the analysis; but *in every analysis one has to proceed like this. A psycho-analysis is not an unbiassed (tendenzlos) scientific research, but just a therapeutic intervention. The physician gives in psycho-analysis every time to the patient the respective expectation-ideas (Erwartungsvorstellungen) by means of which he (the patient) shall be enabled to recognize that which is unconscious and to seize it; on one occasion he gives them more, and on another less plentifully. There are just some cases that require more help and others that require less.* WITHOUT SUCH HELP NO ONE CAN GET ON.[3] What one may cure oneself of are slight disturbances, but never a neurosis which opposes the ego as something foreign. To overpower this another person is necessary, and so far

[1] The italics are mine.

[2] *Sammlungrh Kleiner Schriften z. Neurosenlehre*, 3te Folge, Leipzig, etc., 1913, p. 88.

[3] The ITALICS are mine.

as this other person can help, so far the neurosis can be cured."

What really happens during a psycho-analysis I may best illustrate by a parable: A friend of mine arrived the other day from the country. He had never been in London before, nor did he know its topography. I suspected him of a "Hyde-Park-Complex." If my diagnosis was correct, I argued, he would get to Hyde Park by himself. In place of leading him in a previously determined direction I would merely accompany him in his progress, the direction of which would be entirely determined by his own mental activity, and principally by the workings of his unconscious self.

I took him to the Mansion House and told him to go in whichever direction he liked. He looked around in a wistful manner, and then, after a little hesitation, started off towards Cornhill. That does not look like Hyde Park, I thought. When we came to the junction of Gracechurch Street, Leadenhall Street, and Bishopsgate, I remarked that the last was certainly the most interesting street, and so we turned off to the left. Threadneedle Street? Oh, that would only bring us back to where we started from; so we walked straight on. Here on the right is Houndsditch, that brings us to Petticoat Lane; no? you don't want to buy or sell an overcoat! Straight on leads to Shoreditch—an awfully uninteresting place. Here on the left Wormwood Street brings us to London Wall; now that *is* interesting. Here are the ruins of the wall built by the Romans during their occupation. They are *hidden* at the back of a sort of garden—hidden—to hide —Hyde Park—that sounds suspicious! Now we come to Cripplegate. Shall we pass down Wood Street? No? (Here is "resistance," which must be noted!) Well, let us look at Milton's statue. He lies buried here. Now we are in Jewin Street. This is Aldersgate Street. Shall we turn to the left? It would bring us to the General

Post Office. No? Why not? Because you don't want to? (This continued stubborn resistance is *very* suspicious!) Let us go in the opposite direction then. This is Long Lane. There are the Central Meat Markets. Here is Bart's, St. Bartholomew's Hospital—this new building belongs to it. We are now in Giltspur Street. This is the Central Criminal Court—The Old Bailey. Here on the left is Newgate Street—that would only bring us back to where we started from. On the right is Holborn Viaduct, which is very interesting. You wish to see it? All right. Now we have a straight road: High Holborn, New Oxford Street, Oxford Street, and now we are in Hyde Park. So my diagnosis of a Hyde-Park-Complex was correct. It cannot be objected that I guided my friend in a previously determined direction. I left the choice of direction entirely to him, and I merely accompanied him on his progress, the direction of which was entirely determined by his own mental activity, and principally by the workings of his unconscious self.

Let me now turn to the consideration of the actual analysis which, though not conducted by Freud, was yet performed under his guidance and supervision. It is the first paper in the third series of the *Neurosenlehre*,[1] and entitled: "Analysis of the Phobia of a Five-year-Old Boy." Freud says:—

"The history of the illness and cure of the very youthful patient described in the following pages has, strictly speaking, not been under my own observation. I have indeed sketched out the whole plan of the treatment and also once personally intervened in a talk with the boy; but the treatment itself has been performed by the father of the child, to whom I am very greatly indebted for confiding to me his notes for the purpose of publication. The merit of the father goes still further.

[1] *Sammlung kleiner Schriften z. Neurosenlehre*, 3te Folge, Leipzig, etc. 1913.

I mean to say that no other person would have been so successful in inducing a child to such confessions. The technical knowledge which enabled the father to interpret the utterances of his five-year-old boy could not be replaced; the technical difficulties of a psychoanalysis in so tender an age would have remained unsurmountable. Only the combination of the authority of the father and that of the physician in one person, the meeting there of the tender interests with the scientific ones, have in this case rendered it possible to make use of a method that would have otherwise been unsuitable. . . .

"The first information about Hans dates from the time when he was not yet quite three years old. He manifested then by diverse talk and questions a quite special interest in that part of his body which he used to designate by the name of 'peewee-maker.' He thus once addressed to his mother this question:—

"HANS.—'Mummy, have you got a peewee-maker?'

"MOTHER.—'Of course—why?'

"HANS.—'I have only been thinking.'

"At the same age, coming into a cowshed, he sees a cow being milked, and remarks: 'Look, there's milk coming out of the peewee-maker.'

"Already these early observations arouse the expectation that much, if not most, of that which little Hans shows to us will turn out to be typical of the sexual development of the child. . . . [There follow other references to the 'peewee-maker.']

"The great event in Hans' life is, however, the birth of his little sister Hanna, when he was exactly three and a half years old (April 1903 to October 1906). His behaviour at the occurrence was noted down immediately by the father: 'At five o'clock in the morning, with the beginning of labour, Hans' bed is taken into the next room. Here he wakes at seven o'clock, and, hearing the groans of the parturient mother, asks: "Why does

mummy cough ? " After a while : " The stork is sure to come to-day."

" ' He has, of course, been told during the last few days that the stork is going to bring a little boy, or a little girl, and he connects, quite rightly, the unusual groaning with the arrival of the stork.

" ' Later he is taken into the kitchen. In the hall he sees the bag of the physician and asks : " What is this ? " and is told : " A bag." He retorts quite convinced : " To-day comes the stork." After the confinement the nurse comes into the kitchen, and Hans hears her ordering some tea, and says : " I see, mummy gets tea because she coughs." He is then called into the room, looks, however, not at the mother, but at the vessels with blood-mixed water that are still in the room, and says, surprised, pointing to the blood-stained bed-pan : " But no-blood comes out of the peewee-maker." ' "

Other notes by the father follow, in which references to the peewee-maker predominate. Some remarks of the child respecting girls are interpreted by the father as sexual desires, and expression of friendship towards boys as homosexual. No wonder that with such parents the child should develop in this direction.

" It is evident," continues Freud, " that letting the child make ' peewee ' when his trousers are opened and his penis is pulled out is pleasurable for Hans. On walks it is generally the father who performs this service, which gives rise to the fixation of a homosexual tendency towards the father."

The following episode Freud describes as an attempt at seduction of the mother :—

" Hans is four and a half years old. This morning Hans is given his daily bath by his mother, and after the bath wiped dry and powdered. When his mother is powdering him near the penis, taking care not to touch it, Hans says :—

" ' Why don't you touch it with your fingers ? '

" MOTHER.—' Because it is indecent.'

" HANS.—' What is it ? Indecent ? Why ? '

" MOTHER.—' Because it is naughty.'

" HANS (laughingly).—' But very nice.' "

With the next chapter begins an account of the illness and of the analysis. It opens with the following letter :—

" GEEHRTER HERR PROFESSOR !—I am sending you again some notes about Hans—this time unhappily contributions to the history of an illness. As you will see therefrom Hans has developed, during the last few days, some nervous trouble which causes some anxiety to me and my wife, because we could find nothing to overcome it. I ask your permission to call on you to-morrow, . . . but I have put down for you in writing the material at my disposal.

" Sexual excitement produced by the tenderness of the mother has probably laid the foundation, but I cannot name the cause of the trouble. The fear that a horse might bite him in the street seems somehow to be connected with having been frightened by a big penis. As you know from previous notes of mine, he has noticed very early the large penis of the horse, and he drew then the conclusion that his mother, because she was big, must have a ' peewee-maker ' like a horse.

" I do not know what to do with this. Has he seen an exhibitionist anywhere ? Or is all of it connected with his mother ? We do not like that he should begin already to put riddles to us. Apart from his fear to go into the street, and the ill-humour (*Verstimmung*) in the evening, he is, as usual, gay and joyful."

Here ends the father's letter.

I have given the preceding extracts principally in order to make the following ones from the analysis intelligible, and incidentally to give an example of the education of a young child by parents whose minds are

evidently swayed by psycho-analytic "philosophy." The parents' especial interest in the subject is manifest, and that with such parents the child's interest should likewise be turned in this direction is all that can be expected. The fact that at the age of three and a half years the child is still allowed to sleep in the parents' bedroom speaks volumes, and that the little lad should be called into the confinement-room, showing all the evidence of the recent delivery by its blood-stained vessels, etc., is further confirmation of a neglected, or perverted, upbringing. The whole of the father's thoughts is permeated with sexuality, which manifests itself in his interpretations of the child's remarks. If any confirmation were required it is found in the fact that the father, as is evident from the above letter to Freud, had been collecting the notes for Freud previous to the boy's illness, *and collecting notes for Freud—ça dit tout!*

I will not weary the reader by a translation of the whole of the analysis and of Freud's comments, but give only such extracts as will show the continuous suggestion by the psycho-analysing father and the influence upon the parent and child by the introduction of psycho-analysis into the family. Its introduction into the school, as has been of late advocated by some people, would doubtless be equally edifying.

Hans develops a fear of going into the street and of being bitten by a horse.

Commenting upon the phobia, Freud says: "Hans has confessed that he occupies himself every night with his penis before falling asleep because it is pleasant. Now, will the practitioner say at once: now everything is clear. The child masturbates—hence the fear. Stop! That the child secures for himself masturbatory pleasure does not in the least explain his fears. On the contrary, it makes it still more mysterious. Anxiety-states are not produced by masturbation—in fact, never by indulgence.

By the way, we may assume that Hans, who is now four and three quarter years old, yields to this pleasure every evening, and we shall see that he is just now fighting to break himself of the habit, which accords better with repression and anxiety-formation."

Freud gives the father instructions how to treat the child with reference to the phobia, and among the father's notes is the following :—

"On Sunday, March 1st, on the way to the railway-station, the following conversation takes place when I try to explain to him that horses do not bite.

"HANS.—'But white horses bite. In Gmunden is a white horse that bites. When you show it your fingers it bites.'

"I notice that Hans says 'the fingers' instead of 'the hand.' He then tells the following story which I produce connectedly : 'When Lizzi was going away, a carriage with a white horse was standing before the house to take the luggage to the station.' (Lizzi, he tells me, is a girl living in a neighbouring house). 'Her father was standing close to the horse and the horse turned its head to touch him, and he said to Lizzi : "Don't show the white horse your fingers or it will bite you."'

"In reply to this I say : 'It seems to me that you do not mean a horse which you must not touch with your fingers, but a peewee-maker.'

"HANS.—'But a peewee-maker does not bite.'

"FATHER.—'Perhaps it does,' upon which Hans wants to prove spiritedly that it was really a white horse."

Here is another episode :—

"During the night from the 27th to the 28th Hans surprises us by that he gets out of his bed in the dark and comes to our bed. His room is separated from ours by a dressing-room.[1] We ask him why, whether he was perhaps afraid. He says 'No ; I will tell you to-morrow.'

[1] It is not stated whether the doors were closed or not.—A. W.

He falls asleep in our bed, and is carried back to his own.

"On the next day I interrogate him in order to ascertain why he came to us during the night, and, after some resistance, the following dialogue takes place, which I immediately put down in shorthand :—

"HANS.—'During the night a big and a crumpled giraffe were in the room, and the big one screamed because I took the crumpled one away from it. Then it stopped screaming, and I sat on the crumpled one.'

"FATHER (surprised).—'What? A crumpled giraffe? How was that?'

"HANS.—'Yes,' and fetching quickly some paper, crumples it up and says to me: 'it was crumpled like that.'

"FATHER.—'And you sat on the crumpled giraffe—how?' He shows me again by sitting himself on the floor.

"FATHER.—'Why did you come into the room?'

"HANS.—'I don't know myself.'

"FATHER.—'Were you frightened?'

"HANS.—'No, certainly not.'

"FATHER.—'Did you dream of the giraffe?'

"HANS.—'No, I did not dream it; I have imagined it—the whole I have imagined; I got up before.'

"FATHER.—'What do you mean, a crumpled giraffe? You know you cannot crumple up a giraffe like a piece of paper.'

"HANS.—'I know it. I have just thought it. Such a thing does not exist in the world. The crumpled one was lying on the floor and I took it away—took it away with my hands.'

"FATHER.—'What, such a big giraffe can be taken with the hands?'

"HANS.—'The crumpled one I took with my hand.'

"FATHER.—'Where was the big one, then?'

"HANS.—'The big one was standing farther away.'

"FATHER.—'What did you do with the crumpled one?'

"HANS.—'I held it in my hand a little while, until the big one stopped screaming, then I sat on it.'

"FATHER.—'Why did the big one scream?'

"HANS.—'Because I took the little one away.' And noticing that I am putting everything down, asks: 'Why do you write this down?'

"FATHER.—'Because I am sending it to a professor who can take your foolishness (i.e. phobia) away.'

"HANS.—'Ah, then you have also put down *that mummy took off her nightdress, and you give this also to the professor.*'[1]

"FATHER.—'Well, he will not understand, as you think, that one can crumple up a giraffe.'

"HANS.—'Just tell him that I do not know it myself, and then he won't ask. But if he does ask what the crumpled giraffe is, he can write us and we write back, or we write him at once.'

"FATHER.—'But why did you come during the night?'

"HANS.—'I don't know.'

"FATHER.—'Tell me quickly what you are thinking of.'

"HANS (humorously).—'Raspberry syrup.'

"FATHER.—'What else?'

"HANS.—'A gun to shoot with.'

"FATHER.—'You did certainly not dream it?'

"HANS.—'Certainly not—I am quite positive.' He continues: 'Mummy has begged me such a long time to tell her why I came during the night. But I did not want to tell her, because I was at first ashamed before her.'

"FATHER.—'Why?'

"HANS.—'I don't know.'

"As a matter of fact, my wife has been questioning him the whole morning until he told the giraffe story."

[1] Italics are mine.

Freud interjects that the father discovered the same day the interpretation of the giraffe-phantasy.

" The big giraffe is myself, respectively, the big penis (the long neck) ; the crumpled giraffe is my wife, respectively, her sexual organ, which is the result of the enlightenment.

" Giraffe—see excursion to Schönbrunn. Besides, he has a picture of a giraffe and an elephant hanging over his bed.

" The whole is the reproduction of a scene that takes place almost every morning. Hans comes always early to us, and my wife cannot resist taking him for a few minutes into bed with her. Then I always begin to warn her that she should not do it (the big one screamed because I have taken the crumpled one away from it), and she answers, now and again somewhat irritated, that it is all nonsense, and that a minute did not count, and so on. Hans then remains with her for a short time (the big giraffe stops screaming, and then I sat on the crumpled giraffe).

" The interpretation of this matrimonial scene transported into giraffe-life is this : Hans has during the night a longing for his mummy, for her caresses, for her organ [*sic*] ; he came for this reason into the bedroom. The whole is a continuance of the horse phobia."

Freud augments the " perspicacious " interpretations of the father by a few others, and terminates : " One can quite rightly divine, as the father suspects, behind the phantasy the fear that the mother does not care for him (Hans), because his peewee-maker cannot compete with that of the father [*sic*]."

The following morning the father obtains the confirmation of his interpretation.

" Sunday, March 29th, I go with Hans to Lainz. At the door I take jokingly leave from my wife, saying, ' Goodbye, big giraffe.' Hans asks : ' Why giraffe ? '

I reply: 'Mummy is the big giraffe.' And then Hans: 'Isn't it, and Hanna the crumpled giraffe?' [1]

"At the station I explain to him the giraffe-phantasy, to which he replies: 'Yes, that is right.' And as I tell him that I am the big giraffe, and that the long neck had reminded him of a peewee-maker, he says: 'Mummy, too, has a neck like a giraffe: I have seen that when she washed her white neck.' . . ."

On another occasion when Hans had seen a horse fall down and shown fear, the father questions him.

"FATHER.—'The horse that fell down. What colour was it—white, red, brown, grey?'

"HANS.—'Black; both horses were black.'

"FATHER.—'Was it big or small?'

"HANS.—'Big.'

"FATHER.—'Thick or thin?'

"HANS.—'Thick; very big and thick.'

"FATHER.—'Did you think of Daddy when the horse fell down?'

"HANS.—'Perhaps; yes, it is possible.'

Freud comments upon this: ". . . . we have ascertained the actual cause on which the phobia broke out. This was when the boy saw a big heavy horse fall down; and at least one of the interpretations appears to be that emphasized by the father, that Hans experienced at that time the wish that his father may fall down like that—and be dead. . . ."

Hans had referred to something black at the horse's mouth, which, from some later remarks of Hans, apparently turns out to be a black leather muzzle, but the father did not know it then. He surmises and endeavours to ascertain that the horse means him, the father, and that the black at the horse's mouth had reference to the father's moustache. He therefore asks

[1] But before we had the big giraffe interpreted as the father, or his penis, or the crumpled giraffe as the mother, or her sexual organ. See above.

the boy: "Whether the black did not remind him of a moustache," to which the boy replies: "Only by its colour."

On another occasion the following conversation occurs during the analysis:—

"FATHER.—'Did you see what the peewee-maker of Berta looks like?'

"HANS.—'No, only of the horse, because I was always in the stable, and there I have seen the peewee-maker of the horse.'

"FATHER.—'And then you were curious to see what the peewee-maker of Berta and Mummy were like?'

"HANS.—'Berta was always looking on when I did it (in no way offended, but rather pleased). In the little garden where the radishes are I used to make peewee, and she used to stand at the house-door and look at me.'

"FATHER.—'And when she made peewee did you look on?'

"HANS.—'But she used to go to the lavatory.'

"FATHER.—'And you were curious?'

"HANS.—'I was with her in the lavatory. . . .'

"FATHER.—'Did you tell her you wanted to go in?'

"HANS.—'I went in by myself, because Berta did not object. There is no harm.'

"FATHER.—'And you would have liked to see the peewee-maker?'

"HANS.—'Yes, but I did not see it.'

"FATHER.—'. . . Did you wish that Berta should help you to make peewee?'

"HANS.—'I never told her so.'

"FATHER.—'Why did you not tell her?'

"HANS.—'Because I did not think of it.' (Interrupting himself): 'If I write all this to the professor, then the stupid thing will be all over, won't it?'

"FATHER.—'Why did you wish that Berta should help you to make peewee?'

"HANS.—'I don't know, because she looked on.'

"FATHER.—'Did you not wish that she should touch your peewee-maker with her hand?'

"HANS.—'Yes. (Changing the conversation.) In Gmunden it was fine. In the little garden where the radishes are is a little sand heap, and there I played with my spade.'

Later on this occurs:—

"FATHER.—'You have often been with Mummy to the lavatory?'

"HANS.—'Very often.'

"FATHER.—'Did it disgust you?'

"HANS.—'Yes . . . No.'

"FATHER.—'You liked to be present when Mummy is making peewee or bobbies (defæcating)?'

"HANS.—'Very much.'

"FATHER.—'Why so very much?'

"HANS.—'I don't know.'

"FATHER.—'Because you think you might see her peewee-maker?'

"HANS.—'Yes, I think so.'

"On April 11th Hans comes again early into our room, and is again, as of late, ordered out.

"A little later he says: 'Father, I have thought something. I am in the bath, and the plumber comes to unscrew it. He takes a large gimlet and pushes it into my stomach.' The father translates this phantasy: 'I am in bed with Mummy. Father comes and orders me away. With his big penis he gets me away from Mummy.'

"On April 12th, returning home in a railway-carriage which is upholstered in black leather, Hans is disgusted with the colour, as it reminds him of bobbies (fæces)."

"FATHER.—'Did you see perhaps something black on Mummy that frightened you?'

"HANS.—'Yes.'

"FATHER.—'What was it?'

"HANS.—'I don't know. A black blouse or black stockings.'

"FATHER.—'Perhaps black hairs on the peewee-maker when you were inquisitive and looked at her?'

"HANS (apologetically).—'But I have never seen the peewee-maker.'

Again, on another occasion:—

"FATHER.—'In Gmunden you have often been in bed with Mummy?'

"HANS.—'Yes.'

"FATHER.—'And then you thought you were Daddy?'

"HANS.—'But you know everything; I have known nothing.'

And again:—

"FATHER: 'It seems to me you wish that Mummy should have another baby?'

"HANS.—'But I don't want to have it.'

"FATHER.—'But you wish it.'

"HANS.—'I wish it perhaps.'

"FATHER.—'Do you know why you wish it? Because you would like to be Daddy.'

"HANS.—'Yes . . . how is it?'

"FATHER.—'How is what?'

"HANS.—'A daddy doesn't get a child. How is it, then, if I would like to be a daddy?'

"On the 2nd of May Hans comes home earlier and says: 'Daddy, I have been thinking something to-day.' At first he appears to have forgotten it, but later relates under notable resistance. 'The plumber came, and with a pair of tongs he took off my bottom, and then gave me another one, and then the peewee-maker. He said: "Let me see your bottom," and I had to turn round, and he took it away, and then he said: "Show me the peewee-maker."'

"The father," says Freud, "recognizes the character of the wish-phantasy, and does not doubt for a moment the only permissible interpretation.

"FATHER.—'He gave you a bigger peewee-maker and a bigger bottom?'

" HANS.—' Yes.'

" FATHER.—' Like Daddy has got them, because you would like to be Daddy ? ' "

These are but a few extracts picked out practically at random showing how the father continuously puts his own ideas into the child.

The third chapter is concerned with the epicrisis. Here Freud states: " What the physician communicates to the patient has after all originated from analytic experiences, and it is really proof enough if with the display of this medical intervention the connection and the solution of the pathogenic material is obtained. But, after all, our little patient has during the analysis shown sufficient independence to acquit him of the accusation of suggestion. . . . With a deeper study of the details of the analysis plenty of further proofs for the freedom of our Hans from ' suggestion ' would be found, but I break off the consideration of the first objection. I know that not even by this analysis shall I be able to convince anybody who does not want to be convinced, and I continue the working out of this case for those readers who have already convinced themselves of the objectivity of the unconscious pathogenic material, not without emphasizing the pleasant knowledge, that the number of these latter is constantly increasing."

For mere audaciousness and assurance even Cagliostro is eclipsed! I need, therefore, not examine Freud's " working-out " of the case any further. In practically every extract quoted the little fellow is made to say what the father wants him to say, and everyone who has had anything to do with children knows their rambling ways, their assent to a suggestion from a person in authority like the father, and their love of travelling on along the line on which they have been launched. The story of the white horse in Gmunden has all the characteristics of an actual occurrence, but the father is not content

until he makes the boy say that the horse might be a peewee-maker.

The next episode mentioned looks very suspicious indeed with reference to the bringing up of the child. I drew already attention to the fact that the child was apparently still allowed to sleep in the parents' bedroom at the age of three and a half years. When the boy is about five years old, at the time of this next episode, he sleeps in a room separated from the parents' room by a dressing-room. It is not stated that the doors were closed. The mother had questioned him the whole morning to find out the reason why the child came into their room during the night, and as great an anxiety is betrayed by the father in his interrogatory. When the father says that he is going to send his notes to the professor, Hans replies: "Ah, then, you have also put down that Mummy took off her nightdress, and you give this also to the professor." The father passes over this remark in silence, and thus seems to confirm the suspicion of the reader, that the boy has been an involuntary witness to his parents' embraces. However illuminating Hans' remark and his father's avoidance of the subject raised are with respect to the boy's up-bringing, the incidence has a still greater importance, inasmuch as it enables us to form an adequate judgment of the psycho-analytic method. We are incessantly told that there is no suggestion, and that the patient's communications are spontaneous. This we have seen now is absolutely untrue. We are further told that the patient is allowed to travel in whatever direction he likes, and that no restraint is put upon him. This, too, is here proved to be false. When Hans interjected: "Ah, then, you have also put down that Mummy took off her nightdress, and you give this also to the professor," the psycho-analysing father ought to have allowed the child to pursue this line instead of pulling him back and forcibly pushing him on the previous

direction towards the father's pet complex. The father's questions show the constant leading or pushing of the boy by him, and the answers of Hans the constant change of the phantasy in the direction in which he is pushed or led. The interpretation given by the father to the giraffe-phantasy is this: "Hans has during the night a longing for his Mummy, for her caresses, for her (sexual) organ; he came for this reason into the bedroom." Freud adds that "one can quite rightly divine, as the father suspects, behind the phantasy the fear that the mother does not care for Hans, because his peewee-maker cannot compete with that of the father." And this "explanation" is apparently imparted to the five-year-old child!

When "analysing" the boy about a black horse that he had seen falling down, the father asks: "Did you think of Daddy when the horse fell down?" Hans: "Perhaps, yes, it is possible." Quite independent, no trace of suggestion, is there now?

The "analysis" about the horse's black leather muzzle and the father's moustache; that about Berta and Hans' peewee-maker; that about Hans' object when his mother took him habitually with her to the lavatory; that about Hans' dislike of black and his mother's pubic hair, and the rest—all, without exception, are ideas of the father, and not of Hans. The father suggests them, and Hans, as any child of that age would, says that perhaps it may be so!

In discussing[1] the advantage accruing to Hans from the "analysis," Freud admits that Hans is "not the only child that during childhood is attacked by a phobia. Such attacks are, as is well known, quite extraordinarily frequent, even with children whose up-bringing leaves nothing to be desired as regards strictness. These children later either become neurotic or remain healthy."

[1] Loc. cit., p. 118.

Extraordinary! To have discovered that children either become neurotic or remain healthy testifies as to Freud's remarkable perspicacity, and I cannot help but agreeing with him! However, I am unable to follow him any further. "What harm has been done to the boy by bringing to light the fearful complexes? Has the little one now perhaps attempted in earnest to realize his pretensions upon his mother, or has he put in execution the designs upon his father?" But nothing whatever has been brought to light out of the "Unconscious" of the boy! Freud's, or the father's, repugnant sexual ideas have been communicated to him, and the healthy mind of a healthy little fellow has been polluted. The boy has been corrupted to afford gratification to the sexual phantasies of his psycho-analysers.

To show how differently such a phobia is treated by a healthy minded parent I quote Baldwin [1]: "The following case of fact, in the life of my little girl H, indicates that such a stimulus (i.e. from dreams) may be of enormous importance. When two years and three months of age she was accidentally run over by a dog. Before this she had been very fond of dogs. She was not much hurt, but very much frightened, and repeated to every one the words, 'Doggie run over baby.' The next day she saw a dog in the street and showed some signs of fear until the brute ran away. About the second night after the occurrence her mother and I were awakened by a violent outcry in H.'s room. On going in, the child was found sitting in bed undergoing a paroxysm of fear from a bad dream. She repeated again and again after leaving the room, 'Doggie run over baby "ānā"' (*ānā* was her word for 'there'), pointing into her bedroom. Evidently the child had lived over again in her dream the occurrence with the dog. The effect on her waking life was very

[1] James Mark Baldwin: *Mental Development in the Child and the Race. Methods and Processes*, 3rd ed., New York, 1906, p. 130.

marked. The next day she could not be induced to go into her bedroom, protesting, 'Doggie in *ānā*,' and crying lustily if the endeavour was made to carry her. Further, for several days the sight of a dog on the street threw her into such convulsive fits of fear that her nurse brought her home to be quieted—a much more violent exhibition, be it noted, than that which occurred after the real occurrence with the dog, but before the dream. The sight, or even a picture, of a dog long excited great emotion, and it is not unlikely that she will carry for life this antipathy, which will appear later to be unaccountable." With reasoning, persuasion, and training such antipathy might be overcome. Suggestion can do it without being *that* suggestion which the psycho-analyst employs, and which at the same time defiles the child's mind. There is no need to discover a "complex" that little H. wanted to kill her mother in order to have sexual connection with her father, and then to impart the knowledge of this discovery to the child.

I think it, however, necessary to state here, lest I should be misunderstood, or misinterpreted, that whilst rejecting Freud's psycho-analytic doctrine, I do not contend against what is a sufficiently well-established fact, namely the forgetting of events which may be regarded as forming the cause of some phobia or hysteric symptom. Pierre Janet, I believe, was the first who turned his attention to this. He published [1] an account of a patient, Marie, who first came under his observation when nineteen years old. She had periods of convulsion and delirium which lasted for days. The periods coincided with those of her menstruation, and were irregularly prolonged. Medicinal treatment and hydrotherapy had no effect, and hypnotic suggestion with reference to her menstruation only made matters worse. Janet then induced deep hypnosis, and in this state was able to make her recall

[1] Pierre Janet: *L'Automatisme psychologique*, Paris, 1889, pp. 463 *seq.*

an incident that had never been fully known. When Marie at the age of thirteen menstruated for the first time, she thought that it was something bad, and secretly plunged into a bath of cold water. The menstruation stopped immediately, and in spite of a great attack of shivering she could go home. She was ill for some time and delirious for several days. Then she got better, and the mestruation did not appear again for five years. When it did appear, it was accompanied by the troubles described. Janet tried to take away the fixed idea that the menstruation was stopped by a cold bath, but was at first not successful. The monthly period arrived about two days later, and passed in about the same manner as the others. Janet began his attempts again, and was at last able to dispel the fixed idea in a singular way. It became necessary to take Marie back in hypnosis to the age of thirteen, to put her back into the first stages of the delirium, and then to convince her that her menstruation had lasted three days, and had not been interrupted by any untoward accident. This done, the next monthly period arrived at its due date, and lasted three days without causing any suffering, convulsion, or delirium. In a similar manner Janet cured Marie of her attacks of terror, which he found were due to Marie's witnessing the accident of an old lady being killed by falling downstairs. He suggested that the old lady was not really killed, and only hurt herself slightly. Janet also found that Marie's blindness in her left eye was hysterical. Taken back in hypnosis to the age of five, she could see very well with that eye. The blindness began at the age of six, but of the cause Marie knows nothing in the waking state. In the hypnotic state, however, the following trifling incident was discovered. Marie had been forced in spite of her remonstrances to sleep with a child of her own age whose left side of the face was covered with scab. Marie developed patches of scab in the same places

for several years at about the same season, was anæsthetic on the left half of the face, and blind in the left eye. She was hypnotized, and it was suggested that the child was nice and clean, and after some trials Janet was successful.

Several years later Breuer appeared with his "cathartic method." The fundamental conception of this is that the emotion which resulted from the occurrence which caused the psychic trauma had no opportunity to work itself off ("abreact" is the horrid mongrel term the psychoanalyst would use). The occurrence is forgotten, but the emotion manifests itself in the hysteric stigma. Bringing the forgotten occurrence back to consciousness and allowing the emotion to work itself off, the psyche is, as it were, purged and health restored.

This "working itself off" (*abreagieren*) of the pent up, strangulated (*eingeklemmte*) affect in the cathartic method constitutes a crisis which seems to me in all respects similar to the so-called "Salutary crisis," through which Mesmer's patients used to pass; they became "hysterical," were seized with catalepsy, had palpitations of the heart, perspirations, and other bodily disturbances.[1]

As I said above, the facts upon which Janet's and Breuer's methods are based are, I believe, beyond dispute, but I am not concerned here with their theories. They have, however, little in common with Freud's Psychoanalytic Method, which has been modelled upon Breuer's Cathartic Method.

Neither am I concerned here with the dangers that arise from the bringing back into consciousness of old-forgotten memories, as is done in the cathartic method, and I shall therefore not dilate upon this subject. Suffice it to say that some authorities have pronounced themselves against this method in no equivocal manner.

[1] Herbert Mayo, M.D.: *On the Truths contained in Popular Superstitions with an Account of Mesmerism.* 2nd ed., London, 1851, p. 141.

Binet and Simon,[1] in their interesting discussion, suggest that the theories respecting hysteria could be grouped in three classes. The first is that of the *Literary Theories*, which is not very significant. Here importance is attached principally to the character of the hysteric patient. Dupré calls the disorder *Mythomania*, the mania to invent fables. This name I account inappropriate for this reason, that it would leave us without a distinguishing name for the psycho-analytic doctrine. Some authors on hysteria, e.g. Dubois of Bern, have emphasized in this disorder certain intellectual defects, such as absence of judgment, or excess of imagination, but again these are also characteristic of psycho-analysts, therefore these defects cannot count as *differentiæ* of hysteria.

The second class comprises the *Theories of a Mental State*. Here are to be found those of Sidis, Prince, Freud, Jung, Vogt, Pierre Janet. With reference to Freud's theory, the authors called it "a daring hypothesis, very interesting and very amusing from a literary point of view, but we find it dangerous and useless. Dangerous because nothing whatever is proved, and one runs the risk of taking a veritable phantasy of imagination for an original restoration." The third class is that of the *Theories of Suggestion*. Here we have Reynolds, who was one of the first to point out the existence of illness by imagination (which must not be confounded with imaginary illness), and further, Hack-Tuke, Féré, Charcot (in his later years), Möbius, Strumpell, Bernheim, Déjérine, and Babinski. Möbius[2] defined as hysterical all those pathological phenomena which were caused by ideas. Similarly Babinksi[3] calls Hysteria a condition in which symptoms are present which have resulted from suggestion, and are curable

[1] A. Binet and Th. Simon: *Hystérie Année psychologique*, 16me Année, Paris, 1910, pp. 67–122.

[2] Möbius: *Über den Begriff der Hysterie*; reprinted in *Neurologische Beiträge*, Heft 1, 1894.

[3] *Vide* Arthur F. Hurst: *The Croonian Lectures on Psychology of the Special Senses and their Functional Disorders*, London, 1920, p. 5.

by psychotherapy, especially Pithiatism, that is, curable by persuasion.

Roussy and Lhermitte,[1] after the experience of the war, state: "One of the fundamental elements is certainly that caused by 'emotional shock.' But emotion, however intense it may be, by no means suffices by itself to bring about the psycho-neuropathic symptoms. . . . Between the causal emotion and the psycho-neuropathic symptoms a latent period of variable length is interposed—a well-recognized phase of incubation or contemplation—which makes less clear the causal connection between the emotion and the objective phenomenon of the neurosis. . . . This is easily understood if we bear in mind that from the moment that all danger is passed, the instinct of self-preservation loses all its inhibiting influence over the emotional phenomena. . . . Thus we reach the third act of the series—the *fixation and realization of the emotional reaction*. . . . The restraining bridle rein of self-preservation being no longer present, this fixation is in active operation, whether it is concerned with the dissociation of personality, with a weakening of the mental syndrome, with the imaginative power of the individual, or with the tendency of any idea of a neuropathic subject, which has an emotional aspect, to become crystalized." And again[2] (the psycho-neuropathic constitution) may reveal itself by two modes of expression: those of an *emotional nature*, an exaggerated expression of the psychical and physical reactions of the emotions, and those of a *hysterical nature*, the essential characteristic of which is the faculty of *dissociation of the psychical functions* and the *prolonged fixation of the disturbance of a function*. As regards treatment these authors say[3] that the psycho-neuroses "yield to a rational and persuasive psychotherapy, such as has been recommended and practised for many years by Déjérine,

[1] G. Roussy and J. Lhermitte: *The Psycho-Neuroses of War*, translated by Christopherson, London, 1918, pp. xxvii *seq.*
[2] Loc. cit., p. 152. [3] Loc. cit., pp. 159 and 171.

Dubois, Babinski and others. . . . The cure of a psycho-neuropath really consists of a mental contest, resulting in the victory of the physician. This, in conclusion, is the secret of psychotherapy."

It is also important to remember that, as Kraepelin has pointed out,[1] " hysteric troubles have a tendency to diminish and disappear with age; it is rare that they last for decades "; and, as I have shown above, that suggestion is the principal factor operative in Psycho-analysis and pithiatism is avowedly practised, it is only natural that cures can, and have been, affected by psycho-analytic treatment. On the other hand, cases which have resisted suggestive treatment have yielded to a methodical occupation-therapy with plan-like arranged deviation of the attention and a strict injunction to the patient not to speak of the past experiences. But very great harm may often be done by the recalling of old memories. "An emotional storm may be unloosed, the results of which are quite incalculable. Not only may pathological phenomena be increased, but new ones produced. Thus in one of our cases, says Bingswanger,[2] an attempt at ' working-off ' (*abreagieren*) in the waking state with simple concentration of attention brought on a dazed condition of several hours' duration with terrifying hallucinations that referred to the old experiences."

In this connection the following story of Diderot's is quite interesting.[3] Diderot says: " I met at the Hague two strangers, a man and his wife. After five years of married life, the husband was still as amorous of his wife as on their wedding-day. Nevertheless, this man was made unhappy by the cruel hysterical attacks (*vapeurs*) to which his wife was subject. One day, when I had told him that

[1] Kraepelin: *Über Hysterie. Zeitschr. f.d. ges. Neurolgie and Psychiatrie*, 1913, xviii; quoted from *Année psychologique*, 1914, xx, p. 359.
[2] Otto Bingswanger: *Die Hysterie*, Wien, 1904, p. 909.
[3] *Œuvres complètes de Diderot*, Paris, Garnier frères, 1876, t. xvii, p. 448. *Voyage de Hollande*, ch. La Haye.

there was a remedy for these attacks, he replied: 'Oh, yes, I know it; I am young, I love my wife, and I enjoy her as often as I can, but it is all of no use.' 'But that is not my remedy.' 'And which would be yours?' 'Could you be a good actor?' 'I'll be the devil, if it is a question of curing my wife. But what connection is there between my wife's illness and the talent for acting?' 'More than you think. To-morrow stop in your bed and don't allow the curtain to be drawn back. After you have got up, stay in front of the fire in your dressing-gown and your night-cap drawn over your eyes; refuse absolutely to go out or to dress; in short, pretend you are in hysterics. Your wife, who loves you, will take you travelling about—will take you to dances, will drag you into society in spite of you, and thus will cure herself of her real hysterical attacks by her continuous efforts to cure you of your simulated ones.' I do not know whether he followed my advice, but I know it is a good one. The important point is to arouse in the hysteric some interest that is powerful enough to decide him to help himself."

The *Voyage de Hollande* was written in 1774, and the *Éléments de Physiologie*, which remained unpublished, was begun in the same year, but not finished until 1780. Diderot must, therefore, have had later news from the husband, for we find the following statement in the *Éléments de Physiologie*[1]: "A man had a very hysterical wife. This woman was very much in love with her husband. It occurred to me to make use of this passion in order to create a vivid interest in the woman; for in this kind of illness this is not difficult. Every hysteric is cured as soon as he wants to be; but the point is to make him want to and to use this interest in his cure. 'You advised the husband to simulate the illness of his wife?' 'That is so.' 'And now the woman forgets her

[1] *Œuvres*, t. ix, p. 426.

illness in order to busy herself about that of her husband ? ' ' Precisely.' ' She takes him about, and thus gets about herself ; she makes him saw wood and thus saws some herself ; she makes him dig the garden and digs it herself ; makes him ride on horseback and gallops herself ; she makes him work and thus works herself ; she gets him to give himself up to the amusements of society and thus does it herself ; she rids him of his simulated illness and thus cures herself of a real one ? ' ' I forbade the husband ever to reveal our secret to his wife.' ' You did wisely, and this for more than one reason : for what confidence could anyone have in a man who was able to deceive one for six months at a stretch ? ' ' For our good ? ' ' For our good.' ' I enjoined him to feign relapses now and again, which he continues to do until this day.' ' To treat his wife like a marionette and make her do whatever he likes.' ' Oh, dear no ! his illness breaks out only when his wife is threatened with hers.' ' That shows a man of sense and an excellent physician.' ' I am very pleased indeed that you should think so.' ''

I think I may here with advantage insert a few cases, principally compulsion-neuroses, the determining causes of which have been revealed by psycho-analysis. Freud gives the following [1] :—

(*a*) "A girl under my observation was under the compulsion to swill her wash-hand-basin after having used it. The significance of this ceremonial action was in the proverbial saying, ' Do not throw dirty water away before you have clean.' The action was intended to admonish her dearly beloved sister and restrain her from divorcing her unsatisfactory husband before she had begun relations with a better one."

(*b*) "A lady living apart from her husband had at meals the compulsion to leave the best behind on the

[1] S. Freud : *Sammlung kleiner Schriften z. Neurosenlehre*, 2te Folge, Leipzig, etc., 1909, p. 125.

plate. . . . This self-denial was explained by the date of its beginning. It began on the date when she refused her husband conjugal rights, i.e. she renounced the best."

(*c*) "The same patient could really sit down only on one seat, and could only get up with difficulty from it. The seat symbolized, with reference to certain details of her married life, the husband, to whom she remained faithful. The explanation of her compulsion was expressed by saying: 'It is difficult to leave a (man, seat) upon whom one has once been sitting."

(*d*) "This patient was for some time compelled to perform a certain senseless action. She went from her room into another one, where there was a table in the middle, adjusted the table-cover in a certain way, and then rang for the maid, who was obliged to approach the table, and then dismissed her with a meaningless order. When endeavouring to elucidate this compulsion, the patient remembered that the said table-cover had a bad stain, and that she always arranged the cover in such a way that the maid could not fail to see it. The whole was a reproduction of an occurrence from her marriage which had given her mind a problem to solve. Her husband was during the bridal night the victim of a not unusual misfortune. He found that he was impotent, and 'came during the night several times from his room into hers' to try each time whether it was not possible after all. In the morning he said that he felt ashamed before the maids of the hotel, who would have to do the beds, and, taking a bottle of red ink, poured the contents on the bed sheet, but so awkwardly that the red stain came to be in a place most unsuitable for his purpose. Thus the bridal night played with the compulsive action."

Here are a few examples from Pfister[1]: "From a certain date a gentleman suffers from the annoying and vigorously

[1] Oskar Pfister: *The Psycho-analytic Method*, London, n.d., p. 419.

combated habit of leaving the door open on leaving the house, when he intended to shut it, so that he would have to turn around and draw it to; or he has forgotten something and must turn back, for example, to get a pencil or to brush his hat, or to close a cabinet which he thought was open, etc. Often he was vexed at himself for turning back for such a bagatelle, but originally the intention seemed important. The analysis shows: His marriage is unhappy; further, he takes little pleasure in his children. He would like to free himself from these relations, but does not care to make the plans, chiefly because the external difficulties seem insuperable. Further, he shoves aside this thought: 'I cannot escape from these relationships.' The symptomatic act says: 'Quite right, but it is only the house from which you will not so easily get free.' Perhaps it also means: 'Guard against tearing yourself from your family.'"

Here is another example from the same source:—

"A peasant, aged fifty-three, suffered from violent pains in his arm. The physician made the mistaken diagnosis of beginning muscular atrophy. I found: his son, whom he called his 'right arm,' gave him much pain."

"The same man showed an uncommonly frequent hysterical symptom: pains in the loins (*Kreuz*). They are only an expression of the phantasy: 'You must bear a heavy cross (*Kreuz*); yes, but only in your body.'"

And still another example:—

"A refined lady, married for some months, is suddenly seized with great anxiety lest burglars be found in the garden. Who could wish anything of that sort? The explanation is that the husband is impotent, and that therefore she can love him no more, although she lays no blame on him. The lady suffers also from severe pains in the pelvis (imaginary defloration and birth-pains), and is operated upon for vaginismus, since the hymen is

still present, without the pains being helped in the least. I cured the husband; a woman-physician, with the aid of psycho-analysis, the wife, who naturally wished for burglary in her organs. . . ."

I will add a few unrecorded cases myself:—

(*a*) An English soldier of the Army of Occupation in Germany suffered from severe pains in the right knee. He was treated for rheumatism, but without result; massage gave no relief, and X-ray examination showed nothing abnormal. But on being psycho-analysed it was revealed that Tommy had been making love to Gretchen, and that he had been jilted. To his question "When will you be mine?" she had retorted "*Nie*" (never), hence the pains.

(*b*) Two ladies, friends, one German and the other French, suffered from severe obsessions. The German lady had a washing mania, and the French lady a phobia, a fear of sitting down. Psycho-analytic treatment revealed the following occurrence: One day the two friends were walking in a meadow when the German lady suddenly espied some cows coming towards them. She was seized with terror and shouted "*Küh*!" The French lady, on hearing the word, was startled and horrified at what appeared to her a most indecorous expression; but then, catching sight of the cows herself, she became still more frightened, and also increased the terror of her German friend, when she screamed "*vaches*." [1]

(*c*) A friend of mine, and a convinced advocate of the psycho-analytic doctrine, to whom I had related these wonderful results, developed severe pains in his legs. His medical adviser diagnosed sciatica and prescribed treatment. As this gave, however, no relief, my friend had recourse to psycho-analysis, when it was revealed that I had been "pulling his leg."

And so on, *ad lib.*

[1] Küh', cul; vaches, wasch.

VIII

OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF THE "UNCONSCIOUS": NUMBERS, FORGETTING, SLIPS OF THE TONGUE OR PEN, ETC.

> Im Auslegen seid frisch und munter,
> Legt ihr's nicht aus, so legt was unter.
>
> GOETHE.

"ONE of the most important results of Professor Freud's researches, and one of the cardinal points of his psychological theory, has been the demonstration that a number of conscious mental processes owe their origin to causes unknown to, and unsuspected by, the individual. This applies equally to the mentally normal and abnormal, between whom, here as elsewhere, it is so arbitrary to draw a distinction. In my opinion this apparently simple idea is one of the most far-reaching significance both to psychology and to the sciences, such as sociology, that must be founded on psychology. This conclusion is based on the view that inquiry, pursued with adequate scepticism, shows the number of such mental processes to be exceedingly great; in fact, I would maintain that the large majority of conscious mental processes in a normal person arise from sources unsuspected by him. We are as yet only on the threshold of important discoveries that will surely be made as soon as this principle finds a rigorous application."

This statement is by Ernest Jones,[1] and it is such as we should expect. If Freud's "Unconscious" is as

[1] Ernest Jones: *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, London, 1918, p. 8.

represented by its inventor, it should constantly manifest itself in all our actions, and such performances as choosing a number at random, as mistakes in spelling, slips of the tongue or of the pen, and even acts of forgetting, should be traceable to the influence of the "Unconscious." The ordinary man would generally put these down to chance. By "chance," of course, I mean that an occcurrence is due to antecedents that are unknown and which, owing to the imperfect state of our knowledge, we are unable to ascertain. If I were going to toss up a penny, it would be absolutely "chance" whether it came down "head" or "tail." However, if we conceive a supermind to whom the present state of the universe was known and who was acquainted with all the laws according to which occurrences take place, such a supermind would know the exact state of all the constituent neurones of my nervous system, the exact state of the muscles and tendons, etc., he would know all the other attending circumstances and be able to calculate and predict how the penny would come down. This I mean by "chance," and nothing more or less.

Granting the existence of Freud's "Unconscious," the idea above outlined seems quite feasible, in fact it might even be asserted that its demonstration has some evidential value. I will, therefore, proceed to examine the question.

Freud [1] gives the following case :—

"In a letter to a friend I announce to him that I have now finished correcting the '*Traumdeutung*,' and that I shall make no more changes to this work 'even if it should contain 2467 mistakes.' I attempt immediately to explain the number, and add a little analysis as postcript to the letter. It is best to quote now what I put down then when it was quite fresh.

[1] Sigmund Freud: *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens*, 4te Aufl., Berlin, 1912, p. 167.

"Now quick a contribution to the psychopathology of every-day-life! You will find in the letter the number 2467 as a pert guess of the mistakes that might be found in the '*Traumdeutung*.' It was meant for 'any big number,' and this number then occurred to me. But there is nothing arbitrary or undetermined in the psychical. You will therefore expect, and quite rightly, that the '*Unconscious*' has hastened to determine the number which was liberated by the Conscious. Now, it had just happened that I had read in the newspaper that a General E.M., had retired as Inspector-General of Ordnance. I must tell you that I am interested in this man. Whilst I was doing my service as army medical student, he came one day—he was then colonel—to the hospital and said to the physician: 'You have to cure me in a week, for I have some work to do for which the Emperor is waiting.' I then decided to watch the career of this man, and there you are, to-day (1899) he has come to the end of it, Inspector-General of Ordnance and already retired. I wanted to calculate how long it had taken to complete his career, and assumed that I had seen him in hospital in 1882. That would then be 17 years. I tell this to my wife, and she remarks: 'You ought also then to be retired by now?' I protest: 'May the Lord protect me from that.' After this talk I sit down to write to you. The previous series of thoughts, however, continues, and with good cause. I had calculated wrongly. I have a definite point for this in my memory. The day of my coming of age, that is my 24*th* birthday, I had celebrated under military arrest, for I had absented myself without permission. That was in 1880, that is 19 years ago. There you have got now 24 in 2467! Take now my present age 43, add to this 24 years, and you get 67! That means, to the question whether I wished to retire I have added in my wish another 24 years of work. Evidently, I feel offended that during the time during which I have watched Colonel M., I have not been able

to get very far, and yet I am as it were triumphant, because he is already done, whilst I have everything before me. One can say with just reason that not even the figure 2467 put down at random is undetermined in the Unconscious.

" Since this first example of explanation of an apparently abitrarily chosen number, I have repeated the same experiment many times with equal success. But most cases are of such intimate content that they are unfit for publication."

A little later, after having quoted a case by Alfred Adler,[1] Freud says : " I will linger a little longer over the analysis of numbers which occur to one, for I know of no other isolated observations which could *so conclusively prove the existence of highly complicated mental processes of which consciousness has no information.*[2] And further, I know of no better example of analysis where the assistance of which the physician is so frequently accused (i.e. suggestion) is so definitely excluded. I will report therefore here, with the consent of my patient, the analysis of a number that occurred to him. All I need mention is that the patient is the youngest of a great number of children, and that whilst he was still young he lost his much admired father. In an especially hilarious mood he allows the number 426718 to occur to him, and he asks himself the question : ' What is it that comes into my mind in this connection ? At first an old joke that I have heard. If a cold is treated by a doctor, it lasts 42 days, and if left alone, 6 weeks. That corresponds to the first four digits of the number $42 = 6 \times 7$.' As he hesitates, I draw his attention to the fact that the number of six digits which he has chosen contains all the numbers except 3 and 5. He finds immediately the continuation of the solution : ' We are seven brothers and sisters, of whom I am the youngest : 3 corresponds in this line of

[1] Loc. cit., p. 172.

[2] The italics are mine.

children to sister A, and 5 to brother L, both of whom are my enemies. When a child I used to pray to God every night that he should take these two tormentors of mine away. It seems, therefore, to me that I myself realize the wish here: 3 and 5, the bad brother and the hated sister, are passed over.' 'If the number then indicates the line of your brothers and sisters, what is the 18 doing at the end? You were only seven.' 'I have thought to myself that if my father had lived longer, I would not have remained the youngest. If one more child had arrived, we should have been 8, and I should have had a younger child towards whom I would have played the elder brother.'

"The number has thus been explained, but it was still incumbent upon us to show the connection between the former and the latter part of the interpretation. But this was easily to be found in the condition required for the last digits: If the father had lived longer. $42 = 6 \times 7$ signifies the scorn for the physicians who were unable to help the father, and expressed therefore in this form the wish for the continued life of the father. The whole number corresponds, indeed, to the fulfilment of his two infantile wishes with respect to his family circle: the bad brother and sister were to die, and another little brother or sister come after him; or expressed still shorter: If only those two had died instead of the beloved father."

Similarly, slips of the tongue, or the pen, or any other slips, are manifestations of the "*Unconscious*," according to Freud. He gives in his *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens* pages full of examples, some of which might be good enough for a comic paper. But not one of them has any evidential value. It would be idle to deny that in some cases of *lapsus linguæ* the mistake represents a truer idea than that which was intended to be said, but then this truer idea was probably uppermost in the speaker's

mind, although he wanted to hide it. There is, therefore, no need to have recourse to the "Unconscious" in these cases. However, Ernest Jones says:[1] "No alteration is too slight to have a meaning." This is an assertion, pure and simple, and one requires proof before accepting it. If the proof is insisted on, all we get is a *probatio circularis*. A man has a complex, and therefore makes the mistakes. But how do you know he has a complex? Because he makes the mistakes. "An unmarried man, a patient," writes Ernest Jones, "remarked, 'my father was devoted to my wife.' He must say either 'his wife' or 'my mother.' This is a typical instance of a *lapsus* that would pass as being entirely accidental and devoid of significance. I must add, however, that one of the main causes of the patient's neurosis was an unconscious incestuous attachment to his mother, so that his unsuppressed thoughts on the subject of the remark would run in full, 'My attitude towards my mother is the same as that of my father.' It may perhaps be argued that the Œdipus-Complex had been ascertained by other means, but I have already dealt above with the evidence referred to." Another case related by Ernest Jones is that which occurred at the International Congress of Neurology in Amsterdam. Somebody criticizing Freud's later work said in a speech, 'Breuer and I have demonstrated' instead of 'Breuer and Freud have demonstrated.' From this Ernest Jones concludes that the speaker was jealous of Freud. Possibly he was, but it surely does not follow from the slip recorded, unless we reason in a circle. This reminds me of the following story of a friend of mine of an occurrence which actually happened to him some twenty years ago. My friend's family was staying at Swanage, which was then, and may be still, a railway terminus, and he went down to join them for the week-end. On the Sunday he went to the railway-station to inquire

[1] Loc. cit., pp. 60–61.

about his train, when he noticed that the station clock was out by four minutes as compared with his watch, which was a chronometer and a very exact time-keeper. My friend was greatly astonished at this, and pointed out the fact to the station-master. The station-master contended that my friend's watch must be wrong, for the station clock was set every day by a signal given by the firing of the coast-guards' gun at noon. The station-master admitted that no gun had been fired on the Sunday, but argued that it was impossible for the clock to be out by four minutes in a day, that it was always very exact, and was right to the minute on the previous day. On reaching town on Monday my friend found that his watch was quite correct. When he went down to Swanage the next week-end, he noticed that the station clock was still out, and he made up his mind to investigate this matter. During the day he walked up to the coast-guards' station, and getting into conversation with a coast-guard he said: "I understand you are firing a gun every day at noon?" The coastguard replied that this was so. "Where do you get your signal from? from Greenwich?" asked my friend. "Oh, no!" returned the coast-guard, "I set my watch by the station clock."

I could give numerous examples quoted in psycho-analytic literature of mistakes in reading, slips of the pen, and misprints, but I am afraid I should tire the reader. No further illumination could be obtained from them, and exactly the same criticism as I have advanced against the specimens of *lapsus linguæ* would also apply here. I must, however, record here a slip of the pen of which a friend of mine was guilty. Quoting a line from Shelley's *Œdipus Tyrannus*, he wrote: "All is sealed up with the broad seal of Freud." Turning up the passage, I found that it ought to have been: "All is sealed up with the broad seal of fraud."—Freud—Œdipus—Fraud?—When I met my friend the following day, and drew his attention to

the *lapsus calami*, he smiled, but declined to be psycho-analysed.

Another correspondent with whom I had discussed the question of Freud's "Anal Eroticism" persistently wrote "psycho-analists."

Another friend of mine discoursing upon Sir Oliver Lodge's arguments in favour of spiritualism wrote to me that he considered them quite "*Lodgecal*."

All other kinds of mistakes have, according to Freud, the same cause. Such mistakes as, e.g., getting hold of wrong objects, other wrongly executed actions, and the mislaying of objects. All these are determined and reasoned out by the "Unconscious." When Ernest Jones [1] is suffering from the effects of over-smoking, his "Unconscious" causes him to mislay his pipe, that is, as it were, hides it from him. When he wants to fill his pipe his "Unconscious" makes him seize a fresh tin of tobacco instead of the tin that had been opened before. All this may possibly be true enough, but a mere philosophical possibility is not enough, we want some proof of what appears simply an assertion.

"The view that the psycho-analytic interpretations of the class of occurrences under discussion are reliable," says Ernest Jones,[2] "is based on, among others, the following considerations :—

"(1) The psychological correctness of the principle of the free association method. This is too complex a matter to be gone into here, and I will only refer the reader to Jung's well-known works [3] on the subject.

"(2) The constancy of the findings by different observers, and the harmony of the conclusion with those reached in the study of other fields, e.g. dreams, psychoneuroses, mythology, etc. It is extremely unlikely that this is due to coincidence, and still more so that it is due to identical

[1] Loc. cit., p. 77. [2] Loc. cit., p. 87.
[3] Jung, C. G.: *Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien*, 2 Bde., 1906–10.

prejudices on the part of different workers, for in the first place this would be postulating a very remarkable uniformity in their individual mental constellations; and in the second place, psycho-analytic research brings with it an eradication of personal prejudice, and an appreciation of personal complexes, that is rarely attained elsewhere in the same degree.

"(3) The increased intelligibility of the processes in question. An occurrence that previously was obscure and meaningless now becomes throughout comprehensible, and an integral part of the rest of the person's mental operations. It is seen to be merely an irregular manifestation of a logical tendency that is an essential constituent of the personality, the unusual features having certain definite reasons for their occurrence. Moreover, the discovery of the underlying motive, and its connection with the manifestation being analysed, is a matter which commonly lends itself to external verification. When, in analysis, one traces a given error in mental functioning, such as *lapsus linguæ*, to a thought that the person was desirous of keeping back, it is usually easy to confirm the truth of the conclusion. Very significant in this connection is the unmistakable evidence of the resulting affect in the person, which accurately corresponds with that characteristic of the revealed mental process. Often this is so pronounced that it is quite impossible to doubt the truth of the interpretation made; this especially is a matter where personal experience is more convincing than any possible amount of discussion.

"(4) The fact that in many fields the principles in question are generally recognized as valid. Freud's study is only a detailed working out of laws that were already known to hold true over a limited area. When a man is hurt at finding his name unfortunately forgotten, or at unexpectedly being passed by unrecognized in the street; when a lady is offended by someone who professes regard

for her forgetting to carry out her behests or to keep a rendezvous—they are displaying an affect that accords perfectly with the inferences of the psycho-analyst, and with no others. In this correct intuition of mankind lies already the essential nucleus of the conclusions maintained by Freud."

Now let me examine the considerations of Ernest Jones one after another.

(1) The principles of free association method Ernest Jones thinks too complex a matter to go into here. Without discussing the "psychological correctness" of these principles, I fail to see what they can possible have to do with proving that it is Dr. Jones' "Unconscious" that causes him to mislay his pipe.

(2) It is *NOT* extremely unlikely, but rather the opposite, that the constancy of the findings of different observers is due to identical prejudices. The observer is a psycho-analyst to begin with, and it is, therefore, only to be expected that he should interpret a mistake or slip according to his own preconceived idea. Now, if I had been a convert to Freud's theory, I could have looked down upon my fellow creatures whose "Unconscious," by general psycho-analytic report, is, as a rule, very disreputable, something of which to be thoroughly ashamed. I could have said: "Lord, I thank thee that I am not as other men, for my 'Unconscious' is thoroughly respectable." To wit the following: During the worst days of the war, when our butter-rations had been cut down to two ounces, or thereabout, per week, provided there was a sufficient supply to go round, a good friend presented me with two pounds of the finest dairy-butter. My delight at this magnificent gift can only be appreciated by those who can remember those dreary days. I hugged my treasure, joyfully wound my way homewards, and—left the butter in the train. Needless to say, my inquiries at the Lost Property Office were in vain. The expressions of my vexation I do not

now remember, and I think it is just as well. However, I found consolation in the knowledge that I was really not to blame, that my "Unconscious" revolted at "wangling," and to-day I could be truly proud of my "Unconscious"—if only I were a psycho-analyst.

(3) Where is the increased intelligibility of the process in question? I entered the train, placed the parcel of butter next to me on the seat, and became engrossed in my book or newspaper. Arrived at the home-station, I got up and out and simply did not think of the butter. This is a very simple, plain, and complete explanation of the occurrence. That my "Unconscious" revolted at "wangling," or that Dr. Jones' "Unconscious" hid his pipe for him, are extravagant and unnecessary "explanations." Buying a box of matches from a street vendor the other day, I handed him a half-a-crown piece instead of a penny, and was on the point of walking away when the man drew my attention to the mistake. This was all the greater because the coin was not a two-shilling piece, which is the same size as a penny, but half-a-crown piece. Does my "Unconscious" disdain "filthy lucre" and make me get rid of it as quickly as possible? But this is not confirmed by my frequently forgetting to give a tip to the waiter in those restaurants where the bill is paid by the customer at a desk. It cannot be argued that I am adverse to the system of tipping, because I generally give a gratuity, if I am satisfied with the service, even in places where it is definitely stated that they are not necessary. As to the showing of emotion, of course, it is only to be expected that if a person by a slip of the tongue betrays the very thought he wanted to keep back, that he should become flurried, or show confusion. But whatever has this to do with Freud's "Unconscious"? On the other hand, such visible emotions may be absolutely misleading. I remember a very painful incident of my boyhood. It had happened on one or two occasions that

I had forgotten to give up the change when sent on an errand by my father or mother and had had to be asked for it. Then it happened that I was present when my uncle mentioned in a conversation to my father that some of his employees practised the forgetting of giving up change in order to steal it. When I heard this statement I remembered my own forgetfulness and the idea arose in my mind that my omission might possibly be interpreted in the same way; and although I knew this to be wrong, I blushed to the roots of my hair. I do not remember that either my father or my uncle noticed my embarrassment, but I do not think that they did. Although my emotion was so very pronounced that Ernest Jones would have found it "quite impossible to doubt the truth of the interpretation made," yet he would have grievously wronged me.

(4) I do not know exactly what Ernest Jones means here. If a man to whom I have been introduced has forgotten me, I conclude that I have proved not sufficiently interesting to him to be remembered, and, under certain conditions, I may feel annoyed, either with the men or with myself. I may thus be "displaying an affect," but what I utterly fail to see is that it "accords perfectly with the inferences of the psycho-analyst, and with no others," or that it has anything to do with the "Unconscious." This is meaningless rhetoric for me.

I do not know what the "other" considerations of Ernest Jones' are which would show the reliability of the psycho-analytic interpretations; but if they are like these four he has vouchsafed to us he need not reveal them.

The next question to be discussed is that of "Forgetting." According to Freud, forgetting is due to repression. It is asserted that an unpleasant experience is more easily forgotten than a pleasant one. When this is controverted and exceptions cited, then, we are told, that "the hedonic tone of a given idea is by no means

necessarily the same in the conscious and unconscious layers of the mind; indeed, it is often precisely the opposite in the two cases, and it is probable that all the instances where apparently unpleasant ideas have been registered with unexpected distinctness are of this nature." [1] This makes things very simple :—

Pleasant experiences remembered :	proof of psycho-analytic doctrine !
Unpleasant experiences remembered :	the corresponding unconscious idea is really pleasant, hence again proof of the psycho-analytic doctrine !
Pleasant experiences forgotten :	the corresponding unconscious idea is really unpleasant hence again proof of the psycho-analytic doctrine !
Unpleasant experiences forgotten :	proof of the psycho-analytic doctrine !

Heads I win, tails you lose !

One would, with such a doctrine, expect at least consistency, but this would be rash, for Dr. Jones tells us a little later,[2] " A neurosis essentially means that the patient is unconsciously clinging to various infantile *pleasurable* longings and phantasies, *long since buried* through the ' repression ' by inhibiting force, and hence quite unknown to the patient."

But now for the evidence.

" The main fact [*sic*] that (Freud's repression) theory sets out to explain is that it is more difficult to recall an unpleasant memory than a pleasant one, other things being equal. The fact itself is, I think, beyond dispute, and has not been questioned by anyone who has seriously investigated the phenomena, either experimentally or clinically," says Ernest Jones.[3] Now, although Dr. Jones

[1] Ernest Jones, loc. cit., p. 106.
[2] Loc. cit., p. 295; the italics are mine.
[3] Loc. cit., p. 108.

is most explicit and categorical in his statement, I have, I am sorry, to state here just as explicitly and categorically that he is misinformed. "The fact was altogether false," as Captain Gulliver wrote to his cousin. I have gone in detail into the experimental evidence of the influence of the feelings upon memory in the "Psychological Statement" above,[1] and I need not do so again here. Suffice it to say that this evidence shows beyond doubt that, although affectively toned experiences may be remembered more easily than neutral ones, *there is no difference whatever in the ekphory of pleasant or unpleasant experiences.*

Freud gives a large number of examples and their analyses, so does Ernest Jones and every other writer on the subject. But what does all this prove? Nothing whatever! We know that we all forget some words sometimes and we can always psycho-analyse some reason. Here is an example of mine: when walking with a friend in the country I was asked by him the name of a tree we were passing. There occurred to me at once the German "*Weide*," the French "*Saule*," and the Latin "*Salix*," but the English "*Willow*" could not be ekphored. I remembered too that the initial letter of the German, or the French, name was the same as that of the English equivalent, and I thought it was the French. I strove hard to remember the name beginning with "S," but in vain. After a while I gave it up, and then suddenly "*Willow*" rose in consciousness. Now, why did I forget "*Willow*," but remember "*Weide*," "*Saule*," and "*Salix*"? I had recourse to psycho-analysis, and here is the result: Willow = will oh! But "oh" is an ejaculation of pain, hence "will-oh" = will or want, pain; which, of course, I do not want. Hence "*willow*" was repressed. But why were "*Saule*," "*Weide*," and "*Salix*" remembered? Quite easy: Saule = sole, of which I am exceedingly partial, especially *au vin blanc*, or *à la Dièppoise*, or even plain grilled.

[1] Pp. 28 *seq.*

"*Weide*": On the occasion when this happened we were passing some fine specimens of pollard-willows the branches of which were spreading *wide* in all directions, hence wide = *Weide*, and this was ekphored. "Salix" = "saw leeks;" I had about then noticed some leeks at the greengrocer's, and was looking forward to this favourite dish of mine. On another occasion I wanted to examine my friend. He remembered *Willow*, but did not remember *Weide*, *Saule*, or *Salix*. Why was this? Quite simple: My friend is very particular in the language he uses, and even when he is greatly annoyed he never in his letter goes further than writing "d——," which he pronounces *dee*. Therefore *d* is for him equivalent to bad language, in the use of which he would never vie with anybody; hence he would forget: *vie-d-* = *Weide*. *Saule* = *soul*. My friend is a pronounced materialist and emphatically asserts that he has no soul; small wonder that he should forget it. *Salix* = *Sal hicks*, Sally has the hiccups, to which my friend would naturally object; and so on *ad lib*.

Apart from the examples which Freud cites as evidence of repression in forgetting, he argues his case as follows by means of a simile.[1] "Let us assume that I have been so imprudent as to walk at night in a deserted part of a large city, that I was attacked and robbed of my watch and purse. At the nearest police-station I report the case then in the following words: 'I have been in this or that street and there *loneliness* and *darkness* have deprived me of my watch and purse.' Although I had not said with these words anything that was not correct, yet from the wording of my complaint I should run the risk of being considered not quite right in my head. The actual occurrence can only thus be correctly narrated, that, *favoured* by the loneliness of the place and *under the cover* of darkness, *unknown* thieves have robbed me of

[1] S. Freud: *Zur Pathologie des Alltagslebens*, p. 23.

my valuables. Therefore, the circumstances in the forgetting of names need not be different; favoured by fatigue, disturbances in the circulation, and intoxication, some unknown psychic power [*sic*] has deprived me of the power to dispose of the proper names of my memory, the same power which in other cases can produce the failure of my memory in full health and efficiency."

This simile is quite characteristic of Freud's superficiality and habit of assumption. He does not state the case either fairly or squarely, and introduces in the story as existent the very factors whose existence he ought to prove, but fails to do. However, his little story will do admirably, if told so as to contain less assumption and more analogical factors. Let us assume that Freud has been so imprudent as to walk at night in the deserted part of a large city. Putting his hands into his pockets, he finds that he is without his watch and his purse. He goes to the nearest police-station and reports the case in the following words: "I have been walking in this or that street, and there favoured by the loneliness of the place and under cover of darkness unknown thieves have robbed me of my watch and purse!"

"Herr Professor, what were the thieves like?" asked the sergeant in charge.

"What were they like, man? How do I know!"

"Well, didn't you see them?"

"Of course not!"

"How do you know then, Herr Professor, that thieves stole your watch and purse?"

"My good fellow, don't ask silly questions. Take it from me that since my watch and purse are gone, it follows from all the laws of psycho-analytic logic that thieves must have stolen them."

"I am very sorry, Herr Professor, but I'll be —— if I can see this! You might have missed your pocket when trying to replace your watch, or you might have slipped

and your watch have fallen out of your pocket. On pulling out your handkerchief you might have pulled out your purse too. How can you say that a thief stole these things if you did not see him?"

"Oh, do stop it, you evidently know nothing about psycho-analysis," and off walks Professor Freud, pitying the silly policeman for his lack of imagination in not seeing the brilliancy of the thief idea.

Having failed to find the least evidence of a functioning of "repression" in the case of ordinary forgetting, or for any functioning of the "Unconscious" in cases of slips of the pen or tongue and other mistakes, I turned back to the experiments with numbers, of which Freud has given many examples. I attempted my first experiment on July 4, 1920, and the number I chose was 2467. My analysis gave the following result: The sum of all the digits is $2 + 4 + 6 + 7 = 19$; the product of the 1st and 3rd digits plus their sum $(2 \times 6) + (2 + 6) = 20$. Putting these together I got 1920, the year I did the experiment. Of the remaining digits the 2nd gave the day of the month, viz. 4th, and the 4th digit the month, viz. 7th. That is, the number I had put down gave me the exact date when I did this experiment, viz. July 4, 1920. But this was not all, for the number was evidently over-determined. The last two digits give the year (18)67, when my father married, and he was then in his 24th year, which is given by the first two digits. But still better:—

2 = 2nd month = February—in which falls my father's birthday.
6 = 6th month = June—in which falls my only brother's birthday.
4 + 7 = 11th month = November—in which falls my mother's and also my own birthday.

And again: The year I was 46 years of age was one of great importance to me, so to speak a new epoch began in my life, and in that year the number 27 played a great rôle. However, as Freud says on a similar occasion,

" the details are of too intimate a nature to allow of publication."

Encouraged by this result, I decided to try again. This time I put down 426718. As soon as I looked at the number I grouped the first two digits together, viz. 42. This has been a humorous designation for a lavatory in my household. We seized upon this, when we heard it used by a friend, who had retained this name from his days at college, where, apparently, the lavatory was thus numbered. The sum of the four remaining digits is 22, which is the number of a pill, a podophyllin compound pill, manufactured by Potter & Clarke, and which I have for years been in the habit of taking to facilitate my visits to No. 42. I further noticed that in the compound number all the first numbers were present except 5 and 3. Now these put together make up 53, which is the number of one of the two lines of motor-buses passing my house, and, being a source of great annoyance to me, I wish Line 53 removed, hence 5 and 3 were left out. The other line of buses passing my door is number 28. Their noise and vibration annoys me too, but yet I should not like this line removed, because it connects me up with Golders Green Station. This is represented by the fact that the sum of the digits of the number = 28.

Now these analyses, I believe, are as good as any of Freud's, and, I trust, equally convincing. Freud's argument was that, having written down any number apparently haphazard, when he then examined such number and could find, by manipulating it, certain agreements or relations to his past experiences, it was the " Unconscious ideas " of these past experiences that influenced him in the putting down of the number. In other words, these agreements or relations were a proof for the existence of such " unconscious ideas." This is a proposition which may be correct, or it may not be correct. Anyhow, it requires, I hold, confirmation, and anyone who has but a spark of

the scientific spirit within him, or who has been trained in the mere rudiments of scientific research, would know how to test it. He would know how to devise what is called a " control-experiment." Freud ought to have required someone else to choose numbers for him, and then attempted to " analyse " them in exactly the same manner and with the same diligence and the same honesty as he analysed his own numbers. If he, then, invariably had failed to " analyse " the numbers given to him, whilst he had been invariably successful with his own numbers, then he might have tentatively come forward with his theory. But Freud failed to do this, and I have now supplied him with the necessary control-experiments. If the reader will turn to the beginning of this chapter he will find that I have taken Freud's own numbers, in the writing down of which my " Unconscious " could not have had any influence, and I " analysed " them with the same ease and elegance as Freud did. It is the same shallowness and superficiality which pervades the whole of Freud's " teaching." We find the most elaborate structures built upon the flimsiest foundations, mere phantasies, and nowhere the attempt of proof or confirmation. As for dreams, strange to say, Freud himself furnished the control-experiment by analysing the phantasies and dreams in Jensen's novel *Gradiva*, but, stranger still, he entirely failed to see the significance and meaning of this control-experiment. Or could it be—the idea has occurred to me more than once—that Freud, with the assurance of a Cagliostro, laughs secretly at the gullibility of his followers and counts on their want of criticism ?

If one is allowed full liberty in the manipulation of words, letters, or numbers, remarkable results may be obtained, and I do not think that it is out of place to reproduce here one which ought to be better known than it is. It concerns the discovery of a cryptogram which

reveals the "true authorship" of the psalms. These are generally attributed to King David, but from this cryptogram it would appear that Shakespeare is the real author. Here is the "proof." The name "Shakespear" consists of ten letters, four of these are vowels, and six consonants; 4 and 6 written together make 46. Therefore: turn to Psalm 46, and as there are 10 letters, to verse 10 of that psalm. Count 6 words from the beginning of this verse, and we get "*I am.*" Next count 6 words from the end of this verse, and we get "*will.*" Then count 46 words from the beginning of the psalm, and we get "*Shake,*" and counting 46 words from the end, neglecting "Selah," which does not belong to the text, we get "*spear.*" We have thus deciphered the cryptogram: "*I am Will Shakespear,*" the author of the psalms.

IX

ODDS AND ENDS

. . . je trouve en effet
Que le plus fou souvent est le plus satisfait.
BOILEAU.

I HAVE in the preceding chapters discussed, I believe, all those points of Freud's psycho-analysis which I consider vital to the doctrine, without which it cannot exist. Points of only secondary importance, and which are only incidental, as, e.g., sublimation, transference, anal eroticism, etc., I have passed over, or only just mentioned. There is no sense in arguing whether the potatoes ought to be boiled or fried, when we have ascertained that there are no potatoes to cook. For similar reasons I have confined my criticism to Freud, and refrained from discussing Adler, Jung, and others, whose doctrines are offshoots of that of Freud. If the "Unconscious" is a myth, and, even if it were not, if nevertheless the means of penetrating into it were shown to be imaginary, fallacious, then it is of little consequence whether we people this "Unconscious" with "Infantile Sexual Instincts," or with the "Masculine Protest," the "Will to Power," or all these. If Freud's foundations crumble, Adler's structures and Jung's also collapse. I may mention here that in spite of this Jung's association method is an exceedingly useful instrument in the hands of the physician. If the physician suspects a patient of suicidal tendencies and puts him through an association test, if

on the stimulus-word "water" being called out the patient shows emotion and an abnormal reaction-time, the physician would be quite safe in concluding that that patient had already seriously considered the idea of drowning himself. The physician gains information about the patient, which was unknown to the physician, but not unknown to the patient.

I have, however, a number of notes left which I took during my psycho-analytic reading, and for which I could not conveniently find space in the preceding pages. The present chapter will be concerned with the gleanings.

Travelling in the morning in a railway-train, an observer is struck with the large number of passengers reading illustrative newspapers. As it has been my wont to take as some indication of a man's interest, and, to some extent, as a measure of his intelligence, the literature he habitually enjoys, the observed fact that illustrated newspapers appeared to appeal so much to a large proportion of the public attracted my attention. On looking more closely into the question, it appeared to me that very little mental effort was needed to take in the limited information that was conveyed by the picture, whilst the strain involved to obtain similar information from letterpress was considerably greater. I arrived, then, at the conclusion that those people who were in a hurry, or who did not want to think very much, were likely to prefer picture-newspapers.

Similar consideration, it seems to me, will account in a large measure for the popularity which the doctrine of psycho-analysis enjoys among a great section of the public, especially medical men and educationalists. Feeling and knowing that psychology is a science of the greatest importance to their own science and art, they have, however, neither the time nor the surplus energy

that the study of psychology requires. But here is Freud's "Psychology," everything so pictorial and dramatic: Repressed ideas imprisoned in the dungeon "Unconscious," kicking up a rumpus and playing tricks on the censor, or gaoler, and so on, instead of mathematical formulæ, curves, and correlations, etc. Psychology made easy, pictorial, in a nutshell. They think that when reading Freud they are studying psychology, the newest psychology, just like William Sefton Moorhouse (in New Zealand), of whom Samuel Butler reports [1] that he imagined he was being converted to Christianity by reading Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*, which he had got by mistake for Butler's *Analogy*, on the recommendation of a friend. But it puzzled him a good deal.

". . . Criticism hostile to analysis suffers throughout from a fatal disease which I would call 'ontophobia,' fear of facts. It will be sad for me if my work falls into ontophobic hands, for it is intended only for those who test for themselves, those who are hungry for facts."—PFISTER, *The Psycho-analytic Method*, London, n.d., Preface, p. xii.

Hungry for facts! absolutely famished! I have searched and researched psycho-analytic literature for them. However, whenever I looked more closely at any pretended "fact" it turned out to be a phantom. Dogmatic assertions, unproved statements, arbitrary interpretations with ignorance, or ignoring, of scientific method and contempt for logical reasoning, was all I found the "facts" invariably to be.

"There are many rocks to be avoided in the study of antiquity. After the abuse of etymology, there is nothing more fatal than the abuse of historic confrontations.

[1] *The Note Books*, edited by Henry Festing Jones, London, 1913, p. 311.

Thus the famous Bishop of Avranches has discovered a perfect analogy between Moses and Adonis; Fourmont between the patriarch Jacob and the Egyptian Typhon; Father Paulin de Saint-Barthélemi between the Indian legislator Menon and Noah. The Protestant minister Croese must not be forgotten, who proved in a big tome, entitled *Homerus Hebræus*, that the heroes of Homer are all biblical personages. According to him it is demonstrated by a thousand circumstances that Ulysses and the nymph Calypso are Lot and his daughters."—M. Ouvaroff, *Études de Philologie et de Critique St. Petersbourg*, 1845; *Essai sur les mystères d'Eleusis*, p. 148.

"Among reaction-formation, two kinds are to be differentiated: some as additional affirmation, others as additional negation. The pastor's son, too strictly educated, can tend either to catholicism or political absolutism, and find a father substitute with fanatical zeal in priest or sovereign, or he may become libertine, revolutionary, or anarchist. He who has fallen out with the mother may easily fall passionately in love with an elderly lady, or hate all girls."—Pfister, *op. cit.* p. 324.

The perspicacity and penetration of the psycho-analyst is really marvellous! It reminds me of the old peasants' weather rule:

> If the cock on the dung-heap crow,
> The weather changes, or remains as 'tis now.

Psycho-analysis is as useful as a bread-pill; in both it is faith that heals.

The Psycho-analysist in looking for "complexes" is like an *agent provocateur*. He stirs up trouble where there was none before, and then says he discovered a plot.

"He (Samuel Johnson) related that he had once in a dream a contest of wit with some other person, and he was very much mortified by imagining that his opponent had the better of him. 'Now,' said he, 'one must mark here the effect of sleep in weakening the power of reflection; for had not my judgment failed me I should have seen that the wit of this supposed antagonist, by whose superiority I felt myself depressed, was as much furnished by me, as that which I thought I have been uttering in my own character.'"—BOSWELL'S *Life of Johnson*, edition, John W. Croker, London, 1848, p. 656.

"Make your boy tell you his dreams: the first corruption that entered my heart was communicated in a dream."—*Anecdotes of Dr. Johnson*, by Mrs. PIOZZI. *Johnsoniana*, London, 1836, p. 4.

USE OF DREAMS.

"There is to be made," says Bishop Sanderson, "a lawful, yea a very profitable use, even of our ordinary dreams, and of the observing thereof; and that both in physic and divinity. Not at all by foretelling particulars of things to come; but by taking from them, among other things, some reasonable conjectures in the general, of the present estate both of our bodies and souls. Of our bodies first; for since the predominancy of choler, blood, phlegm, and melancholy, as also the differences of strength and health, and diseases and distempers, either by diet or passion, or otherwise, do cause impressions of different forms in the fancy, our ordinary dreams may be a good help to lead us into those discoveries; both in time of health, what our natural constitution, complection, and temperature is; and in time of sickness, from the rankness and tyranny of which of the humours the malady springeth. And as of our bodies, so of our souls too. For since our dreams, for the most part, look the same way which our

freest thoughts incline ; as the voluptuous beast dreameth most of pleasures, the covetous wretch most of profits, and the proud or ambitious most of praises, preferments, or revenge ; the observing of our ordinary dreams may be of good use for us unto that discovery, which of these three is our Master Sin (for unto one of the three every other sin is reduced), the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, or the pride of life."—Bishop SANDERSON, *Fourteen Sermons*, p. 324. From SOUTHEY'S *Commonplace Book*, 1st series, 2nd edition, London, 1850, p. 92.

Text for Psycho-analysts : " Seek and ye shall find." —MATT. vii. 7 ; LUKE xi. 9.

" The Dreamer is a partial, non-systematized amnesic, whose field of memory is at the same time restricted in extent and incessantly changing its form, its outlines, and its localization. He uses correctly the materials which are at his disposal, and all the mistakes of which he is guilty in the realm of facts, commonsense, logic, or morality proceed not from an impairment of the functions of the cerebral faculties, but from the fact that there are momentarily absent from his consciousness all those ideas thanks to which he might have avoided those mistakes."—YVES DELAGE, *Le rêve et la condition psychique du rêveur*, Scientia, 1918, xii. pp. 259–70, quoted from *Année Psychologique*, 1920, xxi. p. 446.

Compare with the above :

" The dream is a valid psychical act ; its driving force is every time a wish to be fulfilled ; that it cannot be recognized as a wish, its many peculiarities and absurdities, are due to the influence of the psychic censor which it has experienced during its formation. Besides the constraint to escape from the Censor there have assisted in its formation a constraint to condensation of the

psychical material, a regard for the representability in sensory images (*Sinnesbilder*), and—although not always —a regard for a rational and intelligible exterior of the dream-formation."—S. FREUD, *Die Traumdeutung*, 3te Aufl., Leipzig, 1911, p. 356.

ANAL-EROTIC CHARACTER TRAITS.

"The desire to manipulate the product (viz. of defæcation) further and to create out of it leads to various sublimations, beginning with the usual fondness of children for moulding and manipulating plastic material, putty, plasticene, etc. The commonest sublimation is in the direction of cooking, which may later be replaced by an aversion from cooking, or continued as a passion for it. It finds extensive application in two other spheres of life, the industrial and the artistic: good examples of the former are metal moulding, building, carpentry, engraving, etc.; examples of the latter are sculpture, architecture, woodcarving, photography, etc. *Footnote.*—Lest it may be thought that any of these conclusions are speculative, I may say that every one is based on the data of actual analyses, as are all the conclusions presented in this paper."—ERNEST JONES, *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, London, 1918, p. 685.

As, however, psycho-analysis in general is, like dream-interpretation in particular, a *via regia* to the "Unconscious" of the psycho-analyst, I would suggest spelling in future psycho-anal*i*st.

"Psycho-analysis is a touchstone for a scientific mind." When I put down this aphorism, some years ago, I held it to be correct, and I still believe that it is essentially true, as far as it goes. I must, however, account for the fact that some men, trained experimental psychologists too, and who have shown evidence of a scientific mind

by their previous work, have nevertheless pronounced themselves in favour of the psycho-analytic doctrine. These sad cases—they are happily very few and far between —are the martyrs of science in psychology, as there are martyrs in other branches of science. To give but one example or two: there is the late Sir William Osler's assistant, Dr. Lazlar, who exposed himself voluntarily to the bite of a mosquito infected with yellow fever. Three days later Lazlar developed the disease and died of it. Harnack the radiologist of London Hospital had to suffer many operations and amputations owing to disease brought on by his X-ray work, and quite recently Dr. Vaillant of Paris was another such victim. The roll of honour bears many more illustrious names.

Like these heroes, the psychologists in question, not recognizing the danger of the most powerful and almost indefinitely protracted and ceaselessly repeated "Suggestion" to which they exposed themselves, not recognizing this danger, I say, they rushed headlong and heedlessly into their investigation, and to their doom. They were told that the surest and only way to judge of the merits of the method and doctrine was to submit themselves to a psycho-analysis. They believed it, and confided to it like a lamb to a boa-constrictor. The psycho-analytic microbe whose life and habits they wanted to study was "Suggestion" unrecognized; it affected their critical mind, and killed it.

"On peut déguiser ses vices, masquer jusqu'à un certain point ses défauts; mais le ridicule trompe tous les efforts."—Preface de *M. Amar sur la Satire VIII, de Boileau.*

Freud compares himself to Copernicus and Darwin. I assure the reader that I am not joking, or making fun of him, or of Freud, but that I am in real sober earnest.

Lest there be any misunderstanding I will give the passage referred to: "Humanity has in the course of time had to endure from the hands of science two great outrages upon its naive self-love. The first was when it realized that our earth was not the centre of the universe, but only a tiny speck in a world system of a magnitude hardly conceivable; this is associated in our minds with the name of Copernicus, although Alexandrian doctrines taught something very similar. The second was when biological research robbed man of his peculiar privilege of having been specially created, and relegated him to a descent from the animal world, implying an ineradicable animal nature in him: this transvaluation has been accomplished in our time upon the instigation of Charles Darwin, Wallace, and their predecessors, and not without the most violent opposition from their contemporaries. But man's craving for grandiosity is now suffering the third and most bitter blow from present-day psychological research, which is endeavouring to prove to the 'ego' of each one of us that he is not even master in his own house, but that he must remain content with the veriest scraps of information about what is going on unconsciously in his own mind. We psycho-analysts were neither the first nor the only ones to propose to mankind that they should look inward; but it appears to be our lot to advocate it most insistently and to support it by empirical evidence which touches every man closely. This is the kernel of the universal revolt against our science, of the total disregard of academic courtesy in dispute, and the liberation of opposition from all the constraints of impartial logic." [1]

Well, I think it must be exceedingly difficult to observe "academic courtesy" when one reads such rank blasphemy; for it is nothing else. Freud—Darwin!

[1] Sigmund Freud: *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, translated by Joan Revière, London, 1922.

You may as well couple the name of Mr. Potts, of the *Eatonswill Gazette*, with that of Shakespear or Goethe. Freud and Darwin, or Copernicus, are as poles asunder. First, can anyone imagine Darwin comparing himself to Copernicus? I, at least, cannot. Next look at the patient toiling and plodding for years and years of these two men before they came forward with their work, and then they came with accurate observations and irresistible fact, whilst Freud rushes into print without any facts whatever. The main lines of Copernicus' work were laid down between 1502 and 1512, and it was not till 1540 that his consent to its publication was obtained by demand of Pope Clement VII. The first printed copy reached Frauenburg in East Prussia where Copernicus lay on his death-bed in 1543. For nearly twenty years Darwin worked silently and patiently on the *Origin of Species*, Joseph Hooker being the only man to whom he confided the results of his work in 1844. Fourteen years later, in 1858, Darwin received a paper from his friend Wallace, with the request to read it before the Linnæan Society. This paper contained the same results as those obtained by Darwin, and this fact prevailed upon him to read a paper of his own on the same occasion. Both Copernicus' and Darwin's work was violently attacked, and herein may be some resemblance to Freud's, but yet what a sea of difference! Who were the attackers of Copernicus and Darwin? The Church, whose vested interests were endangered. Astronomers, as far as they dared in those dark days and were not Church dignitaries, or teachers at clerical universities, received the work of Copernicus and his successors with admiration. Biologists and geologists were almost unanimously enthusiastic about Darwin's work. The chief objectors—for one cannot speak here of attackers any more than one can speak of a storm in a tea-cup—the chief objectors to Freud's theories, I say, are psychologists *vom Fach*, that

is exactly those people who stand to Freud's work in the same relation as the Astronomers to Copernicus, and the biologists and geologists to Darwin's work, and who hailed it with joy and admiration. Freud's most ardent supporters appear to be some medical men and some educationalists, to whom Freud's teaching seems to be an easy and short cut to psychology, which requires neither much study nor thought.

There are, however, some other doctrines to which Freud's appears to me to be comparable. There was, for instance, the DOCTRINE OF SIGNATURES, taught by the Paracelsians, according to which every natural body, but especially plants, had attached to them a "sign" in their shape, colour, and other peculiarities, by which they indicated for which illness they were intended by nature. Thus the Jew's ear was recommended for ear troubles, the gromwell, the stone brake, and other plants with calcareous exudations for bladder stone, the thistle for pains in the side, the greater celandine was remedy against jaundice, and the bloodstone against hæmorrhage, and so on. We have also the doctrine of SYMPATHETIC CURES, which were alleged to be effected by an unknown force, or sympathy, existing between man and animals and other beings, plants, stars, ghosts, and so on. The Sympathetic Powder, *Pulvis Sympathicus,* is believed to have been introduced in France by Turquet de Mayerne, first surgeon to James I and Charles I, but Kenelm Digby and his disciple, Nicolas Papin, brought it really into fashion. In 1650 the latter published his *De Pulvere Sympathico,* and Madame de Sevigne wrote to her daughter in a letter dated January 28, 1685: "Your sympathic powder is a divine remedy." This powder possessed the marvellous property, when put on some blood or pus on a piece of cloth, of curing the wound from which the blood or pus was taken, although the patients might be miles away. The *Pulvis Sympathicus* consisted, I believe, of

effloresced copper sulphate that had been exposed to the sun.[1]

MESMER'S ASTRAL FORCE and ANIMAL MAGNETISM may also be mentioned. When Mesmer was in Vienna he was principally concerned with astrology, teaching that an Astral Force was influencing all living beings. On a tour in 1776 he fell in with a mystical monk called Gassner, who was engaged upon curing the Bishop of Ratisbon of blindness by exorcism. Mesmer noticed that Gassner produced certain effects upon the human body by passes like the effects which Mesmer himself had previously been able to produce with the aid of magnets. He at once profited by this, and henceforth operated without magnets. There is no doubt that he cured many patients. In 1777 Mesmer was obliged to leave Vienna, and he betook himself to Paris, where he obtained large sums of money. His patients were received with an air of mystery and studied effect. The apartment, hung with mirrors, was dimly lighted. A profound silence was observed, broken only by strains of music, which occasionally floated through the rooms. The patients were seated round a sort of vat, and among them slowly and mysteriously moved Mesmer himself, affecting one by a touch, another by a look, a third by passes with his hand, a fourth by pointing with a rod. What followed is easily conceivable: one person became hysterical, then another; one was seized with catalepsy, others with convulsions, some with palpitations of the heart, perspirations, and other bodily disturbances. These effects, however various and different, went all by the name of "*salutary crises*." The method was supposed to provoke in the sick person exactly the kind of action propitious to his recovery.[2]

Coming to more modern times we meet with Karl

[1] Cf. Alfred Franklin: *La vie privée d'autrefois: Les Médicaments*, Paris, 1891.

[2] From Herbert Mayo, M.D.: *On the Truth contained in Popular Superstitions, with an Account of Mesmerism*, 2nd ed., London, 1851.

Freiherr von REICHENBACH'S OD, or Odylic Force, as it has been translated. Od was an inponderable, a previously undetected force, a "dynamide," which permeated the whole universe. It could be observed by the "susceptibles" as issuing from the poles of magnets, from crystals, organic beings, chemical processes, etc., as a kind of flickering light, or a halo; it could also be perceived by these people through their general sensibility, it irritated or calmed them, according to its polarity, for of this it was possessed; it was agreeably cool, or disagreeably warm, etc. As Reichenbach was a scientist of distinction in other branches, for he discovered kreosote and paraffin, and contributed to our knowledge of meteorites and geology, his doctrine demanded attention, and was the subject of discussions from its inception in 1850 to the death of its inventor in 1869 in Leipzig, where he had gone for the purpose of winning Fechner. Fechner's experiments, however, turned out negative, and his reminiscences[1] are still very interesting reading along with psycho-analytic literature.

Mention must also be made of GUSTAV JÄGER'S "DISCOVERY OF THE SOUL." In 1878 he published a paper thus entitled,[2] which was a result of his anthropological studies. Alongside some very good ideas the main thesis of this work is phantastical. The odour stuffs (*Dunststoffe*) of the exhalations of man and animals are the originators of the affects, impulses, and instincts. His cardinal law he expresses thus: "The odour stuffs function as the soul, and are contained in the albumen-molecule, and the psychical phenomena go hand in hand with the albumen-decomposition."[3] The preface of the second edition is interesting, since it reminds one of Freud: "Should I

[1] Gustav Theodor Fechner: *Erinnerungen an die letzten Tage der Odlehre und ihres Urhebers*, Leipzig, 1876.

[2] Gustav Jäger: *Die Entdeckung der Seele*, Kosmos, Bd. iv, 1878, p. 171; 3te Aufl., 1883–4, 2 Bde.

[3] Loc. cit., 2te Aufl., Leipzig, 1880, p. 65.

now speak to my detractors? I will not do it, having the firm conviction that with this book my doctrine appears before the public as a *rocher de bronze*, that requires certainly further elaboration and arrangement, but against which every one who would try to upset it would merely break his head. . . . If they continue to disseminate confusion and hate, instead of working in an enlightening and furthering manner in the direction opened up by me, and which serves such sublime practical and scientific interest, then I can only say: 'Lord, forgive them, for they know not what they do.'"

Even the present century can furnish a rival to the psycho-analytic doctrine. I refer to "BLONDLOT'S N-RAYS." At the beginning of the year 1903 a distinguished correspondent of the "Académie des Sciences," M. Blondlot, Professor of physics at the University of Nancy, believed to have discovered that a great number of bodies emitted a peculiar kind of rays that were susceptible to refraction, demonstrable by their action on the phosphorescence of the calcium sulphide screen, and whose wave-length could be measured. He called them, after his university city Nancy, N-rays. M. Blondlot enjoyed a very great reputation in physics, and his assertions were accepted without contradiction by the majority of French scientists, who repeated his experiments, and found exactly what they were told they would find.

There were supposed to be two sorts of these rays, the N- and the N_1-rays, which had opposite properties, so that if the result of an experiment did not turn out exactly as was expected, it was explained by the interference of the other kind of rays.

On January 4, 1904, M. Carl Huber presented to the "Académie des Sciences" a revindication of the priority of the discovery by M. Augustin Charpentier, and on April 11th, on the report of M. d'Arsonval, the Académie

solemnly declared that the priority of these "facts" belonged to M. Charpentier. By this announcement of Professor Charpentier the scientific world was probably still more startled than by that of Professor Blondlot, for Charpentier had found that the N-rays were in reality an emanation of the human body, now satisfactorily demonstrated. It was, indeed, a verification of all the "facts" of exteriorization, of telepathy, etc. Charpentier's results were indeed too wonderful. From the very beginning he noticed, for instance, whilst the subject was speaking, an increase of the luminosity of the sulphide screen at a point corresponding to the base of the ascending frontal gyrus, Broca's speech-centre, which for the period (January 1904) was not surprising, for Charpentier could not then have known the work of Pierre Marie, published since. In following the motor tracts in the spinal cord, whilst the subject was moving his arm, he could trace their crossing. It was, however, a great pity that Charpentier had apparently forgotten his anatomy of the nervous system, for he localized the decussation too low. It was a still greater pity that no new localization was discovered. Broca's centre could easily be found, for it was known, but no new one. And such a splendid method withal! It is as regrettable as it is surprising!

For two years the *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Sciences* contained innumerable communications by different professional physicists about the properties of these rays, which became daily more and more marvellous. M. Jean Becquerel announced even that he had been successful in chloroforming them. The most distinguished scientists, especially Professor d'Arsonval, delivered most enthusiastic lectures about them. The "Académie des Sciences," after an investigation by an expert committee of its members, awarded Professor Blondlot the Lecomte prize of 50,000 francs.

During this time foreign physicists and some French

ones, upon whom the prestige of the Nancy school had had no effect, were repeating the experiments, but without success, and several went to Nancy to study there the N-rays, but to no purpose. Thus, for instance, Professor R. W. Wood, of Baltimore University, failed to see the variations in luminosity which Blondlot and his assistant announced to him. Using the method of control, Wood found that Blondlot was unable to determine the presence of N-rays unless he was previously informed. But graver still, he noticed that a bundle of N-rays that was deviated by a prism could not be found again when, unknown to the observer, the angle of the prism was altered, and still graver, Blondlot continued measuring their wave-length, although the prism had surreptitiously been removed altogether.

The *Revue Scientifique* then opened an inquiry which ended disastrously for the N-rays, and the communications respecting them, which before had filled the *Comptes rendus*, stopped suddenly and completely. The N-rays had an existence only in the imagination of their inventors.[1]

The "CLEVER HORSES OF ELBERFELD" might also be mentioned, and last, not least, "FREUD'S PSYCHO-ANALYSIS." It will not be long before somebody will be able to write its epitaph. "The last days of Psycho-analysis," as Fechner wrote that of the "Od-force"; Freud's "Psychische Kraft,"[2] or "eine unbekannte psychische Macht,"[3] are too reminiscent of this; so also is the "Salutary Crisis" of Mesmer.

FREUD AND DARWIN.

Darwin discovered "The Descent of Man," and Freud discovered that there wasn't a Decent Man.

[1] A full account is to be found in *L'Année Psychologique*, 13me Année, Paris, 1907, pp. 143–169; H. Piéron: "Grandeur et décadence des rayons N." A short note in the *Revue Scientifique*, March 26, 1910, 48me Année, p. 394, by Gustave Le Bon: "La renaissance de la magie."

[2] *Studien über Hysterie*, p. 234.

[3] *Psychopathologie d. Alltagslebens*, p. 24.

Darwin was for twenty years dreaming of the "Origin of Species," but Freud presented us in a shorter time with a specious origin of dreaming.

"Psycho-analysts are moral *Voyeurs*. (Ernest Jones defines a *Voyeur* as "a pervert who obtains sexual gratification from the mere act of looking; the counterpart of exhibitionism. Visual sexual curiosity").

"*Verdichtung*" (condensation, compression) is one of the functions of Freud's "Unconscious." It seems to me, however, that the whole of Freud's Psycho-analysis is a "*Ver-dichtung*" (miscarried phantasy).

Kopernicus: De revolutionibus orbium coelestium.
Koprologos: De conjectionibus.—Somnium coeleste!

X

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Il ne suffit à un sage d'étudier la nature et la vérité ; il doit oser la dire en faveur du petit nombre de ceux qui veulent et peuvert penser.—De La Mettrie.

Having finished my task, I will now survey succinctly the path traversed in the preceding pages.

In the first chapter I stated the most elementary facts of psychological teaching that I considered to be essential to enable the non-psychological reader to follow me in my criticisms. I pointed out that psychology was literally the "Science of the Soul," and that by the term "Soul" the psychologist meant nothing but the sum-total of the psychic phenomena. It was necessary to describe in mere outline the method by which the psychologist proceeds to perform his psychic analysis, viz. the method of self-observation or introspection. In passing I referred to the view that all introspection was retrospection, and contended that the opposite was really the fact, viz. that cases of so-called retrospection were but cases of introspection of revived mental processes. Next I gave an elementary exposition of the views of the "psychophysical relations," and confessed to a personal preference for the energetic conception as the best working hypothesis. A short exposition of the tripartite classification of mental phenomena followed, and an explanation of what was meant by the "Stream of Consciousness." "Sensation" and "Meaning" were next discussed, and the view defended that "Nervous dispositions" were a concern for the psychologist. This

brought me to "Memory." The difference between sense-experience and memory-image was examined and the terms "Ekphory" and "Engram" and "akoluthic phase" explained. In this connection I referred to the phenomenon of "Association," and pointed out that there really was but one single "Law of Association," namely that of simultaneity of occurrence of the neural processes that correspond to the given psychical processes. This brought me to the view first put forward by Ewald Hering that "Memory was a general function of organised matter," and to my distinction of biological, physiological, and psychological Memories and their different characteristics. Much space I devoted to the discussion of the influence of the two feeling-tones, pleasure and unpleasure, upon memory, because psycho-analysts appeared not to be very familiar with the psychological work done in this field, and because the inference drawn from that part of the work known to them was mistaken. I gave a summary of some recent work of my own which confirmed the reliable work of previous investigators. This led me to mention some unpublished work of J. C. Flügel respecting a "quantitative study of feeling and emotion in everyday life," which showed that with normal individuals the pleasant experiences far outweighed the unpleasant ones. In dealing with the Freudian "Unconscious" I endeavoured to show its absurdity, pointing out that it was a contradiction in terms.

With the second chapter I began to give a short account of Freud's doctrine of psycho-analysis, pointing out from the very beginning that, from the point of view of the psychologist, the term was a misnomer. The origin from Breuer's "Cathartic Method" was traced, and the lip-service Freud renders to the neutral basis of his devices was noted. A quotation from a psycho-analytic writer of the Zürich school read like unadulterated mysticism, and I was pleased to give Breuer's soundly scientific warning

against the abuse of metaphorical terms, for he evidently recognised the trend of his colleague's mind. Unhappily, no one heeded this warning less than Freud and his followers and imitators; for had they done so there would be no "Psycho-analytic School" to-day.

I made the criticism of Freud's *Traumdeutung*, etc., the main theme of my third chapter. I pointed to the strangeness of the procedure of Freud's followers in requiring their critics to disprove the correctness of the *Traumdeutung*. Anyhow, the fact that they do do so shows, in my estimation, that they are, if only dimly, aware that they have not been able to prove their doctrine. Numerous examples are to be found in my exposition of Freud's way of "reasoning." He makes an assertion, defends it on the ground of its plausibility, and then on the next page he refers to the assertion as a "fact," or, "as I have shown or demonstrated, etc." For instance, he asserts that the dream is a wish-fulfilment. The objection that there are dreams which apparently are not so, he meets with another assertion that such dreams are distorted, that the manifest dream-content is something wholly different from the latent dream-content. This for him constitutes a proof, and he refers to it henceforth as "the fact of dream-distortion." Most of Freud's "proofs" consist of this argument in a circle. Another way he adopts is to answer imaginary critics of his assertions. Thus, e.g., objections to his method of arriving at the latent dream-content he refutes, apparently to his own satisfaction. But if these answers are dissected and examined, as I have done, they are invariably found to be meaningless, or to be false, or to be valueless. Thus, his defence of his dream-analysis I showed to contain five points,[1] every one of which was invalid.

The paradoxical statement that "the dream is the protector of sleep and not its interrupter" is amusing in so far as it shows the utter absurdity of the *Traumdeutung*.

[1] *Supra*, p. 59.

A third kind of "proof" Freud adopts is by way of a simile, or reasoning by analogy. But this is invariably faulty; he generally assumes in the simile as present the very thing he ought to prove,[1] and if, as I have done, the simile is modified so as to contain not any more factors than are present in the argument he wishes to illustrate by the analogy, then Freud is beaten with his own weapon.

All this Distortion, Condensation, Displacement, and what not, are merely devices to give Freud greater latitude for his interpretation. The same remark refers to the statement that the affect may be inverted from the latent to manifest content,[2] this is, as I said, a case of "heads I win, tails you lose." "Secondary Elaboration" is still another nostrum to the same end, as is also the importance attached to the dream being retold in different words by the dreamer.

In discussing Freud's "Regression,"[3] his schema of ψ-systems I showed to be a *rudis indigestaque moles* of psychological notions, or better, terms. I have pondered over this schema, but absolutely failed to get any sense out of it.[4]

I next discussed Freud's "Endopsychic Censor,"[5] that mystical, metapsychical entity, the *Deus ex machina* that always saves the situation when Freud is in difficulties. Ernest Jones wishes the "Endopsychic Censor" to be regarded merely as the "Sum total of repressing inhibitions," but, as I have shown several times, this is quite inadmissible.

I have bestowed, I said above, a great deal of time and trouble upon "regression," but not because it is any way important. I picked out this part of Freudian "Psychology" quite at random to show in what a superficial and cavalier manner the whole subject is treated and what a *terra incognita* the field of scientific psychology is to Freud.

"Wish-fulfilment" was shortly criticized, as was also "Repression," "Compression," etc.

[1] E.g. p. 65 or p. 214. [2] P. 68. [3] Pp. 73 *seq.* [4] Pp. 80 *seq.* [5] P. 84.

To Freud's dictum, "Dream interpretation is the *Via regia* to the knowledge of the 'Unconscious,'" I suggested adding "of the psycho-analyst." [1]

But a few remarks were necessary respecting the culminating absurdities of Freud in the paragraph on "The 'Unconscious' and 'Conscious' Reality," they speak eloquently for themselves. They are good enough for museum-specimens.

Stekel, Jung, and Sadger, came in for a few remarks, and to Pfister's taunt that the critics of psycho-analysis dare not tell their dreams I retorted by the advice: never hesitate to tell your dreams, if you are asked to do so, unless they are manifestly indecent; their interpretation will give you a sure indication of the type of mind of the interpreter.

I concluded the chapter by analysing a dream of mine which I had never dreamt.[2]

Symbolism, which plays such a paramount part in dream-interpretation, since the manifest dream-content is said to consist of symbols expressing the latent dream-thoughts, I considered sufficiently important to treat in a separate chapter, viz. Chapter IV. It was evident from the quotations given from various psycho-analytic writers that they all agree one with another in their inconsistency respecting the subject, all affirming one time or other the constancy of symbolic meaning, and on other occasions denying it. As, however, opinion was fairly unanimous respecting the symbolic meaning of the serpent in dreams, I chose this symbol as a fit subject for a more minute inquiry. I showed how first of all the serpent became a symbol of longevity and then of immortality. From these developed the symbolic meaning of divinity, health, health-giving or healing art, and wisdom in turn.

In referring to serpent-worship, I suggested distinguishing in anthropology between Homologues and Analogues, which

[1] P. 91. [2] P. 95.

would be conducive to a better understanding in the science of religions.

I also went in detail into the fact so uniformly cited by psycho-analytic writers of the presence of the serpent and the phallus in the *cistæ mysticæ* of the Greek mysteries, cited by them as evidence of the phallic significance of the serpent. I gave also many instances of serpent-worship as *genii loci*, etc., where, in my opinion, any phallic explanation appeared to be quite out of place, and gave examples of representations of manifest erotic scenes where other phallic and kindred symbols were given; but the serpent was remarkable by its absence.

The succeeding pages were devoted to a discussion of phallic symbolism. I pointed out that a great amount of confusion was due to the fact that many writers did not distinguish sufficiently a *Phallus symbol* from a *phallic symbol.* I also suggested the term " Secondary Symbolism " for those cases where a symbol was standing for something that was already a symbol itself, e.g. obelisks represented the sun's rays and were symbolic of the sun, which was already a symbol of fertility, and obelisks became thus symbols of fertility. It is doubtless due to this fact that obelisks have been often regarded as phallic symbols because the phallus symbol was also that of fertility. The subject of phallicism I concluded with a warning by Otto Stoll, who gives several instances where uncritical and monomaniac investigators would have arrived at the conclusion that they were dealing with examples of phallus worship.

In fine, I referred to the extravagance of psycho-analysts and mysticists in symbolic interpretations, and gave an example by Silberer, which I supplemented by two more interpretations of my own, indicating that such interpretations could be multiplied *ad lib.*

A short chapter, V, dealt next with the Œdipus-Complex. I pointed out that the name was not appropriately chosen, and that there were other and more suitable instances in

mythology and history which might have served to christen the offspring of Freud's imagination.

In dealing with the evidence for the existence of this alleged complex, I pointed out that I had already shown the evidence adduced for dream-interpretation to be valueless. I dealt next with a concrete case where mother and wife appeared to be mixed up in a dream, i.e. where the dream needed but little interpretation, and I showed convincingly, I believe, that even such dreams were easily explicable, and furnished no proof whatever of the Œdipus-Complex. Lastly, I disposed of what might be called the zoological evidence, that is, that supposed to be derived from ancestral usage, and also mentioned that I would show in Chapter VII that any other psycho-analytic evidence was just as futile as that derived from dream-interpretation.

The next chapter, VI, was devoted to the assertion of Freud's, that all men, normal men not excepted, had homosexual tendencies. I pointed out that there was in the paper by Freud from which I took this dictum not a shred of proof. In fact, Freud states distinctly that he "supplemented" the patient's pollutions "by homosexual phantasies that remained unconscious"! Unconscious ideas are, as I have explained repeatedly, to say the least, simply nonsense. Undismayed, however, I decided, with a perfectly open and unbiassed mind, to ascertain the truth and to experiment upon myself and introspect. I described the experiment which turned out negatively.

Chapter VII dealt with the "Psycho-analytic Method" in general and with the phenomenon of "suggestion." I pointed out that psycho-analysts when faced with the fact of the total absence of any proof of their theory generally resorted to two devices, that of attacking their critic, and that of referring to the "splendid" results of psycho-analysis. The former I showed not only to be a threadbare confidence trick, but also that it recoiled upon the psycho-analyst, who would stand revealed as a person with

far more formidable complexes than his critic or his patient. With reference to the second device, namely the claim to the "splendid cures" obtained by psycho-analysis, I endeavoured to show that the fact that hysterical cases could be cured by other means than psycho-analysis showed *ipso facto* that the theory was not correct. I contended that the procedures of the rival psycho-analytic schools and those of other successful psychotherapists had one factor in common, that was the effective one, and that this was simply "*Suggestion.*" I showed the lamentable confusion that exists in the minds of psycho-analysts with respect to this phenomenon, Suggestion, and exposed the wonted superficiality of Freud's in one of his similes. I gave quotations from various psycho-analytic sources, and juxtapose now two of these:

Ernest Jones.

. . . the physician contents himself with watching over the evolution of the analysis, instead of, as in other methods, endeavouring to play the part of guide and teacher. In place of leading the patient in a previously determined direction, the analyst accompanies him in his progress, the direction of which is entirely determined by the patient's own mental activity, and principally by the working of his unconscious self.

Sigmund Freud.

During the analysis (the patient) has indeed to be told many things which he himself does not know to say, ideas have to be suggested to him which have not as yet occurred to him, his attention has to be adjusted in those directions from which (the psycho-analyst) anticipated that which was to come . . . but in every analysis one has to proceed like this. A psycho-analysis is not an unbiassed scientific research, but just a therapeutic intervention. The physician gives in psycho-analysis every time to the patient the respective expectation-ideas by means of which he shall be enabled to recognize that which is unconscious and to seize it . . . without such help no one can get on.

Who speaketh true, the master or the disciple?

What really happens during a psycho-analysis I illustrated by my parable of the "Hyde-Park-Complex," but far more telling than anything is the specimen psycho-analysis of little Hans, of which I gave sufficient extracts to let the reader form his own judgments.

As a relief to this I gave then an extract from Mark Baldwin respecting a similar phobia in his own little daughter. What a healthy atmosphere after that in which poor little Hans was being brought up!

Pierre Janet's case of Marie was next outlined, and I referred again to Breuer's cathartic method. The similarity between Breuer's and Mesmer's "Salutary Crisis" was mentioned, as was also the apprehension expressed by several authorities respecting the danger of bringing back to consciousness old forgotten memories laden with emotion. I gave Binet and Simon's classification of the theories of hysteria, and quoted Roussy and Lhermitte's conclusions of their war-experiences. Kraepelin and Binswanger were likewise quoted. I gave next two interesting extracts from Diderot, and concluded by quoting several cases recorded by psycho-analysts, to which I added some "unrecorded" ones of my own.

In Chapter VIII I discussed "Other Manifestations of the 'Unconscious,'" such as Freud discovered in writing down numbers at random, which determined forgetting, mislaying, slips of the tongue and pen, etc. I gave Freud's examples of numbers, and then, discussing *lapsus linguæ et calami*, showed the total absence of any scientific proof, and pointed out the psycho-analyst's reasoning in a circle. I next examined Ernest Jones's considerations which induced him to pronounce the psycho-analytic interpretations to be correct, and found every one of them futile. With reference to "forgetting," I had to controvert the psycho-analytic dictum that unpleasant experiences were more easily forgotten than pleasant ones, as Experimental Psychology has shown without any doubt that there is no difference whatever

between the forgetting of pleasant experiences and the forgetting of unpleasant ones. I showed by actual analysis that one can "prove" whatever is wanted. I then exposed once more the utter superficiality of Freud's analogical "reasoning."

Turning back to numbers, I took the very same numbers which Freud had taken, and the analysis of which I had reported, analysed them as if the numbers had been put down by myself. This is to say, I performed the *experimentum crucis* which Freud had failed to make, with the result that Freud's inference from his "experiments" becomes absolutely untenable and his theory totally collapses.

Having discussed all the essential points of the "psycho-analytic doctrine" and many other ones, frequently mentioned, I had left a few notes and aphorisms for which I had not found a convenient place. As some of these appeared to me of importance, others of interest, or amusing, I thought it expedient to include them in a chapter styled "Odds and Ends."

In one of these notes I tried to account for the fact that Freud's "Psychology" appeared to appeal to a certain class of people. It seemed to me that this was due to the marked pictorial character of his phantasies. As these could be almost visualized, the absence of any proof was not noticed, or the assertions of psycho-analysts that all this was proved by their analyses unquestioningly accepted in lieu of proof.[1]

In another note I referred to Freud's claim—which I refrain here from qualifying by any adjectives, trusting that the reader's vocabulary is vaster than mine—I referred, I said, to Freud's claim of ranking his invention with Copernicus' and Darwin's discoveries. Freud argued that since there was opposition to his theory, as there had been opposition to Copernicus' and Darwin's, that his theory was

[1] P. 219.

as important and as true as the theories of the great astronomer and that of the great biologist. He neglected, however, this trifling difference, that whereas the opposition to Copernicus and Darwin came from the Church, and not, to any extent, from astronomers and biologists, the objection to his own theory came essentially from psychologists. There were, however, in the history of science other "discoveries" that could be suitably compared in importance to Freud's, and I gave short outlines of the Doctrine of Signatures, the Doctrine of Sympathetic Cures, Mesmer's Doctrine of Astral Force and Animal Magnetism, Reichenbach's Doctrine of Od, Gustav Jäger's Discovery of the Soul, Blondlot's N-rays, and the Clever Horses of Elberfeld.

This, then, is the course my criticism in the foregoing pages has traversed. It behoves me now to summarize it in a few concluding remarks. In competent scientific circles "Psycho-analysis" has fallen absolutely flat. Experimental psychologists have been trained to walk warily; they know that in their science the pitfalls are far more numerous than in any other of the natural sciences; every experiment has to be carefully scrutinized and the conditions closely watched. The greatest and most insidious enemy is "suggestion," and to eliminate this is never easy. When therefore such a doctrine as "Psycho-analysis" is put forward it cannot even deceive a tyro. "Suggestion" is to the psychologist what bacteria are to the surgeon. The psychologist aims, as it were, at an aseptic treatment, whilst the psycho-analyst indulges in deliberate infection. After having waded through the psycho-analysis of little Hans, which is reeking and teeming with suggestion, to read Freud's remarks upon it and upon its critics simply takes one's breath away. Here they are again: "I know that not even by this analysis shall I be able to convince anybody who does not want to be convinced, and I con-

tinue the working out of this case for those readers who have already convinced themselves of the objectivity of the unconscious pathogenic material, not without emphasizing the pleasant knowledge that the number of these latter is constantly increasing." A truly Cagliostrian gesture!

There is apparently not a psycho-analyst who really understands what is meant by suggestion. The least of their confusion is to mistake for it the means employed in producing it.

Nowhere in the whole of Freud's writing is there a shred of a proof, only assertions, assertions of having proved something before, but which was never done, and mysterious reference to inaccessible and unpublished results of psycho-analyses. Almost complete ignorance is manifested everywhere of the literature and the results of modern psychology, of experimental method and of logic.

This, then, is the conclusion to which I have come. I did not approach the subject years ago as an unsympathetic critic who had his own axe to grind. On the contrary, I took to it rather favourably, especially after the difference of the latent dream-thoughts and the manifest dream-content appeared clear to me. Only after my suspicions had been aroused by the *Gradiva* analyses did I begin to look critically at the subject and realize my awful mistake.

That I have not written this criticism before has its reason in this: For psychologists, in general, psycho-analysis was still-born, and has ever been as dead as a door-nail. Only when, owing to the propaganda of psycho-analysts in the press, the general public began to take an interest in the subject, but especially when I saw that some medical men and, worse still, educationists appeared to be taken in by the psycho-analytic confidence trick, did I decide to warn the unwary.

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Wohlgemuth, A

AUTHOR

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